Venice and the Crusades in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries by Amorosi, Ian
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Venice and the Crusades in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries 
 
Ian Christopher David Amorosi 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of MPhil 
 
Department of History, Royal Holloway, University of London 
  
2 
 
 
Declaration of Authorship 
 
The title page should be followed by a signed declaration that the work presented in the 
thesis is the candidate’s own. Please note that there is no set wording for this but an 
example is provided below: 
 
 
 
Declaration of Authorship 
 
 
I, Ian Amorosi, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my 
own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated. 
 
Signed: ______________________ 
 
Date: ________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
 Venetian involvement in the crusades and other anti-Ottoman military actions of the late 
Fourteenth to the mid-Fifteenth centuries has never received a comprehensive study. This thesis 
sets out to fill that gap by providing analysis of the Venice and the Venetians during this time and 
investigating why Venice joined the crusades discussed, namely: the Crusade of Nicopolis and the 
Crusade of Varna, and how they participated in the defence of two major Aegean cities, Thessaloniki 
and Constantinople. Throughout the course of the paper I investigate why Venice got involved, 
challenging the typical historiographical answer that the Venetians only sought personal gain. I 
attempt highlight the positive actions the Venetians made towards assisting in these campaigns 
while at the same time not trying to downplay the hindrances and problems that the often caused 
during these times. Furthermore, throughout the thesis I challenge the writings of several historians 
who would attempt to portray Venice as a minor concern in these campaigns. This work will show 
that Venice, while a small state territorially, was a major proponent of these crusades and sets out 
to begin a deeper discussion of the role the Venetians played and their motivations for engaging in 
these conflicts.     
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Introduction 
Venetian participation in and its policies toward crusading in the Later Middle Ages have received 
very little attention from modern historians. This lack of interest may derive from the fact that the 
early crusades (late eleventh to late thirteenth centuries) have absorbed most of the scholarly 
attention. Additionally, there appears to be an anti-Venetian bias stemming largely from the 
outcome of the Fourth Crusade tainting their image. Venice, therefore, has not been the subject of a 
comprehensive study after 1300. Brief mentions are found, however, indicating their presence and 
involvement and yet their motives and policies as to why they participated in some and not in others 
has not been fully explored. 
Turning to the first point, numerous studies have focused on how Venice participated in 
crusading throughout the early period typically ending around 1291 and the loss of Acre, the last 
crusader stronghold in the East. Much of this investigation is based around the Fourth Crusade as 
Venice played a major role in the outcome of it. Presented here is just a sample of the range of 
discussions of Venice’s engagement in the early crusades. An investigation of the index of most 
histories of pre-1300 crusades will reveal references to the Venetians that will lead to at least minor 
mentions of the commune. This can be epitomised in a collection of Italian essays published in 1965, 
featuring historians such as Steven Runciman (1903-2000) and Dionysios Zakythinos (1905-1993), 
which covers studies of Venice in the crusades from the First Crusade through the 1204 campaign.1 
There are, however, a number of important studies that focus on the early period of crusading and 
do, to varying extents, discuss the Venetians. The work of Jonathan Riley-Smith (1938-2016), for 
instance, covers the full breadth of crusading until the 1700s where he believes crusading ended; 
however, Venice only sees limited mention throughout it and most of it tied to their efforts in the 
early years of the overall crusading effort as a naval power in support of the Crusader states and the 
                                                          
1 Venezia dalla prima crociata alla conquista di Costantinopoli del 1204 (Florence: Sansoni, 1965) 
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Kingdom of Jerusalem.2 David Jacoby presented an article focused on the Venetians in Acre 
throughout the history of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and how their involvement within the kingdom 
influenced the city and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.3 Most of his study focuses on the Genoese-
Venetian War of St. Sabas and its effect on Acre and Tyre and not on the crusades themselves. 
However, Venice achieved their position in these cities through their actions within the early 
crusades, primarily in 1100 with their aid in capturing Haifa and in 1123 in Tyre.4 Hans Mayer and 
Louise Robbert fall into this same dilemma as well. Mayer does not provide much detail on Venetian 
crusading at all and ends in 1291 with the fall of the Crusader states.5 Robbert, unlike many of the 
others, does focus heavily on the Venetians in her essay in Kenneth Setton’s edited work.6 Robbert’s 
work provides an excellent background on why Venice joined the early crusades and what the 
commune was able to obtain throughout the early period of crusading. This information is very 
important for the study of later crusading as it gives context to what Venice may expect from a 
crusade and what may cause them to join or refrain from joining one. Robbert’s study is supported 
by Christopher Marshall’s article on the motivations of the city republics in the early crusading 
period.7 Through his investigation Marshall, argues that the Italian Republics are motivated not 
solely by the commercial privileges that they earned for their service but by a genuine religious 
fervour. Using contemporary narrative sources, Marshall shows that the Venetians, Genoese, and 
Pisans were motivated by religious figures such as priests, bishops, and in the case of the Genoese in 
                                                          
2 Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, Second Edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005) 
3 David Jacoby, ‘New Venetian Evidence on Crusader Acre’ in The Experience of Crusading vol. 2: Defining the 
Crusader Kingdom, Peter Edbury and Jonathan Phillips (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
pp. 240-56 
4 John Pryor, ‘The Venetian Fleet for the Fourth Crusade and the Diversion of the Crusade to Constantinople’ in  
The Experience of Crusading vol. 1: Western Approaches, Marcus Bull and Norman Housley (eds.) (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 2003)  
5 Hans Eberhard Mayer, The Crusades, Second Edition, John Gillingham (trans.) (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990) 
6 Louise Buenger Robbert, ‘Venice and the Crusades’ in Kenneth M. Setton (ed.), A History of the Crusades: Vol. 
V: The Impact of the Crusades on the Near East (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985)  pp. 379-
451 
7 Christopher Marshall, ‘The Crusading Motivations of the Italian City Republics in the Latin East, 1096-1104’ in 
The Experience of Crusading vol. 1: Western Approaches’, Marcus Bull and Norman Housley (eds.) (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) pp. 60-79  
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the First Crusade direct contact from the Papacy, to join in the crusade.8 Though they gained 
commercial privileges these were not seen as contradictory motivations in the contemporary 
sources, despite the fact that many historians now see this in a negative light. However, the limited 
time scope of these investigations keeps the overall usefulness of the articles limited to background 
material for this thesis on later crusading.   
No crusade before or after 1300 has received more attention directed at the Venetians than 
the Fourth Crusade.9 This crusade has coloured the opinion of historians against the Venetians more 
than any other with the blame for its diversion and attack on Constantinople being put almost solely 
on the Venetians. This anti-Venetian bias began at least as far back as the 1960s and 1970s but 
continues through much of the work being done today. This bias largely seems to stem from a belief 
that Venice and the Venetians are not what can be considered ‘true’ crusaders. Venice has been 
deemed by historians that follow this line of thought to not be joining crusades for the wholesome 
reasons of defence of Christendom or reclaiming lost lands of Christendom but instead for more 
selfish reasons of gaining power, authority, or trade gains in the targeted area. This of course is not 
all encompassing and has led to debates over the Fourth Crusade. In the introduction to his work on 
Venice’s self-perception as a possible hindrance to the Crusades, Şerban Marin states that much of 
the study of Venice as a disruption to crusading focuses on the Fourth Crusade. Marin states that 
this view of Venice as ‘an element that diverted – and thus deserted – from the original crusading 
ideal’ has become seen as a ‘consecrated tendency’ of the Venetians.10 Marin, however, ignores this 
sentiment and instead attempts to focus on how the Venetians themselves viewed their 
                                                          
8 Marshall, ‘The Crusading Motivations’, p. 67 
9 For more on the Fourth Crusade and the debates over the placement of the blame on various parties see: 
Jonathan Harris, ‘The Debate on the Fourth Crusade’ in History Compass 2 (1) (2004), Donald E Queller, The 
Fourth Crusade: the Conquest of Constantinople, 1201-1204 2nd edition (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1997), Luigi Andrea Berto, ‘Memory and Propaganda in Venice after the Fourth Crusade’ in 
Mediterranean Studies vol. 24(2) (2016) pp. 111-138, Alfred Andrea, Contemporary Sources for the Fourth 
Crusade (Boston: Brill 2000), Michael Angold, The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context (Harlow: Longman, 2002), 
Jonathan Phillips, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople (London: Jonathan Cape, 2004) 
10 Şerban Marin, ‘Venice- Obstacle for the Crusades? The Venetian Chronicles’ Point of View’, Revista Istorica, 
vol. 23 (2012) p. 251 
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involvement in the crusades. Before continuing his study which unfortunately focuses only on the 
crusades pre-1300 Marin does state that the Venetian sources that discuss the Fourth Crusade do 
not actively see themselves as a hindrance to the crusade at all and instead see it as a glorious 
victory for the commune.11 Donald Queller (1925-1995) and Thomas Madden have devoted much of 
their academic lives to defending the Venetians.12 Amongst their collective works they lay out a fair 
understanding of the critics’ arguments against the Venetians. Madden divides them into two 
parties: treason theorists, who blame specific parties for the diversion of the Fourth Crusade, 
typically the Venetians, and the accident theorists, who typically consider the blame to be on poor 
planning and who are less likely to blame solely the Venetians, though some still do.13 Queller goes 
through tremendous effort throughout his works to lay out the beliefs and perceptions of the anti-
Venetian historians including: that religious crusading enthusiasm was foreign to the Venetian 
psyche, that the Venetians purposefully compelled the crusading host to comply with its treacherous 
plans during the Fourth Crusade, that Egypt was not a priority target for the Venetians, and that 
setbacks within the trade deals with the Byzantines made Constantinople demand her attention over 
the crusade.14 John Pryor provides an interesting  riposte to the belief that the Venetians planned 
the entire diversion ahead of time, though he does admit that convincing many anti-Venetian 
historians is impossible.15 Pryor’s argument focuses around an understanding of the fleet 
composition that is provided in the documents of the Fourth Crusade and an understanding of what 
those ships are designed to do. The argument focuses around two points, first that the transport 
ships called uissiers and the Venetian fleet of fifty galleys that accompanied the crusaders were 
                                                          
11 Marin, ‘Venice- Obstacle for the Crusades?’, p. 251 
12 A sampling but not the entirety of the bibliography of the Madden and Queller defence of the Venetians 
includes: Thomas Madden, ‘Food and the Fourth Crusade: A New Approach to the “Diversion Question”’, in 
Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, John Pryor (ed.) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p. 209-228, Donald 
Queller and Thomas Madden, The Fourth Crusade 2nd Edition, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1997), Thomas Madden, Enrico Dandolo and The Fourth Crusade, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2003), 
Donald Queller and G.W. Day, ‘Some Arguments in Defence of the Venetians in the Fourth Crusade’ in 
American Historical Review 81 (1976) pp. 717-37, Donald Queller and Thomas Madden, ‘Some Further 
Arguments in Defence of the Venetians in the Fourth Crusade’ in Byzantion 62 (1992) pp. 433-73 
13 Madden, ‘Food and the Fourth Crusade’, p. 209 
14 Queller and Day, ‘Some Arguments for the Venetians’, p. 718 
15 Pryor, ‘The Venetian Fleet’, p. 103 
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better suited for an assault on the Egyptian coastline as was originally planned and not against the 
city of Constantinople. Uissiers, according to Pryor, are boxy wooden ships designed with a stern 
door way that would allow for knights to beach the ship and charge out on their horses while already 
mounted which is beneficial when assaulting a hostile beach when port services are unavailable.16 
These ships are inefficient transport vessels compared to other designs, however, and would likely 
have only been used if there was the likelihood of a hostile beach invasion or a location where port 
facilities would not allow for the loading and unloading of horses. The second point that Pryor 
argues is that the Venetians provided a combat fleet of their own accord and that would have been 
entirely unnecessary to confront the Byzantine fleet, which he argues had suffered from years of 
neglect leaving them with little naval power, while the Egyptian fleet and coastline would have 
necessitated a fleet of galleys.17 Pryor does admit that the Venetian fleet of fifty galleys is overly 
excessive for either target but that it would have been entirely unnecessary for them to bring that 
fleet against the Byzantines. While much of the argument over the Venetian’s crusading practice is 
focused on the Fourth Crusade, it is this argument and the bias that has arisen from the anti-
Venetian histories that carries on throughout a fair amount of modern study on the Venetians within 
the crusades. Norman Housley even considers the Venetians to be greedy and exploitative. In his 
discussion of the Crusade of Smyrna in 1345 he believes that the Venetians overcharged and 
exploited the crusaders for the transportation of their troops.18 This is a similar claim to those that 
blame the Venetians for the diversion of the Fourth Crusade that the Venetians were too greedy and 
did not join the crusades for ‘true’ purposes. Aziz Atiya (1898-1988) considers the Venetians’ actions 
and dealings with the Ottomans in the lead up to the Crusade of Nicopolis ‘unscrupulous’ and 
explains that Venice was too willing and active in making peace and treating with the Ottomans.19 
There are numerous examples of this making it undoubtable that many historians of the crusades 
                                                          
16 Pryor, ‘The Venetian Fleet’, p. 117 
17 Pryor, ‘The Venetian Fleet’, p. 120-1  
18 Norman Housley, Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305-1378 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) p. 148  
19 A. S. Atiya, Crusade, Commerce, and Culture (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1962) p. 460 and A. 
S. Atiya, The Crusade of Nicopolis (London: Methuen, 1934) p. 111-2 
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have been influenced by these opinions and thereby created a stigma against the study of Venice as 
a crusading force. This is compounded by the lack of study of the primary material, the focus on 
earlier time periods, and an interest in the larger crusading forces in general.  
Returning to the issue of Venice’s interaction with the crusades after 1300, one positive 
development has been the enormous strides taken in the study of the later crusades over the past 
thirty years, especially by Norman Housley. However, despite the crusades of the Later Middle Ages 
receiving greater attention from more recent historians, much of the current research does not 
discuss Venice’s role in them. Study seems to drop off drastically after the beginning of the 
Fourteenth Century. This is even true of historians who study Venice itself and not just crusade 
historians. Dennis Romano’s book on Francesco Foscari who was doge of Venice (1423-1457) 
through both the Crusade of Varna and the fall of Constantinople, important events of the mid-
Fifteenth Century, barely discusses Venice’s involvement with the anti-Ottoman activities and 
crusades around these events at all.20 His only major mentions of the Crusade of Varna come when 
discussing the selection of Alvise Loredan, Foscari’s rival, as a commander on the expedition, and of 
the overall failure of the crusade being blamed on the Venetians which caused issues for the Doge. 
A perfect example of this neglect is the existing literature on the Crusade of Nicopolis. 
Venice provided a place of embassy prior to the crusade allowing for the various parties including 
the Papacy, Burgundy, France, and Byzantine courts to negotiate and plan for the crusade. Upon 
joining the crusade, they built a fleet that would support the land armies; this fleet supplied and 
transported armies as they travelled eastwards, and during the siege of Nicopolis itself, it served as 
part of a blockade of the city and after the disastrous battle outside the city, part of the fleet saved 
King Ladislas of Hungary and brought him safely back to Constantinople. Numerous historians have 
covered the Crusade of Nicopolis and yet Venice has received very little attention.21 It is known and 
                                                          
20 Denis Romano, The Likeness of Venice: A Life of Doge Francesco Foscari 1273-1457 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 2007) 
21 For studies on the Crusade of Nicopolis see: A. S. Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages (London: 
Methuen, 1938): Atiya, The Crusade of Nicopolis: Atiya, Crusade, Commerce, and Culture: Kenneth M. Setton, 
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accepted that the Venetians were present during the Crusade and even saved the King of Hungary. 
Kenneth Setton comments that later in the 1300s when the Venetians and the Hungarians were at 
odds the Venetian Senate called the king of Hungary, Sigismund (1387-1437), to witness their role in 
saving his life after the defeat at Nicopolis. Unfortunately, this is the only mention of the Crusade in 
Setton’s chapter on the Venetians and does little more than confirm their presence and actions on 
the crusade.22 Most of the rest of these historians provide much the same information about the 
Venetians. Mainly it confirms that they were present during the crusade. Such is the case of 
Norwich’s work that discusses very briefly the Crusade of Nicopolis but does not provide any analysis 
of Venice’s actions other than they were ‘scarcely heroic’ despite saving King Sigismund.23 Atiya, 
Donald Nicol (1923-2003), , and Wilhelm Heyd (1823-1906), however, do actually research to some 
extent the subject of Venice’s in the Crusade of Nicopolis each building off of the other. Heyd’s work 
is only available in the original German, and its French translation was heavily used by Atiya during 
his work while Donald Nicol uses much of Atiya to support his claims. However, none of these 
historians specifically discuss Venice in the crusade. Donald Nicol’s sole contribution concerning the 
Venetians in the crusade is to comment that their sole practical role in the crusade was the saving 
Sigismund’s life after the defeat and that some of the Venetian Senators lamented their involvement 
in the crusade entirely.24 This is an interesting bite of information but it is not expanded further why 
some senators believed this and what actions the Senate might have taken to prevent Venice from 
joining in further crusade actions. Atiya, of all the historians of the Crusade of Nicopolis, discusses 
Venice the most. Atiya tells us that the Venetians provided twenty-five ships to the crusade and 
                                                          
The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976-84), H. L. Savage, 
‘Enguerrand de Coucy VII and the campaign of Nicopolis’ in Speculum vol. 14 (1939) pp. 423-42, D. J. 
Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1354-1453’ in Kenneth Setton (ed.), A History of the Crusades 
(Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1955-89) Vol. 3, pp. 69-103, John Barker, Manuel Palaeologus 
(1391-1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 
Donald Nicol, Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), W. Heyd, Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age 2 vols., Furcy Raynaud 
(trans.) (Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1885-6) 
22 Setton, Papacy and the Levant, vol. 2, p. 7 
23 John Julius Norwich, A History of Venice, (London: Penguin Books, 2012), p. 261-2 
24 Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, p. 335 
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were initially unwilling to join at all as they wished to protect and maintain the trade agreements 
they held with the Ottomans and did not wish to provoke them.25 In his work focused on the 
Crusade of Nicopolis, Atiya does provide a little more information into Venice’s motivations and 
contributions to the crusade but again it is limited with most of the focus dedicated to the main 
armies of the crusade. Part of this limited study can be attributed to the lack of discussion of Venice 
in the primary material.26 Much of what is known comes to us through the Venetian’s own records in 
the ASV and the works of Freddy Thiriet (1921-1986) and Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940).27 The other 
primary sources such as Jean Froissart and Shams al-Din ibn al-Jazari do not discuss Venice at all 
during the crusade.28  Others, like the letter from Tommaso Moncenigo written to counter the claims 
of King Sigismund confirms, not only that the Venetians were involved in the crusade but also that 
they were instrumental in the rescue of Sigismund following the defeat of the crusader army outside 
of Nicopolis 25 September 1396.29 This letter is only recently being investigated despite how useful it 
is to provide evidence of this long standing claim that Venice participated that has long been 
unsupported. This is a common problem for the study of Venice in the Later Crusade, the Venetians 
themselves were great bureaucrats providing detailed information on the running of the state, the 
votes of the Senate, but they were not as well known for their production of chronicles or other 
literary works of their own deeds. However, the lack of exploration into primary material does not 
fully explain the dearth of analysis of Venetian crusading. This is not limited to the Crusade of 
Nicopolis but appears throughout the study of crusading in the Later Middle Ages.  
                                                          
25 Atiya, Crusade of Nicopolis, pp. 14. 34-8 and Atiya, Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, p. 437  
26 The primary material used by these historians: Sigismund, King of Hungary, ‘Letter from Byzantium, 
November 1396’, in Barker, Manuel Palaeologus, pp. 482-5; Jean Froissart, Chronicles, trans. J. Joliffe (Penguin: 
London, 1967),; Exhortation a la Croisade (1395?) in Atiya, Crusade of Nicopolis, p. 127 
27 Freddy Thiriet, Regestes des délibérations du senat de Venise concernant la Romanie, 3 vols. (Paris: Mouton 
& Co., 1958-1961) and Nicolae Iorga, Notes et extraits pour servir à l’histoire des croisades, (Paris: E. Leroux, 
1902) 
28 Ilker Evrim Binbaş, ‘A Damascene eyewitness to the battle of Nicopolis: Shams al-Din ibn al-Jazari 
(d.833/1429)’, in Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean, 1204-1453, ed. Nikolaos G. Chrissis 
and Mike Carr (Farnham and Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 153-75. 
29 Mark Whelan, Germany, Hungary and the Crusade during the Reign of Emperor Sigismund, c.1400-1440 
(Routledge: Abingdon, forthcoming- 2019) 
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Further examples of this inattention can be found in two major histories of Venice from its 
creation to its fall from prominence, the works of F. C. Lane (1900-1984) and John Julius Norwich 
(1929-2018). Neither of these historians however devote much time to Venice’s role in crusading 
despite their long timelines. Norwich’s history runs from 700 to nearly 1800; however, Venice in the 
crusades receives only minor mention. Such is the case when discussing the Crusade of Varna which 
receives merely a sentence of discussion with no mention at all of Venice’s involvement in the 
crusade.30 Norwich does not discuss to any great detail how Venice received crusades, what caused 
them to join or refuse to join certain actions, or analyse how Venetian policy influenced or was 
changed by these events. His sole analytical mark is that Venice was too weak to fight a crusade 
alone and could only sit by passively and watch the growth of the Ottoman threat.31 This is not 
necessarily true as they did what they could to resist the Ottomans where possible. But did become 
hesitant to join in crusades they did not believe could be successful; however, should a crusade 
show promise, they were more often than not willing to join any anti-Ottoman campaigns. Norwich’s 
history focuses almost entirely on the growth and expanse of Venice at home in Italy but ignores 
much of their work in the wider course of European and crusader history. F. C. Lane’s work is divided 
more into topical sections rather than chronologically; however, it devotes no more time to 
Venetian crusading throughout their long history than Norwich’s. In fact, Lane’s work only directly 
mentions the First through Third Crusades in reference to Venice in the crusades and the entirety of 
his discussion of Venice in the Later Middle Ages is only fifteen pages long and does not discuss 
crusading at all. In his work, the most we get is that the Venetians played a ‘prominent role’ in the 
failed defence of Constantinople in 1453.32 Likewise in the collected works of John Law, a book that 
includes sixteen of his essays on Venice, not one deals with the crusades despite the long period 
covered by these papers.33 Peter Lock’s work on Frankish peoples in the Aegean covers a section on 
                                                          
30 Norwich, History of Venice, p. 325 
31 Norwich, A History of Venice,  p. 262 
32 F. C. Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973) p. 325 
33 John E. Law, Venice and the Veneto in the Early Renaissance (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2000) 
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Venice and their occupation of lands in the Balkans, where many later crusades were focused.34 
Unfortunately, Lock does little more than summarize the Venetian actions and does not discuss their 
role in the crusades throughout the phases into which he divides Venetian involvement. It is unfair 
to criticise historians for focusing on the earlier period of crusading. This section is merely to show 
that there is study of Venice as a crusading state in the early period of the crusades which is 
understandable as there is a greater interest in the early period of crusading in general. However, 
this study will go to show that study of the Later Middle Ages are just as important.  
There are four historians who should be noted for providing varying degrees of information on 
Venice in the crusades of the Fifteenth and later centuries; Norman Housley, Kenneth Setton, 
Elizabeth Zachariadou, and Mike Carr. Each of these historians does work on Venice or at least the 
trade communes of Italy and their role in the crusades in the later medieval period and their works 
are of special importance to this study.  
Norman Housley’s work is extensive and covers every imaginable topic from throughout the long 
and storied period of the crusades from the First Crusade in the 1090s until the late Sixteenth 
Century. The most important works being: The Later Crusades: From Lyons to Alcazar 1274-1580 and 
The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades 1305-1378. Housley’s work on the Avignon papacy focuses 
just prior to the focus of this study and provides background information on Venice’s involvement in 
the crusades leading up to the 15th century. This includes the crusading projects of Philip VI of France 
and Charles de Valois as well as the defence of Smyrna and the various naval leagues that Venice 
participated in during the late 1300s. Housley begins examining the Venetians throughout the period 
covered in his work but it only scratches the surface. He goes so far as to discuss the motivations of 
Venice in the 1320s and 30s, that Venice had become increasingly targeted by the pirates and raids 
of the Emirates of Aydin and Menteshe and were interested in defence, had attempted to form a 
defence league in 1325, and then tried to secure help from France in 1331.35 Housley also states that 
                                                          
34 Peter Lock, Franks in the Aegean 1204- 1500 (London: Longman, 1995) 
35 Housley, Avignon Papacy, p. 25 
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Venice seemed, at this point in time, to believe it could best secure its position through negotiations 
rather than through force. Unfortunately, Housley does not further investigate or analyse Venice’s 
motivations here. Housley’s comprehensive study of crusades in the later middle ages provides an 
even less in-depth study of Venice, her motives, her policies, and her actions.36 The most engaging 
study of Venetian practice and policy found here is the development of the naval leagues from the 
mid-1320s-30s. He discusses in brief the events leading up to the creation of the first league in the 
late 1320s that saw the 5-year league of Byzantine, Venetian, and Hospitaller ships.37 Study of this is 
lacking here, however, and little more than a brief summary and description is provided by Housley. 
His lead up to the Crusade of Varna discusses almost nothing of Venice’s involvement nor how they 
reacted to the increasing Ottoman threat. During Housley’s discussion of the Crusade of Varna there 
is almost no mention of Venice at all, not even when discussing Eugenius IV, the Pope and himself 
born Venetian.38 We do get more about the Venetian involvement in the crusade itself when 
Housley points out that all but two of the ships in the fleet that joined the crusade were crewed by 
Venetians, and that therefore was representative of Venice’s desires, and whose actions were 
dictated by the Venetian commander, Alvise Loredan.39 This is not accurate as this thesis will later 
show that Cardinal Francesco Condulmer, papal legate of the crusading fleet, took steps to ensure 
that the papacy dictated the actions of the fleet, despite the fact that he himself was Venetian born 
and nephew of Pope Eugenius. Housley does go into the processes that Venice had to enforce to run 
their growing colonial empire after 1204; however, he does not discuss how these processes and 
offices created, such as the consiliarii and basilii, effected and played into the policies that Venice 
created in response of its crusading action.40 Overall, these works by Housley provide useful 
background information on a surface level when dealing with Venice and crusading in the 14th and 
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15th centuries. Aside from this however, Housley does not provide any deep discussion or 
examination into Venice, more often mentioning events in which they were present but without 
discussion or examination, as is common with many historians. Before moving on, one last Housley 
work should be discussed mostly for its clear statement of the role Venice was to play against the 
Ottoman expansion.41 Housley here lays out in detail the idea of the ‘antemurale’ or bulwark state. 
Simply put this idea was that certain states could serve the greater benefit of Christendom by 
forming a buffer against Muslim, or more specifically Ottoman, aggression.42 The two most 
important of these antemurale states were Hungary on land and Venice at sea. Though as Housley 
explains Venice’s status as an antemurale state was less impactful on Venice itself than it was on 
Hungary. He attributes this mostly to the smaller frontier that Venice shared with the Ottomans 
compared to that of Hungary, based around Negroponte, and later Modon, until those places were 
lost to the Ottomans in the latter half of the 15th century. Venice also had, as Housley states, a less 
friendly relationship with the papal curia than Hungary and received less praise and support for its 
actions as a bulwark state.43 This was further weakened by Venice’s penchant for making treaties 
with the Ottomans and other Turkish powers over time and their continued trade with them. 
Housley further expands on this explaining that rumours arose throughout the 1450s and into the 
1480s of Venice’s complicity with Ottomans. These rumours included Venetians serving in Turkish 
armies in the fight for Belgrade in 1456 and in the continued suppling of arms to the Turks 
throughout the century. Based on the discussions by Housley here, the only author to address this 
idea of antemurale states in these terms, it leaves a rather ambivalent view of Venice in this role. 
They seem to be one of the best candidates for the role as a bulwark Christian state due to their 
proximity to the Ottomans and their need to curb Ottoman aggression in order to maintain their 
overseas empire. However, as Housley shows through this chapter, Venice instead did not accept 
this role as bulwark wholeheartedly and instead continued to serve their own interests far more 
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than those of Christendom. With such a limited focus in this study it is difficult to come to a strong 
opinion over how far Venice truly adopted the antemurale rhetoric and these are exactly the ideas 
that this thesis sets out to explore further. Much of the rest of his work focuses on the period after 
the scope of this thesis and could benefit from the context and background this thesis will provide 
for further study of Venice and Ottoman conflict into the 16th century.    
 Amongst all of the historians discussed here, Kenneth Setton’s monograph provides perhaps the 
largest amount of information of the Venetians and their role in crusading despite its title.44 The 
second volume of this work which covers the period of 1402 to 1503, devotes an entire chapter to 
the actions of the Venetians against the Ottomans during this period.45 This chapter forms the 
background of this volume. Setton discusses the successes of Venice over the Ottomans in the early 
years of the Fifteenth Century such as the major victory of the Venetian fleet over the Ottoman one 
at Gallipoli in 1416.46 He also provides insight into their treaties with the Ottomans such as the treaty 
between Venice and the Ottomans in 1454 which offered protection and for the rights Venetian 
citizens, their ships, and their goods. The treaty substantially benefited Venice, but as Setton says 
‘not the needs of Christendom’.47 Outside of the introductory chapter Venice next appears in the 
context of the background of Pope Eugenius IV, who himself was a Venetian. Unfortunately, Setton 
does not provide any information into how closely Eugenius, born Gabriel Condulmer, kept his ties 
from his birth city during his reign as pope. Later, in his chapter on the Crusade of Varna, Setton 
does discuss the involvement of Venice in the crusade and the fleet they helped build and send to 
the Dardanelles, though Setton himself states ‘The extent of Venice’s involvement in the crusade of 
1444 has probably not been sufficiently appreciated, perhaps because the fleet achieved so little in 
the end.’48 Furthermore, Setton’s footnoting style provides a treasure trove of information for 
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further study including documents in the ASV and other primary sources both archival and literary. 
However, despite its usefulness, Setton’s main focus is on the Papacy and its continued interest in 
the Eastern world throughout the later middle ages. Although his analysis of Venice and crusading in 
this period is in greater depth than almost any other it is all to provide context and background to his 
discussions of various Popes, Cardinals, and the Curia. This is highlighted when Setton discusses 
Pope Pius II and his crusade when Setton states ‘In their cautious way the Venetians were 
reconsidering their Turkish policy.’49 Setton does not go on to explain what Venice’s policy was prior 
to this, nor exactly what was changing other than stating that the change was brought about by the 
provoking attacks by the Ottomans on Coron and Modon. This continues later in the same chapter 
when Setton discusses the arrival of Cardinal Bessarion in Venice to preach Pius’ crusade. Setton 
states that Venice needed to retaliate for the attacks and punishments they had received from the 
Turks; however, Bessarion arrived to an indecisive Venice.50 Venice was often indecisive when it 
came to crusading as they had to weigh the possible gains of a campaign versus the current status 
quo they enjoyed. Setton, unlike others that tend to fall short of the time period studied here, goes 
beyond into the 1470s and on up to the 1500s which falls beyond the bounds of this study. It is 
important to mention that he does continue to be a valuable source of information and discussion of 
Venice in the crusades; however, once the discussion of the Papacy enters into the book Venice 
loses its importance as Setton’s inspection leads him elsewhere.  
There are a couple scholars whose work looks in-depth at Venice’s actions within the Crusades 
during the 14th and 15th centuries; Elizabeth Zachariadou and Mike Carr. Zachariadou’s work is most 
closely related to this thesis in terms of topic. Her work focuses on the impact of trade and trade 
agreements on Venetian Crete. Trade of course was the prime element of Venetian political 
decision, heavily controlling the policies decided on by the Signoria; however there are other aspects 
neglected in her work that must be discussed. Furthermore, Zachariadou does not focus on how 
                                                          
49 Setton, Papacy and the Levant, vol. 2, p. 234 
50 Setton, Papacy and the Levant, vol. 2, p. 244 
20 
 
trade affected the policy and position of Venice but rather the trade deals Venice made and 
explaining the vast topic that is Venetian trading; providing discussions on weights and measures as 
well as commodities. Zachariadou’s work is divided into three main sections: the historical 
background of her study, the trade including long discussions on coins, weights and measures, 
taxation, and commodities, and finally texts from the period. The middle third of the book while 
interesting is of little help to this study as it focuses on describing, defining, and illustrating how 
trade worked in the Venetian islands.51 The final third of the book proves enlightening as a 
background to the study as the texts that Zachariadou reproduces are treaties between the Dukes of 
Candia, now called Crete, and various emirs, particularly those of Menteshe between the years 1313 
and 1414.52 This does however pose a problem, Zachariadou’s study is of the island of Crete which 
was ruled by the Venetians largely without interruption from around 1204. However, the decisions 
of the Dukes are not necessarily tied entirely to the decisions and policies of the Signoria in Venice. It 
is true that, unlike Genoese overseas territories that were largely independent from the centralised 
government of their home city, Venetian overseas territories were more attached and highly 
governed by the Senate at home. However, there was an increasing amount of independence of the 
Dukes of Crete during the 14th and 15th centuries with numerous revolts not just by the native 
Greeks but also of wealthy and powerful Venetians who had settled the island and saw the distant 
home government as oppressive. So these treaties may not in fact be representative of the treaties 
that the Senate would gauge in-keeping with the policy of Venice. Last to be discussed is the first 
third of the book. Covering the background of the study which Zachariadou is undertaking (despite 
the book’s title) it is largely lacking in any discussion of crusading and Venice’s role or the policies 
that led the city to join the efforts. It merely discusses the campaign known now as the Crusade of 
Smyrna in the late 1340s. The most enlightening events described by Zachariadou here are that 
while the Venetians were at war and sending a fleet to support the crusade to Smyrna against the 
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Emirate of Aydin they kept their trade agreement with the Emirate of Menteshe under the Sancta 
Unio of 1332 and 1334, documents which she provides at the end of her work.53 This is interesting as 
it shows that Venice and the Senate differentiated between various groups of Muslims and did not 
recognize all Muslims as enemies or infidels and were happy to continue trading even with those 
that were even nearby their current enemies. Even war materials like grain and horses were allowed 
to be traded during this time.54 Much of the rest of the work focuses on the issues that Venetian 
Crete had with other Christian powers such as the Genoese, the Catalans, and the Greeks. 
Unfortunately, Zachariadou does not even mention the crusade of Nicopolis and the extent of her 
study ends in 1415. Zachariadou’s work provides some insight into the large subject of trade and 
helps readers to understand the many aspects of trade including commodities, measurements, and 
costs; however, it does not go into great detail over how trade impacted the Venetian Senate’s 
decisions or policies, particularly when it came to crusading. This study is interesting as it can show 
why Venice would fight to keep the trade agreements and helps to show where the wealth of Venice 
came from. However, it does not satisfactorily discuss how trade impacted Venice’s policies towards 
crusading nor does it go into any deep analysis of what Venice hoped to gain from crusades in the 
later middle ages.  
Similarly to Zachariadou, Mike Carr focuses on the relationship between trade and crusade in 
the later middle ages, particularly with the Italian trade republics. However Carr focuses largely on 
the early period studied here mostly focusing on the period 1305-2955 in one piece and 1300-50 in 
another.56 Carr focuses primarily on the Genoese in the Aegean during this time, as is the case with 
his article in the book Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean where he focuses on 
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the Zaccaria family that ruled the island of Chios for the Genoese. The main work of Carr to focus on 
is his PhD thesis which was later expanded on into a book that does cover Venice and their actions 
on crusade between 1302 and 1351. His work, while set earlier than the scope of this thesis, lays out 
the Venetian position in the Aegean from the beginning of the 14th century and describes how 
Venice influenced the future of crusading adventures by pioneering the naval league as a form of 
resistance to Turkish aggression. In Carr’s work one can finally find discussions of Venetian policy in 
dealing with Turkish aggression and crusade. He first begins by pointing out that between the early 
decades of the 14th century despite Catalan-Turkish aggression and piracy Venice refused to go on 
the offensive and join the papacy against the Catalans.57 Proof of this is seen in the treaties that 
Venice accepts from the Catalans in 1319 and renewed in 1321 and 1331. However, Venice also 
begins to change its policy in order to begin the steps towards allying against the Turkish threats 
from Aydin and others. From this grew Venice’s plans for naval leagues as a counter to Turkish 
aggression, a weapon that was heavily influenced and led by Venice and relied on the support of 
many of the major Christian powers in the Mediterranean.58 Carr describes the steps Venice took to 
reconcile with the Byzantines, whom they had been opposed to since the end of the Fourth Crusade 
in 1204, that led to the support granted to the naval leagues by the Byzantines in the face of a 
growing common enemy.59 Carr’s discussions on particular crusades focuses around the Crusades for 
Smyrna (1343-51), the major crusades that took place during the time period he covers.60 Venice, 
Carr argues, was a willing and major participant of these crusades and even when troubled by 
financial problems due to the closing of the Black Sea markets never deserted the campaign and 
even proposed continuing the effort in 1350.61 The Republic led the naval leagues that supported the 
crusades land actions. Further Carr provides the model for how this thesis will handle the question 
of religion versus practicality when dealing with Venice and the crusades. There exists a long debate 
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over the position of Venice and religion, much of it sprouting from the Fourth Crusade, with many 
historians on both sides. One side argues that the Venetians were not ‘true’ crusaders working for 
the betterment of the Christian world but instead opportunistic adventurers looking solely for the 
best economic benefit for the Republic. With Venetian defenders arguing against this. Carr frames 
this argument as two sides of the same coin, an approach this thesis will adopt. Instead of arguing 
for one side or the other, Carr acknowledges that Venice joined crusades in order to achieve both 
goals, the defence of Christendom and for economic or territorial advantage for the Republic. 
Recently an article was published by Stefan Stantchev dealing closely with the topic of Venice in 
this time period. The article, instead of investigating Venice in crusades directly, is focused on 
Venice’s view and response to Ottoman aggression.62 Stantchev concludes that Venetian 
government rarely saw the Ottomans as a veritable threat until the late fifteenth or early sixteenth 
century.63 Instead, he argues that Venice was largely focused on countering their other rivals such as 
the Catalans, the Knights of Rhodes, and the Genoese, as well as expanding their mainland holdings 
in northern Italy. This argument is largely based around Stantchev’s own interpretation of archival 
material presented in Thiriet’s work as well as the works of many modern historians. Stantchev often 
counters the interpretations of other modern historians such as Ruthy Gertwagen, Kate Fleet, and 
John Melville-Jones in this analysis, particularly when dealing with the importance of the Aegean in 
Venetian policy. Whereas others have argued for patterns that arise in the Venetian acquisition of 
locations throughout the Aegean with most of them tying the Ottoman aggression to at least some 
of these acquisitions, Stantchev instead believes that Venetian expansion of their overseas empire 
was sporadic, haphazard, and half-hearted. His article provides an interesting counter to the focus of 
this thesis and will provide an alternative view to the events of the late fourteenth and into the 
fifteenth centuries. For instance, Stantchev barely discusses Venetian involvement in two major anti-
Ottoman crusades undertaken during the period he covers, Nicopolis (1395-6) and Varna (1444-5), 
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both of which Venice to part in and which will be covered in this work. Venetian involvement in 
Nicopolis receives only a bare mention in Stantchev’s work and which he calls ‘typical’, to which he 
fails to elaborate further.64 Meanwhile, the Crusade of Varna is relegated to the concluding 
paragraphs of the work allowing for very little analysis despite the fact that much of the participation 
of Venice in the Crusade of Varna runs counter to his own arguments.65  
The key to any investigation is the primary source material that will help form and support the 
core arguments of the work. For this thesis much of the primary material comes from the Venetian 
archives stored at the Archivio di stato di Venezia (ASV) in Venice which has been compiled, edited, 
and translated through the works of Freddy Thiriet and Nicolae Iorga, whose works are invaluable to 
this study.66 In terms of primary, literary material this study will focus on a number of different 
sources for each of the crusades in question. In the case of the Crusade of Varna it will focus on two 
chronicles, one non-Venetian and one Venetian source. The non-Venetian chronicle is the work of 
Jehan de Wavrin whose nephew participated in the crusade and who provides the most complete 
account of the fleets’ movements and action on the crusade.67 The other chronicle is Giovanni 
Tiepolo’s work covering the history of Venice but does briefly discuss the crusade.68 Tiepolo does not 
discuss in-depth the crusade of Varna and in fact does not report much of it other than what 
occurred within Venice in the lead up to the launching of the fleet. However, this is still a crucial 
source as it confirms and reiterates certain information that not many other literary sources provide. 
Furthermore, it has not been used at all by other historians of the Crusade of Varna and this alone 
                                                          
64 Stantchev, ‘Venice and the Ottoman Threat’, p. 166 
65 Stantchev, ‘Venice and the Ottoman Threat’, pp. 188-90 
66 Nicolae Iorga, Notes et extraits pour servir a l’histoire des croisade, tome III, (Paris: E. Leroux, 1902), Freddy 
Thiriet, Regestes des délibérations du senat de Venise concernant la Romanie, 3 vols. (Paris: Mouton & Co., 
1959-1961) and Freddy Thiriet, Délibérations des assemblées vénitiennes concernant la Romanie, 2 vols. (Pa 
Co., 1966-1971)  
67 Jehan de Wavrin, Recuil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretaigne, a present nomme 
Engleterre, Vol. 4, Edward L. C. P. Hardy (ed.), (London: Longman, Trubner, 1884) 
68 Cronica di Venezia di Giovanni Tiepolo fu de Agostin patrizio Veneto (secc. XVI-XVII), Emilio Aleo (ed.), 2 vols. 
(Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2012)  
 
25 
 
makes it an important find to add to our understanding of the crusade. These sources are invaluable 
to the study of this crusade and each of the crusades discussed in this thesis will have their own 
sources attached to them that will help support the argument and focus of each chapter.  
In terms of primary, literary material this study will focus on a number of different sources for 
each of the crusades in question.  Among those produced in Venice is the Morosini Codex, although 
it has the disadvantage of only covering events up to 1433.69 Another chronicle is that attributed to 
Giovanni Tiepolo (d.1631) which covers the history of Venice up to 1570.70 Nicolò Barbaro’s diary is 
an important source for Venetian participation in the defence of Constantinople in 1453.71 
Furthermore, it has not been used at all by other historians of the Crusade of Varna and this alone 
makes it an important find to add to our understanding of the crusade. These sources are invaluable 
to the study of this crusade and each of the crusades discussed in this thesis will have their own 
sources attached to them that will help support the argument and focus of each chapter. Non-
Venetian literary sources are also very helpful. For example, the work of Jehan de Wavrin, whose 
nephew participated in the crusade of Varna  provides the most complete account of the fleets 
movement’s and action on the crusade.72 
Venice has not been the main focus of any single comprehensive study of the crusades and 
particularly not of the crusades of the Later Middle Ages after 1300. When Venice is discussed it is 
usually with the smallest of mentions of their presence. Venice’s involvement within the crusades, 
how and why Venice decided to join some crusades and not others, or how Venetian policy changed 
or shifted to match the outcomes and failure of crusades in the Later Middle Ages continues to go 
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understudied. This thesis will seek to bridge the gap within the scholarship of Venice in the crusades 
by focusing on how Venice’s policies shifted in the period between 1390 and 1471. It will constitute 
a comprehensive study that investigates the extent to which Venice participated in crusading efforts 
during this time, it will explain why Venice participated in some actions and not others, it will 
investigate how certain Venetians in positions of power both within and without the Venetian 
government participated and effected Venice’s involvement in the crusades, and it will show how 
Venetian policy shifted to deal with the changing political and social landscape presented by the 
various crusades during this period.  
Chapter 1: Venice and the Crusade of Nicopolis 
1.1 Introduction:  
Venice fought the War of Chioggia 1378-81 against the Genoese mainly over control of the 
strategically located island of Tenedos. Although they technically won the war through the defeat of 
the Genoese fleet, at the treaty of Turin in 1381 Venice was forced into a disadvantageous 
settlement that cost them not only a substantial loss of land on the Dalmatia coastline to their rivals 
Hungary, as well as losing the rights to the island of Tenedos and its occupation. The war crushed 
Venetian morale and bankrupted both Venice and Genoa.73 Venice was able to recover rapidly in 
large part due to its overseas territories. Through the exploitation of their territories and the money 
and resources they were able to rebuild and recover. By the late 1380s when the plans for the 
Crusade of Nicopolis were forming Venice was considered a viable place to meet and hold the 
planning sessions and were asked to join in the campaign. This campaign then launched in the mid-
1390s, but Venice’s involvement is still shrouded in mystery. Of all the campaigns discussed in this 
thesis, the Crusade of Nicopolis is the least studied, particularly when it comes to Venetian 
involvement. Much of the primary material that has survived comes from sources outside Venice 
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that were either ignorant of their involvement or were focused on other topics in which the 
Venetians held little sway over. This includes surviving archival material for the Venetians, that for 
other campaigns provide details of the preparations and orders made and issued by the Senate in 
the lead up to the Venetian fleets leaving for the campaigns, but for Nicopolis are lacking in a 
significant amount of this same information.  This has led to secondary sources ignoring the 
contribution of the Venetians. This has led to the misunderstanding that the Venetians were either 
not involved or only a minor section. There has been limited study into why they joined the 
campaign, what their goals were during the campaign, and what Venice contributed to the crusade. 
This chapter will look at the weakness of the sources and the issues caused by how secondary work 
treat the Venetian involvement in the Crusade of Nicopolis, followed by a specific example of how 
Venice participated in the crusade including: their role in planning the campaign, the preparations 
they made as much as can be found, and their known actions during the campaign itself.  
1.2 The Issue of the Material  
 The largest problem when dealing with the Crusade of Nicopolis is the limited source 
material that has survived to the modern day. This lack of information and material, as well as other 
factors such as the small scale and uninspiring outcome of the crusade, has led to the Crusade of 
Nicopolis receiving very little attention from historians to this day. In fact, many historians simply 
use the works of Aziz Atiya whose studies were published in the 1930s. This has caused a level of 
misinformation to persist in the historical study of the Crusade of Nicopolis and hindered any 
original study to be done on the crusade in recent years. This section will briefly investigate the 
issues involved with the secondary source material and highlight two instances where Venice’s 
involvement is known by historians but ignored or downplayed out of hand, in large part due to the 
lack of material and the reliance on the minor study of the crusade by previous historians.  
   The major reason that the Nicopolis campaign is poorly studied and largely ignored or 
skimmed over stems from the seeming lack of information provided in primary material that 
discusses the crusade, with only two major sources: the first is the work of Philippe de Mézières 
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(c.1327-1405), a French author who was not an eyewitness of the events. Instead Mézières collected 
accounts of the returning French crusaders and wrote based on the compilation of these accounts.74 
However, there is a level of doubt raised about the trustworthiness and reliability of the source as an 
accurate record. The other major source for the crusade is the account of Johann Schiltberger, a 
young German who fought in the crusade but was only privy to his small section of the fighting and 
the campaign and therefore is not able to inform historians on the crusade as a whole. Neither of 
these sources discuss the Venetians during the crusade. Mézières likely either did not know of their 
involvement if their attendance was not reported by his sources or ignored their involvement as 
they were not part of the major battle and were not the focus of his work. Meanwhile, Schiltberger 
was likely unaware of the goings on of the fleet and does not report their presences from his lack of 
knowledge. The Venetians do not feature in other contemporary or near-contemporary accounts of 
the crusade, Christian or Muslim.75 
The Venetians themselves do not record much information about the crusade or their 
involvement either. This is particularly true of the preparations made in the lead up to the campaign. 
As will be seen in later chapters, particularly the defence of Thessaloniki, the archival material from 
Venice often records the purchases of materials, weapons, and food to be used during campaigns as 
well as the commissions and orders given to the chosen ship captains and Captain Generals whom 
were chosen to lead the Venetian fleets during these events. These records are incredibly useful in 
understanding the efforts that the Venetian Senate and the state put into building up and preparing 
their fleets and their logistics networks. These records also help historians understand the goals and 
plans that Venice sought to gain from their participation, a key example of this is the orders given to 
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the captains of the Varna crusade fleet who were instructed to seek out Turkish targets in the 
Aegean during the campaign that could be seized; this included the city of Thessaloniki which was 
lost in the decades prior to the Crusade of Varna. However, the records for the crusade of Nicopolis 
are limited in their scope and detail limiting what can be gleaned from their actions. Despite this, 
other sources of information for the Venetian involvement do exist but are largely unstudied as a 
source of Venetian involvement. These being the letters of Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos 
(1391-1425) and the King of Hungary, Sigismund =. Sigismund himself was rescued from the disaster 
of the crusade by Venetian ships and was brought to Constantinople safely by these ships. He wrote 
a number of letters discussing this fact and it became a particular point of contention later when 
Venice and Hungary were locked in disputes later. These letters prove that not only was Venice 
active in the area during the time of the Crusade, they were in contact with the crusaders and in a 
position to provide aid to the army. However, these letters have received little attention in the 
context of Venice and the crusade.  
 The Crusade of Nicopolis is perhaps one of the least studied crusades of any period. The 
most comprehensive study is the work of Aziz Atiya from 1934.76 Atiya’s focus for this work was to 
study the crusade as a whole, not just the Venetians or the Venetian role in it. There are a few 
mentions of their involvement but little analysis of their presence within the forces of the crusaders. 
There is no discussion of why the Venetians were involved and, aside from a few mentions, no real 
understanding of what the Venetians accomplished during the crusade. Atiya’s work provides a 
necessary framework of the crusade but is desperate for an update and an expansion of the material 
available and what can be inferred from it. This is especially true given the books importance as the 
basis of most other discussion of the Crusade of Nicopolis, including the later works of Atiya who 
often footnotes back to his first publication. Most other historians, when discussing the crusade of 
Nicopolis, use summarize Atiya’s text. Sometimes these are with some original commentary or 
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additional material but typically they are just summaries and then move quickly on.77 That is all the 
more odd given that the deficiencies of Atiya’s book (though not its neglect of the Venetians) were 
pointed out very shortly after its publication.78 
There are two examples of this cursory treatment of the Crusade of Nicopolis which draw 
specific attention to the Venetians. The first is a comment by Paul Wittek (1894-1978) about the 
indecision and lack of desire by the Venetians to participate in the Crusade of Nicopolis and the 
second is Stefan Stantchev’s idea that Venetian participation in the Crusade of Nicopolis was 
‘typical’, but then fails to explain what was typical of Venetian involvement. Wittek writes:  
We cannot believe that the crushing victory at Nicopolis, achieved in 1396 over an army of 
crusaders recruited from almost the entire European knighthood, could purely have been 
due to chance. This crusade had been undertaken in an outdated spirit and with insufficient 
means: the lukewarm attitude that the political realists of Venice showed towards this 
venture is the best proof of this.79 
The section continues to say that even if the crusaders had been successful they would only have 
been able to relieve the siege of Constantinople and nothing further. This dismissive attitude of the 
crusade of Nicopolis is a common one, in large part because of the crushing defeat suffered by the 
crusaders outside the city of Nicopolis and the overall unsuccessful plan of the campaign as a whole. 
However, his analysis of the campaign is questionable. The Ottomans were not entrenched in the 
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mainland of Greece nor overly strong at that time. Had the campaign been successful the Ottomans 
risked losing control over major gains that had been made within the area. It would be hyperbole to 
claim that they would have been forced from Europe entirely, but they would have been in a poor 
position to fight back against the Christians had they lost against the crusaders and then had to face 
the threat of Timur, the ruler of Samarkand, in the east, much like the events that followed the 
defeat of the crusade by the Ottomans. Furthermore, Wittek’s comment shows the sort of anecdotal 
use of the Venetians as reluctant or half-hearted participants of the crusades of the later middle 
ages that is common of historical works. Without corroboration of any kind the Venetians are used 
as an example of why the crusade failed. A trope common to studies of the later crusades where 
Venice is discussed. Wittek’s work, as many others often do, quickly moves on from the campaign 
having acknowledged its existence and proceeded with their narrative. Stantchev’s commentary on 
the Venetian involvement of the crusade follows the usual model of summarizing the work of Atiya 
while concluding that the Venetian involvement in the crusades was ‘typical’.80 He fails to effectively 
explain what the typical involvement of the Venetians was. Instead he recaps what Atiya claims of 
the promises that Venice made during the lead up to the crusade and includes a little of what the 
Morosini Codex provides.81 There is no analysis of this information, simply reading as a derogatory 
statement of the Venetians, another common trope of study of that city state.  
 Having addressed the limitations of the primary material and drawing attention to the 
difficulties that these limitations have placed upon scholarship of the subject and the skewed 
workings of previous scholars, the rest of this chapter will seek to bring to light the extent the 
Venetians were involved in the Crusade of Nicopolis and attempt to explain what their motivations 
were for getting involved with the campaign.   
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1.3 Background to the Crusade 
At the outset of the Crusade of Nicopolis in 1395 Venice was at that time, more than 
probably any other, in the best position it could be to participate. Since the end of the Smyrna 
campaigns in 1351 Venice had worked to expand and consolidate its Aegean and Mediterranean 
Empire and had, with the Treaty of Turin in 1381, defeated its long-time rival Genoa making it the 
nearly undisputed Christian naval power in the area. The state was not without its challenges but 
now more than any point in the history of crusading in the later Middle Ages was Venice in a position 
to assist the Crusade of Nicopolis. However, there was hesitation on behalf of the Senate and 
Venice’s participation seems to have been largely downplayed and ignored by contemporaries. 
Before examining Venice’s actions during the crusade to further our understanding of how crusades 
were carried out in this period the contemporary history of Venice must be examined to fully 
understand their position in the world at that time.  
 From the beginning of the Fourteenth Century Venice took an important role in the Christian 
response to the arrival of the Turks in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, what are known as 
Anti-Turkish Leagues. These leagues were formed to hem in Anatolia and the various Turkish states, 
though primarily these were aimed at the Emirates of Aydin and Menteshe who controlled the 
Anatolian coastline. Venice took a leading role in the negotiation, leadership, and maintenance of 
these leagues. In the late 1320s Venice was in need of allies against the Turks: the French were more 
interested in crusades to recover the Holy Land and Armenia, the Crusader States having fallen in 
1291 with the fall of Acre, Martino Zaccaria had lost Chios and had been imprisoned in 
Constantinople, Byzantium was weakened from civil wars and internal strife, while the Papacy 
nominally supported the Christian rulers in the Aegean but were more focused on the events of Italy 
and Germany.82 However, in 1332 Venice began another round of negotiations to form a new anti-
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Turkish league which would finally form in 1334 to push out against the Turkish states of Aydin and 
Karasi. Aydin was seen as the more important threat as their ports of Ephesus and Smyrna, which 
they had taken from the Genoese in the late 13202, were not only major trade centres but the 
launch point for many of their raids into the Aegean.83 Venice bore the brunt of these incursions and 
had been forced to recognize the power of the Turks and the threat they presented. In 1332, the 
Duke of Naxos was forced to sign a treaty with the Turks and later the Senate discussed a treaty over 
Negroponte, which would become a tributary to the Turks. Venice attempted to secure their trade 
with the Turks, making deals with the Emirate of Menteshe though in the mid-1330s they banned all 
trade with the Turkish states. This decision by the Senate did not take into account the position of 
their Aegean colonies, many of whom made their own treaties and deals with the Turks. In the lead 
up to the Anti-Turkish league in 1334, the Senate urged the bailos of Negroponte and Crete to form 
an alliance with the Hospitallers on Rhodes in 1332 though both were neglected from the document 
that confirmed the 1334 league. Many of the bailos were not willing to risk their tenuous treaties by 
acting overtly against the Turks that threatened their homes. Despite the weakness shown by the 
Byzantines from their internal conflicts, Venice still saw them as their strongest and most likely ally 
and signed a six-year treaty with the Byzantine Emperor, Andronikos III (1328-1341). This was 
immediately followed by two ambassadors, Pietro Zeno and Pietro da Canale, who were given full 
power to create a union between all interested parties, namely Byzantium, the Knights of Rhodes, 
and the Angevins in Naples. The French and Papal courts did not enter into much of the 
negotiations. In 1328, the newly crowned French king Philip VI (1328-1350) approached Venice with 
his plans to launch a crusade to the Holy Land. The Doge countered his offer with the idea of a 
league and attempted to garner his support by explaining that the league could blockade the Turks 
from interfering in the crusade. This was not a new idea but instead was an older idea proposed in a 
new way. It did successfully tie the league with plans of a larger crusade, however by the time the 
Doge responded to the king plans for the league were already progressing and the negotiations 
                                                          
83 Carr, Merchant Crusaders, 94-103; Carr, ‘Motivations and Response to Crusades’, p. 129. 
34 
 
dragged. Venice proved that it could and would proceed without support of the French or the 
Papacy if it needed to. With the French returning to their long battles against England in 1335 the 
league, despite its successes against Karasi and Aydin collapsed. The newly elected Pope, Benedict 
XII (1334-1342), lacked any enthusiasm for crusading and the French war with England and the end 
of the league gave him the perfect reason to withdraw his support for any further action. 
Throughout Benedict’s pontificate very few indulgences were granted for the Mediterranean states 
including Cyprus, Armenia, and some colonies but these were granted specifically for opposition 
against the Mamluks of Egypt, none were given for opposing the Turks leading to a dearth of interest 
in fighting against them during the late 1330s. However, with the election of Pope Clement VI (1342-
1352) changed all this leading rapidly to the launch of the Crusades of Smyrna 1343-51.84  Within 
months of his election, Clement wrote to the Venetian Senate for their advice on what would be 
necessary to confront the Turks of Aydin. By November Henry of Asti, Patriarch of Constantinople, 
had arrived in Venice with a letter inviting Venice to join in a league against Aydin consisting of 
Papal, Cypriot, Hospitaller, and Venetian ships. A fleet of twenty ships was gathered and the 
campaigns began. The crusade culminated in the capture of the port of Smyrna which was left in the 
hands of the Hospitallers and would remain under their control until the Timurids seized the city in 
1402. Though successful the Smyrna campaigns had been costly with the deaths of many important 
figures including the Venetian commander Pietro Zeno.  
 The league that served the Crusade of Smyrna ended for Venice in what John Julius Norwich 
calls a ‘characteristically Venetian fashion’ with Venice securing the grant of all ecclesiastical tithes 
from within the Republic for three years from the papacy.85 Between 1351 and the end of the 
Crusade of Smyrna and the lead up to the Crusade of Nicopolis Venice focused largely on 
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maintaining its position in the Aegean and Mediterranean. To this end, the Republic spent much of 
this intervening period at conflict with their long term rivals the Genoese. They fought over control 
of the Crimean, for the advancement of position within Constantinople, and over islands such as 
Tenedos. Venice had gained Tenedos in 1370 from John V Palaiologos as collateral for a 20,000-
ducat loan.86 The island was of extreme strategic importance to both Republics and would be a 
major sticking point to the Treaty of Turin in 1381. The wars against Genoa were broken up by 
occasional treaties like that brokered by the Visconti rulers of Milan in 1355 that ruled that neither 
republic could encroach on the home waters of the other and both would refrain from entering the 
Sea of Azov near the Crimean coast for three years. During these periods of peace with the Republic 
however Venice fought other battles against the Kingdom of Hungary over control of Dalmatia and 
with the commune of Padua.87 War once again broke out between Genoa and Venice in the 1370s 
culminating in the Genoese siege of Chioggia not far from Venice itself. Though hard fought on both 
sides and with Genoese having the advantage, the Venetians were able to break the siege and wreck 
much of the Genoese attackers. In 1381 Amadeus VI of Savoy was brought in to settle the treaty 
between the two republics, the Visconti’s at this time had agreed to an alliance with Venice in 1377 
and may have been seen as too involved to play a more impartial judge to negotiate a treaty 
between the communes. The resulting Treaty of Turin however was not kind to either side of the 
war. Venice, having successfully fought off the Genoese at Chioggia thought that they should be 
allowed to make their demands; however, it was the King of Hungary that benefitted the most from 
the treaty. Venice did reclaim the strongholds it had lost around the lagoon that protected the city 
but was forced to accept ceding Dalmatia to Hungary and their control over Tenedos. Following this 
Genoa, facing internal strife and governmental collapse, slipped into relative obscurity never again 
becoming a major player in the West and only a minor inconvenience and nuisance in the East. 
Venice however surprised all of its rivals by bouncing back quickly and emerging from these decades 
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of war with a strong economy and united government. The most severe of the colonial rebellions, 
particularly those in Crete had been suppressed, the commune controlled numerous posts 
throughout the Levant and the Black Sea and by the end of the century Venice would control Corfu, 
Scutari, Nauplion, Argos, Durazzo as well as most of the Cyclades and Dodecanese Islands.  
 The crusade of Nicopolis was launched to counter the aggression posed by the Ottoman 
Sultans and their incursions deeper and deeper into Europe. The Ottomans however had not been a 
threat to the Europeans just forty years prior when the Crusade of Smyrna was launched against the 
Turks of Aydin and Karasi who were then the preeminent states. The rapid rise and expansion of the 
Ottomans has been the focus of many studies, but a brief overview is necessary to understand the 
drastic action of launching one of the Later Middle Ages largest crusades against them so 
immediately following their rise to prominence. Osman Bey, progenitor of the Ottoman beylik, 
entered into the political field in 1301 as the victor over the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III at the 
Battle of Bapheus. Shortly following this victory, Osman captured the Byzantine cities of Nicaea and 
Bursa. Nicaea had been the capital of the Byzantine state during the period of the Latin Empire of 
Constantinople between 1204 and 1261 and was one of few cities still held by the Greeks in 
Anatolia.88 Along with these cities the Ottomans under Osman and his son Orkhan Bey (1326-1362) 
had consolidated a moderately sized beylik with considerable agricultural land and several towns 
and cities. However, they had not yet become the greatest Turkish threat. It was around this time 
that Umur Bey of Aydin had become a major threat and provoked the Crusade of Smyrna which lost 
him his capital city to the Knights of Rhodes. In 1346 the Ottomans absorbed the beylik of Karasi, 
another earlier target of the Crusade of Smyrna and in 1352 they entered Europe for the first time.89 
John Kantakouzenos, rival to the regency for the young John V Palaiologos, invited the Ottomans 
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into Europe as his allies against John V and his mother’s forces. The army led by Orkhan’s son 
Süleyman travelled into Europe and fought alongside Kantakouzenos. After the conclusion of the 
civil war, however, they refused to leave the Balkans, occupying the port of Tzympe. In 1354 after 
earthquakes had weakened the walls of the city the Ottoman forces captured the city of Gallipoli.90 
Not all Christian powers were immediate targets of Ottoman aggression however, as the Genoese 
began to make treaties and align themselves with them in the 1350s. During the War of the Straits 
from 1350-5 the Ottomans allied with the Genoese against the Venetians who had the support of 
John Kantakouzenos. From the outset this alliance proved to be important to both states as can be 
seen at the end of the War of the Straits when the Genoese and Ottomans agreed that the treaty 
between Genoa and the Byzantines could not adversely affect their own treaties.91 Then in 1357 
Murad Bey, son of Orkhan Bey, took over the offensive in Europe after his brother Süleyman Bey. He 
captured the city of Adrianople, in 1361 and prompted responses from the Byzantines who received 
help from Amadeus I of Savoy who briefly captured Gallipoli in 1366. Murad succeeded as emir in 
1362 and focused on expanding progressively in all directions while securing Anatolia through 
marriages to the Karamanid Turks, rivals to the Ottomans to the East and one of the largest states in 
Anatolia. In Europe, Murad won victories against the Serbians in the 1370s, achieved concessions of 
over-lordship over both the Greeks and Bulgarians in 1373 and 1376 respectively, and captured the 
city of Nish in 1385 forcing the Serbians to submit a year later. Murad returned to Europe in 1389 to 
fight the Serbians at Kosovo and achieving a major victory. However, Murad was assassinated on the 
battlefield and was succeeded by his son Bayezid I (1389-1402). Bayezid gave up his father’s policy of 
gradual expansion and pressed harder and faster earning the moniker ‘Yildirim’, lightning bolt. 
Under Bayezid the Ottomans obtained direct rule over much of the Balkans and began making major 
incursions into Hungarian and Wallachian lands, as well as beginning the first Ottoman siege of 
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Constantinople in 1394.92 This rapid aggression was the impetus of the Crusade of Nicopolis and 
brought French, Burgundian, Hungarian, Venetian and other Christian powers to bring their forces to 
bear against the Ottoman threat for the first time.  
1.4 Venetian involvement in the Crusade  
With the siege of Constantinople underway the Ottoman threat from Anatolia was 
recognized and the plans for a new crusade began. This new threat to Christian power coming from 
the East needed to be put in check before it could expand. In response to this growing threat the 
target and purpose of crusades was shifted from its eternal goal of taking, or retaking, the Holy Land 
and instead aiming at taking down and countering the threat of the Ottomans. The Crusade of 
Nicopolis was the first of these crusades; although some contemporaries such as Charles VI, King of 
France, continued to view the crusade still saw this crusade as a precursor to a crusade to recover 
the Holy Land.93 The crusade drew from most of the major powers of western Christendom, 
including the Venetians. Despite the loss of Tenedos and the weakened position of Venice at the end 
of the War of Chioggia, the commune had been able to rebuild and Venice was prepared to assist 
the Crusade of Nicopolis. They does seem to have been some hesitation on the part of the Senate, 
this can be seen when the ambassadors of the various interested parties arrived in Venice, to discuss 
the involvement of the Venetians and their fleet, the Senate delayed the meetings with them forcing 
the campaign to be delayed until 1396.94 However, in the end Venice decided to join in the naval 
league that was formed in 1396 in order to support the crusade. This league contained ships from 
Venice as well as ships from the Hospitallers from Rhodes.95  
1.4.1 Preparations for the Crusade:  
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The Venetians were already invested in the events of the Aegean before the plans for the crusade 
even began to take shape. Despite the loss of Tenedos in 1381 the city-state still controlled 
numerous other possessions along the Greek coast and islands such as Crete and Negroponte in the 
sea. The defence and protection of these territories was of great importance to the Senate, 
particularly because of the role these territories played in Venice’s quick recovery from the 
devastations of the prior war. In March 1392 the Senate sends an ambassador to the Sultan to 
protect their hold on Negroponte. At the same time a galley was designated from Crete to be sent 
yearly to defend Negroponte.96 This galley was instructed to protect Euboea and the Archipelago but 
to refrain from attacking Turkish ports. The protection of these islands and the peace that Venice 
held with the Ottomans seems to be of the greatest importance to them in the early 1390s. In 1394 
the Senate sent word to the bailo of Negroponte to give up plans to annex Monemvasia. This order 
sent 5 March warns that it would anger the Turks and that they should not act in this manner 
without permission from the Senate in the future.97 Fear of Turkish aggression then was a worry of 
the Venetians. On 6 April 1394 the Senate ordered the Captain of the Gulf to make a tour of the 
Aegean islands to confer with the rectors about what to do should Sultan Bayezid go on the 
offensive against the Duke of Athens.98 This fear continued in to May when the Senate voted not to 
send out embassies during debates over what should be done about the Ottoman threat.99 Later on 
21 May two galleys were chosen to go to Constantinople to protect Venetian interests within the 
city. They were to instruct the bailo to express the sympathy of the Venetian Senate and suggest 
that the Emperor should send delegates to the Pope, the German Emperor, and the French King. 
However, the dispatch of these ships was postponed as the events in the area were progressing too 
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rapidly.100 In July 1394 the Senate replies to Emperor Manuel II insisting that he must remain within 
the city and because it would fall if the Sultan learned that the Emperor had left the city. They 
assured Manuel that if the situation worsened Venice would bring him to the city if he wished or to 
Lemnos.101 Furthermore, they refused the Emperor’s offer to take control of Lemnos as they are not 
in the position to hold it. This refusal is interesting. It shows that Venice was consciously aware of 
their limitations of their own positions and the necessity for Venice not to reach beyond what they 
could comfortable and efficiently hold on to.  In March 1396, they reported that the Hungarian king 
was planning a crusade to push down the Danube and to reach the Black Sea by June.102 To show 
their support for the crusade the Senate withdrew their ambassador in Ottoman Sultan Bayezid’s 
court and instead sent delegations to Constantinople promising aid and grain. Still wary of the 
wisdom of the campaign Venice sends only four ships in support of the crusade.103 As plans 
progressed around them for the preparations of a campaign against the Ottomans the Senate 
replied to ambassadors sent by Sigismund of Hungary requesting aid and advice in 1394 for their 
planned campaign in May the following year. The Senate claimed they were willing to advise the 
King but replied that they could not provide aid unless other Christian princes also promised their 
aid.104 In October 1394 Boniface IX issued anti-Turkish papal bull to preach the crusade in Austria and 
Venice, but in January the Venetian Senate banned Gian Domenico from preaching the crusade 
within Venice for fear of Turkish reprisals.105 The plans and negotiations for the crusade continued 
and the Hungarian contingent planned for a fleet of 25 galleys to be raised to support the land 
crusade. Venice wrote in March 1395 to remind Sigismund that they were currently at peace with 
the Turks and had many merchants within Ottoman lands that would be threatened should Venice 
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join the campaign against them. The Senate continued to say that if the King could convince Dukes 
of Burgundy, Orleans, and Lancaster to join the campaign they would provide a quarter of the 
planned ships as long as the fleet did not exceed 25 total ships.106 On 9 December 1395, the Senate 
continued their hesitance to join in an answer to a Greek ambassador. The claimed that the entry of 
the commune into the anti-Turkish league would be inefficient as they had no land strength and 
were already constantly at war with them at sea. They argued that remaining neutral would be more 
effective and would allow them to bring supplies into the city and that Venice would arm a fleet that 
would scare the Turks in order to do this.107 In February 1396 Senate received word that Hungary 
and Byzantium had successfully negotiated for the provision of ten ships for the campaign. The 
Senate responded by rescinding their embassy to the Ottomans, the ambassador’s main directive 
had been to negotiate and maintain peace between the Ottomans and the Byzantines.  
Then on 1 March 1396, new orders were sent to the Captain of the Gulf, the future doge 
Tommaso Mocenigo (1343-1423), sending him to Constantinople to inform the emperor that Venice 
would provide arms and wheat for the support of the city. These continued with orders to begin to 
solicit a renewal of the treaty concluded between Manuel II’s nephew, John VII Palaiologos, and 
Doge Francesco Foscolo.108 The Captain should also protect the merchant ships of Venice in the area, 
but should also remain near the city if he deems his presence there beneficial for the defence of the 
city or to the hindrance of the Turks.109 In April 1396 the Senate wrote to praise Sigismund’s planned 
march for May but reminded him that that their primary condition for joining the crusade, the 
participation of the Dukes of Burgundy, Orleans, and Lancaster, had not been met; however, the 
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Venetians would still provide four ships to be armed and sent to the Bosporus and that they would 
reach there by mid-July and would await the army’s arrival until mid-August.110  
 It is clear from this that Venice was indeed hesitant to join in with the proposed campaign. 
Having only just recovered from their previous major war against Genoa it is not unreasonable to 
believe that this hesitation was born from a lack of morale and a desire to keep their territories safe 
and defended. This is clear in their requirements that other alliances are gathered before Venice will 
even consider participation in the crusade. They attempted to maintain a level of neutrality while 
speaking on behalf of the Emperor in the negotiations with the Ottomans. Their overseas empire, 
which was only just beginning to grow. These territories were necessary for Venice’s survival and a 
failed crusade could harm them more than help. Which led to the Senate requiring extra 
commitment before they would join in the campaign. Although as they told Sigismund they would 
join for the defence of Christendom and even though Sigismund was unsuccessful in obtaining the 
required Dukes the Venetians did still send four ships for the crusade.  
1.4.2 Actions during the crusade:  
 There is almost no information for what the Venetians accomplished during the Crusade of 
Nicopolis. They sent four ships to assist from the sea, but aside from their promise to send them and 
a singular instance where the Hungarian King Sigismund is saved by Venetian ships after the crushing 
defeat of the army outside the city of Nicopolis, the Venetian participation in the actual campaign is 
entirely unknown. What is clear is that the French crusaders passed through Venice on their way 
East.  Ogier d’Anglure comes across the French commanders in Venice during his passage back to 
France from a pilgrimage that covered much of Syria and Egypt. His party arrived in Venice 23 May 
1396 and stayed there for six days obtaining passage, provisions, and horses. While in the city they 
met Lord Henri de Bar and Lord de Coucy and were meeting with the Count of Nevers before 
                                                          
110 ASV, Misti, Reg. 43, f. 112v: TR, I, no. 900, p. 211: Setton, Papacy, Vol. 1, p. 346 
43 
 
continuing on to Hungary.111 From there the French either sailed down to the Dalmatian coast line 
before continuing over land, but this seems unlikely as it would have been a less well-known route 
for the French and would have been dangerous in the rocky terrain so close to Ottoman controlled 
territory. Or they marched on from Venice sticking to the mainland and into Hungary from there, 
this route was longer but much significantly safer and most likely much better known. The campaign 
started well, reaching Vidin in September 1396 which fell without a siege. The city had been held by 
a Bulgarian vassal of the Ottomans. The Ottomans within the city were slaughtered. Rahovo and 
Oryahovo were assaulted by the French contingent but are repulsed. The rest of the crusader army 
arrived later and began to siege the cities. The Ottoman defenders sought surrender, to which 
Sigismund accepted. However, the army sought to wipe out the Ottomans and loot the area and the 
castle was stormed against the orders of the King. The army arrived outside the city of Nicopolis on 
12 September 1396 and set out to lay siege to the city. The fleet supposedly arrived on 10 
September, but Atiya does not believe that the Venetian ships ever reached the city at all and 
instead stayed near Constantinople and the straits. Unfortunately, as is common with much of the 
discussion of the Crusade of Nicopolis, the comment is left unfootnoted.112 During the siege the 
French knight Enguerrand de Coucy learned of Ottoman reinforcements approaching the city to 
provide aid and successfully led an ambush against them, striking a successful blow against them.113 
The ease of the campaign combined with this successful ambush made the Christian army arrogant. 
However, Sultan Bayezid was able to march his army to the city in time to bring aid to the defenders. 
On 25 September 1396 the Ottomans arrayed themselves, trapping the crusaders between the city 
and the relief force. The French forces charged the Ottoman lines against the Sigismund’s commands 
                                                          
111 Michel Tarayre, Nicole Chareyon, and Jean Meyers (eds.) Vers Jerusalem Itineraires Croises au XIV Siécle: 
Nicolas de Martoni, Notaire Relation du Pelerinage aux Lieux Saints (1394-1395) suivi de Ogier D’Anglure 
Journal de Voyage a Jherusalem et en Egypte (1395-1396) (Les Belles Lettres: Paris, 2008) p. 316: François 
Bonnardot & Auguste Longnon (eds.) Le Saint Voyage de Jherusalem du Seigneur D’Anglure (Librairie de Firmin 
Didot et G.: Paris, 1878) p. 98  
112 Aziz Atiya, ‘The crusade in the fourteenth century’, A History of the Crusades, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 6 vols 
(University of Wisconsin Press: Madison WI, 1955-89), vol. 3, pp. 3-26, at 23. 
113 On Coucy’s role, see H.L. Savage, ‘Enguerrand de Coucy VII and the campaign of Nicopolis’, Speculum 14 (1939), 
423-42. 
44 
 
and were defeated by the terrain and the Ottoman army. The rest of the army was driven back and 
the King was able to flee to the river and escape to Constantinople.  
 The role of the Venetians up to this point is almost entirely unknown, the one thing that is 
agreed upon is that the Venetians saved King Sigismund from capture outside the city of Nicopolis. 
There is very limited information about this instance and the source material is debatable. 
Furthermore, there is debate over where the Venetians saved the king: either they were present for 
the battle at Nicopolis and were able to save the King as he fled the field or, the more likely case, 
that Sigismund escaped the battle in a small ship and made his way down the Danube before being 
rescued at sea by the Venetians and brought to Constantinople that way. Despite how common this 
claim is the secondary material is difficult to sort because this story always comes without 
citation.114 A clear example of this is found in the works of Nicol who states in one work that it was 
not Venice that saved the king from the battle but the Knights of Rhodes;115 however in a later work 
states that it was indeed Venice that saved the King.116 Neither work, as is common with this claim in 
secondary works, is able to provide any source material to support either claim. The primary 
material does not provide any greater clarity to the situation, with conflicting stories or entirely 
skipping over the events of Sigismund’s flight from the battlefield. The German, Schiltberger, was 
present at the battle as a runner for one of the lords and was captured following the crusaders’ 
defeat. He states that the King fled on ships down the Danube but does not say to whom the ships 
belonged nor does he give any indication of the Venetians being present at the battle or during the 
campaign.117 Bertrandon, who was writing roughly twenty five years after the crusade had ended, 
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claims that he knew that the King fled on his own ships down the river. Again, there is no mention of 
Venetian involvement. But Bertrandon only records what he himself ‘has seen or heard from 
undoubted authority’ from his travels in the area.118 The Morosini Codex, supported by the letter of 
Doge Tommaso Mocenigo, confirms that Sigismund was indeed saved by the Venetians.119 According 
to the Codex: 
…the said Lord, the king of Hungary, rushed with some of his barons towards the Danube to 
find out whether the Venetian, Genoese and Byzantine galleys were to be found there and 
he quickly reached the galleys where he boarded that of the Venetian captain Tommaso 
Mocenigo, to whom she showed great honour’120 
Moncenigo would later receive a pension for his actions in saving Sigismund during the crusade.121 
Furthermore, in a letter written in late August 1415 by the Venetian Doge Tommaso Moncenigo.122 
This letter was written in response to Sigismund’s own letters sent to many princes and kings of 
Europe in which he claims that the Venetians were supporting and supplying the Ottoman Turks to 
the detriment of all Christendom. Moncenigo refutes this and over the course of his letter provides 
numerous examples of how Venice protected not just Christendom as a whole but also the 
Hungarians, whose accusations they are defending themselves from. The first paragraph of the letter 
incredibly lays out that it was the Venetians that saved the king after the battle at Nicopolis. 
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‘We would first like to bring forward in witness against the lord King Sigismund, that when 
he was travelling to Byzantium, wandering and frightened after being defeated and put to 
flight by Bayazid, Lord of the Turks, it was the captain our armed fleet, which was present in 
those parts for the aid of Christians, who rescued the lord king (who was then terrified of 
everything behind and in front of him) from the jaws of the enemy and led him and many of 
his prelates and barons in our galleys honourably and humanely to Byzantium.’123 
The upcoming work by Mark Whelan analyses the correspondence. Moncenigo was the captain of 
the galley that saved Sigismund and he bore witness to these events. The letter provides further 
proof that the Venetians did indeed save the king after the defeat. Furthermore by the wording it 
seems that the Venetian did not save him from the battle itself, but from his ‘wandering’ after he 
had escaped the battle. This upcoming work by Whelan shows great promise in providing further 
detail into the shadowed and largely unstudied events of the Crusade of Nicopolis and the Venetian 
role in it. It is clear from these sources that the Venetian did indeed save the king following the 
disaster; though whether it was from the battlefield or from the Danube is still debatable. It is 
curious however that there are few non-Venetian sources that corroborate these events. Not even 
the reports from the Byzantine emperor and of King Sigismund himself in letters that he wrote in 
following the defeat. The letters preserved in the work of Barker simply comments that Sigismund 
had made it to Constantinople ‘in a fashion other than that in which we were hoping to go’, an 
obvious reference to the defeat and his rescue.124 He proceeds to discuss using the Venetian and 
Genoese ships to guard the city of Constantinople. Manuel II’s letters say nothing of the Venetian’s 
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actions that protected the king’s life.125 Though it is interesting that the Venetians further carried the 
king homeward via the Dalmatian coast later in 1397.126   
In the immediate aftermath of the defeat of the crusader army the Senate sought to protect 
themselves from any coming punishment from the Ottoman forces. On 29 October 1396 the Senate 
sent Giovani Loredan to the Captain of the Gulf with further orders. The captain was to watch over 
the safety of the merchants and galleys in the vicinity of Romania, a bounty of 5000 ducats was 
provided for the maintenance of his ships for this mission. If threatened by the Turks the ships 
should flee and seek shelter at Negropont and remain there over winter but should not rearm.127 
The Senate then sought to deal with the Genoese and sought to regain or reuse Tenedos now that 
the position of Christendom was weakened in the Balkans by the defeat of the crusader army. On 30 
January 1397, under the advisement of various Sages who council them, the Senate sent an 
ambassador to Genoa to discuss Tenedos. The main point used was the argument that the Venetians 
could use the island to increase the efficiency of their fleet’s actions against the Turks. They 
requested that the Genoese relax their demand that the island remained unfortified. The 
ambassador was then to return to Venice immediately if the Genoese refused.128 The negotiations 
continued throughout the early months of 1397. In February the Senate commissioned Pietro Emo 
as ambassador to Genoa. Emo was instructed to thank the Genoese for arming galleys for further 
protection in the Aegean but to explain to them that the King of Hungary, and others, blamed the 
demilitarization of Tenedos as the reason that the Ottomans were able to expand. He was then 
instructed to ask once again for them to allow Venice to refortify the island.129 The Genoese 
suggested that the island be given to Papal control and the cost of its defence split between the two 
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trade powers of Venice and Genoa, but this is outright refused by the Venetians.130 When these 
negotiations failed the Senate turned their attention back towards the East and desired to keep their 
options for peace open there. On 7 April 1397 Benedetto Soranzo was commissioned as Captain 
General of the Gulf and given orders to intervene in the negotiations and political scene in the east. 
His first point of call was to stop at Modon and confer there about the movement of the Turks, 
review the situation with local authorities, and ensure that the Byzantines had not yet treated with 
the Turks. They argued that the emperor should not give up any cities or change the current borders 
and promised aid from Venice in order to deter both Greeks and Genoese in Pera from treating with 
the Turks. They wanted to keep the option of treaties with the Ottomans open in case further aid 
from the West but was delayed. If negotiations were underway then the Senate demanded that 
Venice be included, with the vice-bailo of Constantinople serving as the Venetian representative. 
Before Venice would agree to any treaty the agreement must include: granting the Sultan maritime 
peace only within the straits, and the Turks must recognize the recent annexations of the Venetians: 
Argos, Nauplion, Athens, Scutari, and Durazzo. If Soranzo found Manuel II’s nephew, John VII, on the 
throne he must also treat with him to ensure agreements between Venice and Greeks stood.131 
Venice also played a role in negotiating the release of the high-ranking prisoners captured at the 
battle of Nicopolis.132 
1.5 Conclusion  
The defeat of the army at Nicopolis ended the crusade and dismayed many of the Christian 
kingdoms that had sent men to support this campaign. For many historians the Crusade of Nicopolis 
is seen as the last of the ‘traditional crusade’ where a multinational collection of Western Christian 
powers organised themselves into a major campaign against Muslims.133 This seems disingenuous as 
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the Crusade of Varna in 1444 would see numerous contingents of Western Christians fighting an 
almost identical campaign roughly fifty years after the end of Nicopolis. If others truly believed that 
Nicopolis was indeed the last of the traditional campaigns it would likely have received much greater 
attention from the academics that study them. Instead this crusade has been relegated to a minor 
footnote in the story of late medieval crusading. For the Venetians, the defeat put them in an 
awkward position. Their hesitance for joining the campaign had led to a lack of support for it. 
Although not a major cause of the defeat as it seems that the fleet itself did not accomplish much of 
anything during the crusade, their participation put them at odds with the Ottomans. The Turkish 
threat could not be focused upon the Venetians if they were not careful to defend themselves and 
get an advantageous treaty, something they learned from the bad negotiations at the end of the 
War of Chioggia. They attempted once more to regain control of Tenedos to no avail and instead 
focused on ensuring that they would not be forced out of the Aegean by the Ottomans. This cycle of 
campaign and treaty would mark the future of all Venetian-Ottoman affairs and will be a common 
theme throughout the rest of this study and Venice comes to be seen increasingly as the Western 
Christian frontline against the Ottoman expansion.  
Chapter 2: The Occupation and Defence of the city of Thessaloniki 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the course of the remainder of the fourteenth century Venice sought to recover its losses and 
heal its wounds. However, by the middle of the fifteenth century it would reach its height. One of 
the most important, if only briefly held, of these colonies was the city of Thessaloniki. The city sits on 
the coast of the Thermaic Gulf in the north-western corner of the Aegean Sea. The city was always 
considered highly important to the Byzantine Empire and earned the nickname of co-capital. After 
Constantinople, the city was the second city of the Empire in terms of both size and wealth. It was 
also a strategically placed port and easily guarded thanks to its impressive fortifications. It even 
enjoyed a lucrative pilgrimage trade based on the shrine of its patron saint, the soldier-martyr 
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Demetrius.134  All these advantages made Thessaloniki an attractive acquisition for the Venetians 
and likely played heavily into the decision to accept the offer of the city when presented the option 
by the Greek rulers of the city. Investigation of this city will provide not only a key component to 
understanding Venetian involvement in the Aegean but also will help further our understanding of 
why Venice involved itself in anti-Ottoman action throughout the fifteenth century. This section will 
examine the acquisition of Thessaloniki and the Venetian Senate’s votes and debates surrounding its 
acquisition, it will analyse the defence of the city and the supplies and manpower that Venice sent, 
and finally briefly discuss the fall of the city to the Ottomans in 1430 and show that Venice did not 
take the fall of the city lightly and looked instead to reclaim it if possible. 
2.2 The Acquisition of Thessaloniki (1423) 
Venice acquired the city of Thessaloniki from its ruler, Despot Andronikos Palaiologos, brother of the 
Byzantine Emperor John VIII Palaiologos (1425-48), in 1423.135 This was, in the eyes of Ruthy 
Gertwagen, Venice’s first step towards a new policy of expansion with a focus on defence that would 
lead to the expansion of the Stato di Mar to its height later that same century.136 The Ottoman 
Sultan Murad II (1421-44 and 1446-51) had laid siege to both Constantinople and Thessaloniki in 
June 1422 with a great army to punish the Byzantines for backing his uncle, Düzme Mustafa, in his 
bid for the Sultanate. The siege and its drain on the empire, combined with Andronicus’ poor health, 
drove the Byzantines to offer the city to the Venetians to prevent it from falling into the hands of the 
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Ottomans.137 The offer came with the condition that the Venetians should respect the rights, 
institutions, and traditions of the native Thessalonians. The Venetians then debated over whether or 
not to accept this offer and the potential the city offered on 7 July 1423. Of particular concern to 
them was the opinion of the Greek Emperor and whether or not the Venetians should allow for the 
city to be returned to the Byzantines at a later date.138 The Senate brought in numerous sages, men 
chosen to advise the state before major decisions were made.139 These men could not vote on the 
subjects upon which they advised but helped to understand the risks and rewards involved with the 
decision to be made, in this case the acceptance of the city of Thessaloniki. The Senate accepted the 
offer with a vote of 99 for, 45 against, and 11 abstentions. This is less than the number of total 
present that is reported by Roberto Morosini, indicating that either his account is mistaken or that 
some left before the count could be taken. Two proposals were made by members of the Senate; 
the first by Morosini who moved that Venice should leave the option for the Greeks to resume 
control the city of Thessaloniki from the Venetians if they repaid them for any expenses incurred in 
defence of the city itself. The proposal failed to pass after two votes receiving 5 and then 9 votes in 
favour of the option.140 The second proposal by Fantin Michiel followed from Morosini’s original but 
modified it to some extent. It also went to the vote twice failing with 30 and 47 votes.141 Orders for 
their representatives to the city were drafted and by September 1423 the city had been handed over 
to Venetian control. Their representatives, Santo Venier and Niccolo Zorzi, were commissioned 27 
July 1423 and their orders instruct them to travel first to Negropont where they should receive word 
from Andronicus and accept transfer of the city. Once they had control of the city they were 
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instructed to form a garrison using funds from the revenue of the city and then one should be 
chosen to serve as ambassador to the Ottomans.142 Zorzi was chosen for this duty and went to meet 
with the Sultan to explain that Venice had taken over the city of Thessaloniki and that the city 
wished to continue the peace and friendship that the Venetians had with the Ottomans; instead, 
Murad had him arrested.143 Venier was quickly instructed to secure the release of the Zorzi through 
the promise of annual tributes to the Ottomans while at the same time he was meant to secure the 
surrounding villages and defences of the city. In the meantime, the Senate selected Bernardo 
Loredan as Duke of Thessaloniki and Jacopo Dandolo as Captain of the city in May 1424 to replace 
Venier and Zorzi and assume a more direct command of the city and its defence.144 
That Venice should decide to take over the city at this juncture was by no means a foregone 
conclusion. Under its new and more active Doge, Francesco Foscari (1423-1457), it was still 
recovering from the crisis following the War of Chioggia.145 They had acquired the a few territories 
such as Argos and Nauplion in 1388146 but had refused to take Thessaloniki when it had been 
threatened by the Ottomans in 1385. In 1395 they had refused to take Megara and Corinth and in 
1397 had refused to take command of the city of Constantinople when it came under threat from 
the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid .147 Venice, then, and particularly the Senate, contrary to the opinion of 
Stantchev, was cautious and thoughtful about the acquisition of new territories. Their taking of 
Thessaloniki is no different. The Senate takes the precaution to bring in numerous voices to advise 
them of the best course of action. It is not known what these men advised but they seemingly 
moved the Senate to vote in favour of claiming the city. Furthermore, the failure of the proposals to 
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let the city fall back into the hands of the Greeks is further indicative of Venice’s commitment to 
holding the city permanently. In hindsight if this clause had been passed they might have been able 
to escape the burden that would come to play out over the next seven years of siege and warfare; 
however, the Senate had made the decision to take Thessaloniki and was not willing to relinquish it. 
Not that the act of a state that was only half-hearted in its decision to assume control of new 
territories. Furthermore, the rapid creation of a Ducal title for the city and the filling of that post 
shows the hope that the Senate had for the city and the desire that install a more permanent 
leadership figure for the city under Venetian rule. This title would have increased interest among the 
nobility who might seek to hold it for prestigious reasons or for the salary that title would be 
afforded and thereby bring interest from the Venetian patricians to bring trade and investment into 
the city.148 There was, of course, another consideration. In May 1423, the Senate heard that:  
The people of Thessalonica had sent to tell the Lord Turk [Murad II] that they wished to give 
themselves up on these terms: they said that they were prepared to give him two thirds of 
their revenues and live off one third themselves, and to remain at peace, and if not, they 
would send to the [Venetian] regime of Negroponte so that they could give themselves to the 
dogal Signoria of Venice.149 
The thought of the city being in Turkish hands might well have been what pushed up the required 
number of votes. 
Before continuing to discuss the extent of Venice’s contribution to the defence of the city 
there is one further point that deserves mention. Neither John R. Melville-Jones nor John W. Barker 
found any evidence of the rumoured payment made by Venice for their acquisition of the city. It was 
rumoured that Venice paid 50,000 ducats as payment to gain control of the city, a story that likely 
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has its origin on the Byzantine side as it appears in several later Greek chronicles.150 However, no 
record of this transaction exists within the Venetian documents and sources. Venice was not beyond 
paying for new territories but it does not seem to be the case here. It is possible that the rumour 
comes from a misunderstanding of the Venetian offer of a stipend to Andronicus, if he remained in 
residence within the city.151 In any case, he chose not to and died on 4 March 1429 in the 
Pantokrator monastery in Constantinople.152 
2.3 Governing Thessaloniki (1423-30) 
Over the course of the next seven years Venice, as it will be shown, devoted a large amount of 
manpower and resources to the defence of the city. Stantchev argues that the resources spent on 
Thessaloniki do not compare to the amount of time, money, and resources spent with Venice’s war 
in northern Italy that was running concurrently to the defence of Thessaloniki.153 However, it 
becomes clear that instead of sending the minimum that they could Venice sent as much as they felt 
the city could spare. The distances involved and the necessity to defend the home city from war 
closer to home obviously meant a lesser amount could be spent on defending a far off city. Venice’s 
ambitions for northern Italy were increasing as rapidly as their ambitions for the Mediterranean as 
the fifteenth century continued. War in Italy was closer to home there by allowing for faster transfer 
of men and supplies as well as orders and failure to win during such a contest between states could 
threaten the safety of the city of Venice itself. Thessaloniki was an important city and needed 
assistance so the Senate sent what they could when they could and much of the archives for this 
period records the exact nature of this assistance and helps to highlight the extent to which Venice, 
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a city on the brink of economic crisis only thirty years prior, was able to devote to the defence of a 
faraway city, even while fighting an offensive war at home.  
 Immediately after taking control of the city the representatives of the Venetians, Santo 
Venier and Niccolo Zorzi, as discussed previously, were ordered to set up a garrison for the city using 
the revenues of Thessaloniki. Venice likely expected the city to be able to support its own defence at 
least to a point, though the years of siege and assault by the Ottomans had left the city poor and 
starving so it is of little real surprise that it was incapable of such a feat.154 What followed was seven 
years of intense battling with Venice committing a wealth of resources to the city. The archival 
material records much of this but more may exist or have not survived to the modern period. From 
the material three main avenues of expenditure are evident. First is the provision of supply, mainly 
wheat but also weapons, secondly the provision of troops, ships, or the money to raise and maintain 
these and other defences, and finally is the advancement of negotiations and politics and the cost of 
embassies and ambassadors to the Ottomans as well as increasingly disadvantageous offers for 
Venice to be allowed to keep the city from the Ottomans.  
Food was a constant issue for the beleaguered city and the arrival of the Venetians and their 
readily available fleet was a godsend for the starving city. Venice had better access to ships and was 
a significantly stronger naval power compared to the Byzantines at this time and could protect its 
sea lanes against most attacks allowing for better delivery of food. However, the drain of the 
constant need to supply the city became an overbearing issue for the Senate and eventually private 
Venetian citizens began transporting the necessary wheat for the city and were reimbursed or 
offered rewards by the government. Much of the wheat came from Crete or through the ports of 
Negroponte and Corfu having been purchased from markets there, while a few shipments came 
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from the markets in the city of Venice. The first reminder that survives comes from 19 December 
1423 when the Senate sent word to both Crete and Negroponte to remind both that they were 
expected to supply the city with wheat. 155 Feeding of the city was a constant problem and was one 
of the many grievances addressed in the Senate’s orders to the Duke of Thessaloniki in response to 
the delegation of Caloianni Radino, Thomas Crussulora (Chrysoloras) and George Jaica from 
Thessaloniki. One of the many clauses of these orders, which deal with everything from justice of 
crime to the payment of workers and the taxation of Jews, is for the provision of 2000 measures of 
wheat for the poor of the city per month while the Venetians hold the city.156 Again in December of 
1425 the need for wheat was growing and the purchase of 14,000 staia of wheat to be bought in 
Venice, Puglia, and Corfu. 157 It quickly becomes clear that the winters and the mid-spring time seem 
to be when the calls for food are dealt with and that may not be accidental. In the winter the 
besieged city needs food to survive the colder months and had little access to its own hinterland for 
the harvest while in the spring the Ottomans would have been pressing their attacks and 
campaigning to take the city further preventing the collection of food. On 8 February 1426 Crete is 
reminded that all available wheat should be sent to the city to prevent starvation. 158 The island was 
further ordered to send its wheat 22 July 1426.159 Crete was not the only sources of these shipments 
however and on 13 August 1426 the bailo of Corfu was ordered to provide 1400 staia of wheat for 
Thessaloniki.160 Then 22 July 1427 wheat is needed again for the city and 8000 staia was 
purchased.161 The next three documents that deal with the problem of Thessaloniki are all found in 
quick succession and deal with the payment for and provision of wheat for the city that the Senate 
handled directly. These occurred on 30 December 1427 when more money was found for 2200 staia 
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of wheat to be delivered to the city162, on 28 February 1428 when 3-4000 staia of wheat were ready 
to be sent to the city and must leave before 31 March163 and finally another order was placed 26 
March 1428 for 12,000 staia.164 As time progressed the Senate and the state it seems could not keep 
up with the demand of the city. On 17 September 1428, Giacomo Badoer was reimbursed for the 
money he spent shipping wheat to Thessaloniki.165 It is possible that more nobles and merchants 
took on these shipments and sought reimbursement or payment later for the provision of food for 
the city the Senate was attempting to save. As the end neared the strain placed on the rest of the 
Venetian Stato di Mar became greater and on 2 March 1430 Negroponte and Crete were ordered to 
stop withholding wheat bound for the city.166 The total combined effort to deliver a constant supply 
of food to the starving, besieged city of Thessaloniki demanded a heavy toll on the city of Venice 
who had no source of wheat itself. Venice required its own supplies as well as those it had to send 
off to Thessaloniki and other territories within its budding overseas empire. 
Aside from the supply and feeding of the city of Thessaloniki Venice became responsible for the 
defence of the city as well. This took the form of not only soldiers but also the fleet that came to 
defend the city when threats of attack were imminent. Venice may have expected the city to 
support its own defence but many of the ships came from Venice and from Crete and the money and 
troops came from throughout Venice’s lands. When Venier and Zorzi first took command, their 
orders instructed them to create a garrison from the revenues of the city. However, the city needed 
naval defence so on 19 December 1423 Crete was ordered to prepare two galleys. They recognized 
that a strong naval presence was required, though at this point Thessaloniki was not specifically 
called out as needing protection. The correlation however is easily made between the acceptance of 
this city and the order to strengthen the fleet.167 In June 1424 a shipment of 2000 ducats bound for 
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Tana was diverted and half of it was left with Thessaloniki to help cover the costs of its defence. To 
recover these loses customs agents in Venice were made to pay the duties of two and three percent 
of all goods brought into the city by 15 July.168 Later in June 1424 one hundred foot-soldiers were 
sent to the city to make up for ‘losses’. It is clear that fighting was a continuous event at the city and 
troops were needed to recuperate the losses suffered.169 In the same response and orders to the 
Duke that the Senate presented to the delegation of Thessalonians on 7 July 1425 the early sections 
of the orders concern the protection of the city and the fortification of Kassandreia, the fortifications 
that protected the harbour and peninsula of the city as well as the repair of portions of the city’s 
walls.170 23 July 1425 they ordered that the tower defending the city should be repaired while Murad 
is distracted. The Captain of the Sea is then ordered to leave his galley to defend the city if peace 
had been made between Venice and the Ottomans, but if not, he should continue to harass and 
attack the Ottomans. The Senate also provides 14,000 ducats to pay for the men of the fleet that 
were protecting the city through their aggressive actions.171 On August 29 1425, the Captain General 
of the Sea requested 200 soldiers for the defence of the city a further indication of the losses the city 
was suffering. The Senate in Venice is only able to send 50-60 Paduan crossbowmen.172 Despite 
numerous attempts, peace with the Ottomans was not concluded so the Senate commanded that 
two new galleys should be sent to Thessaloniki from Crete on 8 February 1426.173 Two more were to 
be sent to Modon if possible. In April, Niccolo Trevisan, the Supervisor of the Gulf, was sent to Corfu 
and Modon to report on the situation in Thessaloniki as well as Genoese plans before travelling on 
to the city of Thessaloniki itself. There he was meant to deliver 3000 ducats for the defence of the 
city and bring the two old galleys from Crete back home since they had already been replaced.174 In 
April of 1426 along with their new diplomatic offer for Murad’s consideration the Senate instructs 
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the Duke and the Captain of Thessaloniki to use the 3,000 ducats sent with the ambassador for the 
troops defending the city.175 By September of that same year the Senate gave instruction to the 
Captain of the Gulf to on what to do with the fleet before his return to Venice. If peace had been 
made with the Ottomans then the captain should decide whether or not to leave the galley at 
Thessaloniki to defend it; however, if peace had not been concluded then the galley must be left 
behind for the defence of the city.176 In July of 1427 the situation in Thessaloniki seems to have 
grown desperate as the White Tower there was granted to the governor of Crete, thereby tying him 
to the city’s fate and requiring him to send fifty troops for the defence of the city. This was to be 
matched by fifty troops from Venice and these troops and their equipment were transported to the 
city via Negroponte aboard a galley.177 On 25 July 1427 the Senate elects Paolo Orio the new Captain 
of Thessaloniki but he was unable to join the galley sailing to the city and travels later on another 
carrying more troops for its defence.178 Later in September the Captain of the Gulf is ordered to 
guard the city and a galley from Crete is sent to support this action.179 In an interesting case of 
compensation one Antonio Contarini was paid for equipment that was taken from him to outfit a 
warship in anticipation of a Turkish assault on the city.180This may indicate that the city was not 
always aware of incoming assaults by the Ottomans, nor in a position to always be able to answer 
them immediately. On 23 January 1429 the large galley that defended the city was deemed 
completely out of service and a replacement was ordered, that ship was sent 7 February.181 In March 
of that year the captain of the city was captured by Murad and the Senate sent 3 galleys to assist the 
city. One of these suffered damage and Crete was made to pay for the replacement.182 In April the 
new captain was elected and departed immediately for the city with new ships.183 Venice continued 
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to provide support for the city with what they believed could be sent to save the city. It is clear that 
the Senate did not send the troops requested by the defenders of the city. Stantchev argues that 
they should have been able to supply more troops and defences to the city based on their 
expenditure and troop numbers for their northern Italian wars fought concurrently with the defence 
of Thessaloniki.184 However, it was very likely that this concurrent warfare was the cause of the 
Senate’s inability to send greater defences to the city. A loss of in the Aegean could be disastrous 
and set back Venetian plans of expansion; however, a loss in northern Italy could mean the loss of 
Venice entirely. Therefore, it is understandable that the Senate would focus most of its time and 
resources on the threat closer to home.  
Finally, the Senate spent more than a small fortune on numerous embassies and diplomatic 
overtures in hope of securing peace with Murad II. The first recorded peace offer for the city 
between the Venetians and the Ottomans comes from April 1426.185 The Senate demanded that 
Venice remain overlords of the city but are willing to pay 100,000 aspres a year from the sale of salt, 
as had been the practice when Andronicus had ruled the city. Furthermore, it Turks would be given 
the right of trial by the cadi for matters of money but by Venice for all other things. Fugitive slaves 
would be exchanged by both sides and the gates of the city would be opened for trade and 
commerce would be allowed to continue. This agreement was never agreed upon. The next 
attempted offer came July 1427 and kept the same conditions and agreements but increased the 
yearly tribute from 100,000 aspres to 150,000.186 This was also rejected. And the final attempt at 
diplomacy before the fall in 1430 came in August 1428. This agreement offered 300,000 aspres from 
the revenue of the city and only added that two ships recently capture in the Dardanelles be 
returned to Venice.187 Venice it seems was desperate to maintain control over the city so greatly 
that it was willing to offer ever increasing tribute to the Ottomans to retain their dominion over it. 
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Once again this appears to be an action born of careful consideration and thought to keep what was 
deemed to be an important city to the Venetians. Despite the problems it caused the republic the 
Senate continued to send vast resources and multiple diplomatic overtures in an effort to keep the 
city in their possession.  
Although it was agreed that the Venetians would take the city from the Greeks and hold it 
against the Ottoman incursions, not all Greeks were pleased with the situation. While preferable to 
Ottoman occupation, it was not long before problems arose between the Venetians and their Greek 
subjects within Thessaloniki. The Venetian Senate received complaints from the Greek population 
twice: the first in 1425 with various complaints about the administration of the city by the Venetians 
in charge, and again in 1429.188 The first letter of complaints discusses various taxation and duties 
that had been placed on the Thessalonians and limited or competed with their rights to the sale of 
goods such as cloth and linen.189 It also discussed the expenditure of money, in times of peace, to 
honour St. Demetrius, patron saint of the city, for his feast days. This may indicate that Venice was 
not upholding their promise to the Greeks, the condition of their acceptance of the city, that the 
people of the city would be allowed to keep their rights and religious practices without interruption. 
The second brings forward many of the same complaints and indicates that the state of relations 
between Greek population and their Venetian overlords had not improved in the preceding four 
years of occupation. This second letter of complaint focuses mainly on the defences of the city and 
the demand for further protection by the Venetians, but also requested that the rights of the 
Archbishop be recognised and his jurisdiction within the city.190 It also dealt with the return of 
Greeks who had previously fled the city and wished to return. It is clear from these records that the 
Venetians were not upholding their promises to the Greeks; however, they were also helping defend 
the city from the Ottomans and were likely acting as best they could to counteract the assault on 
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their newly acquired city. Including cracking down on the rights and freedoms of the inhabitants. It is 
known that four Thessalonians, one of which died in prison, were arrested by the Venetians and sent 
first Crete and later to Venice itself.191 Later, there is mention of two Thessalonians imprisoned in 
Padua who are released because of the expense it is to keep them held captive.192 These Greeks 
were deemed a threat to the Venetians for collusion with the Ottomans during the siege. The Greek 
accounts further highlight the feelings of feelings of discord between the Venetians and their 
subjects. Symeon, the Archbishop of Thessaloniki before his death in 1429, was a strong supporter of 
keeping the city Orthodox and while he supported the fight against the Ottomans was not a 
supporter of the Venetian occupation. He praised the enthusiasm that the Venetians held for 
defending against the Ottomans at first but comments that the city remained ‘suffering and 
oppressed’.193 While it is not recorded that the Greeks ever did revolt against the Venetians the 
Greek chronicles and authors certainly believed that it was possible and in one case had actually 
happened. Doukas records that to prevent rebellion from the Greeks the Venetians moved many 
Greeks out of the city. According to the Greek author this was reported to have been done under the 
guise of reducing the drain on the city’s resources.194 These nobles were sent to Euboea, Crete, and 
Venice. There does not seem to be much support for this; however, it was not a tactically unsound 
move if truly carried out by the Venetians. Before Venice even took charge of the city of Thessaloniki 
many Greek nobility that could relocate already had due to the constant threat of the Ottomans. 
One Greek, Kougeas, who left the ‘unfortunate city’ due in part to the Venetian occupation. Fleeing 
on April 8 1425, he made for Constantinople ‘on account of the great and dreadful and unbearable 
occurrences’ in Thessaloniki including the siege and ‘because that wretched city had come under 
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control of the Venetian Franks’.195 His departure from the city predates the Venetian response to the 
ambassadors sent to the Senate, but he likely knew of the grievances posed in their embassy. One 
source claims that the Greeks were in open revolt against the Venetians but no other source claims 
or even hints that the Greeks ever reached that level of opposition to the Venetian rule.196 It seems 
that the Venetians, despite their efforts to defend the Greeks, were not welcome. Some, like 
Symeon, even refused to attribute the help of the Venetians as an assistance. The arrival of food on 
ships is often described as a surprise and attributed to the miracles of St. Demetrius throughout 
Symeon’s account.197 The Venetians were ‘neglectful… quarrelling with one another and there was 
no human agency to help us [the Greeks], no ship, no galley, no sustenance’.198 This in contrast to 
the known expenses and effort Venice put into defending the city against the Ottoman threat.  
2.4 Losing Thessaloniki (1430) 
Despite the efforts of the Venetians and the Senate the city fell to the Ottoman army on 29 March 
1430. The Greek author and eye witness to the events of the Venetian occupation and the siege, 
John Anagnostes, recorded the events of the final assault and the fall of the city to the Ottomans. His 
account, often critical of the Venetians displays them as a cowardly group and suggests that they 
abandoned the city and the people. From Anagnostes we know that most of the Venetian forces 
were what he called Tzetarioi, a ‘collection of robbers brought together from various places’.199 
These were the mercenary soldiers that the Venetians brought in to help defend the city at what 
was likely not an insignificant cost to themselves. Melville-Jones explains that they were mercenary 
soldiers hired from around the Balkan area. The surviving archival material does not mention these 
mercenaries; however, it is likely that the Duke and Captain of the city may have hired them as their 
commission provided for the maintenance of a force for each and implies that they were required to 
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have these soldiers for the defence of themselves and the city.200 These mercenaries were used to 
make up for the lack of Venetian soldiers within the city. According to Anagnostes, the Venetians 
lined their men along the walls and found them not only in poor supply of weapons but also they 
numbered only ‘one man standing there for every two or three merlons’.201 Furthermore, the 
mercenaries were used to watch over the Greek soldiers whom the Venetians deemed 
untrustworthy, likely stemming from the issues already discussed that plagued relations with the 
Venetians and the previous plot to betray the city to the Ottomans previously.202 The Venetians, 
worried over their ships sitting in the city’s harbour and fearing attack by Ottoman ships withdrew 
their archers from the walls and repositioned them to defend the three galleys in the city at that 
time.203 According to Anagnostes this was done without the knowledge of the other defenders and 
many Greek believed the Venetians were retreating from the walls and not repositioning to better 
defend from a sea attack. The Venetian insight is proven correct when shortly after this, the 
Ottomans did strike from the sea but were defeated by one of the Venetian galleys. This is recorded 
as a rare point of praise from Anagnostes, though he does finish the passage with the lamenting 
words ‘…if only this [the victory at sea] had been so with the disaster which took place during the 
day’.204 It seems that the Venetians had prior knowledge or idea that the Ottomans may strike from 
the sea first and thus their move was a smart tactical decision to help repel the ships should any of 
the Turkish vessels break through into the city. While not tactically sound to not inform their allies 
along the walls of this decision, it likely stems to the growing distrust between the Venetians and 
their Greek co-inhabitants of Thessaloniki. If the Venetians felt they could not trust the Greeks, as 
Anagnostes helpfully points out, they may have believed that informing the Greeks of the shift in the 
defenders may have reached the ears of the Ottomans, prompting an attack when the defences 
were weakened. The assault on the city began on the fourth day of the siege with the personal foot-
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soldiers of the Sultan Murad focused on the district of the city known as the Trigonion, because he 
saw that the walls there were ‘rotten’ and that the city would fall easily through this section.205  
 Anagnostes provides a vivid account of the assault and the fall of the city on ‘third hour of 
the fourth day’ of the siege, 29 March 1430.206 The Ottomans swarming into the city drove into the 
city towards the inhabited areas, particularly towards the harbour. As the city fell the inhabitants 
took shelter wherever they could, hiding in homes, churches, tunnels, and tombs in fear of the 
attackers. Others fled towards the harbour in attempts to board the galleys and other ships that 
waited there. Here, Anagnostes seems to highlight the height of the Venetian cowardice. The fleeing 
citizens of the city fled towards the tower, called Samareia or Samaria, because it was near the shore 
and was well stocked and defended. However, the Venetians ‘of high rank and some of the Tzetarioi 
who were acting as their bodyguards made their escape there, then they blocked the entrance to 
the rest’.207 These high-ranking Venetians then fled across the mole and boarded the galleys that had 
been moved from the harbour to wait for them there. There are no surviving Venetian accounts of 
the siege and the fall to counteract the claims of cowardice or fleeing the city. Other later Greek 
accounts continue to tell of this act of cowardice and anti-Venetian sentiment.208 It is interesting 
though that one of the few Ottoman account of the siege makes no distinction between Venetians 
and Greeks, noting only that the sultan was opposed by ‘infidels’.209 
Immediate reactions to the loss of the city do not appear to have survived in the records of 
the state, if they were recorded at all. This has led to the belief that the city meant very little to the 
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Venetians. However, it becomes clear from two key instances that the Senate had every intention of 
reclaiming the city if possible. The first instance can be found not long after the fall. The Senate 
sends orders to the Captain of the Sea to continue to strike out at Ottoman ships and harass their 
territories like Gallipoli in an attempt to achieve a more favourable treaty. The goal of this treaty was 
to regain the lost city if at all possible.210 Reports from the captain’s actions do not survive, so it is 
unclear whether or not he was successful in striking any meaningful targets. However, as the terms 
of the treaty, signed 4 September 1430, did not include the return of Thessaloniki to the Venetians it 
seems unlikely that his harassment achieved much at all.211 The order however does indicate that 
the Venetian Senate did not simply accept the loss of Thessaloniki and sought to find a way to 
reverse this. The second instance occurs fourteen years after the loss of Thessaloniki, in the lead up 
and events during the Crusade of Varna in 1444-5. These will be addressed in more detail in the next 
chapter; however, it should be mentioned here. In the lead up to the departure of the crusading 
fleet from Venice, which consisted of ships from Burgundy as well as ships under command of the 
Papal legate and ships from Venice itself, the Senate sent out a letter to the bailos and captains of its 
holdings overseas. These instructions told them to gather information on likely targets for the fleet 
to hit the Ottomans where they were weakest with several suggested locations listed, this list 
included the city of Thessaloniki. The response to this order has not survived if there was one; 
however during the crusade itself the Venetian fleet detoured into the Aegean. The next chapter 
deals with this crusade and the possible conclusions that can be drawn from these events and the 
goals of this diversion.   
Venetian occupation of Thessaloniki did not last long, only seven years from acquisition to 
loss, but it provides a clear example of the extent and limit that the city of Venice was willing to go 
to protect their investment, even during a time of war closer to the home front. They provided the 
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city with food, protection in men, weapons, and ships, and sent numerous diplomatic missions to 
sue for peace with the Ottomans and allow Venice to retain control of the city. The deliberations and 
choices of the Senate leading up to their occupation of the Senate were not the actions of a state 
that was acting on reflex or haphazardly. Sages were brought in to advise the Senate and careful 
consideration was placed before taking the city, having rejected a chance to take the city previously. 
Venice likely planned to use Thessaloniki as a main port and possibly a centre for managing their 
Aegean holdings if they could keep a hold on the city for long enough. The loss of the city led the 
Senate to seek to reclaim it on several occasions. The expansion of their overseas empire was of 
utmost importance to the Venetians and the city of Thessaloniki was a significant jewel to add to 
their collection.  
There remains the question of whether the Venetians in any way considered themselves to be 
defending the Christian faith in their efforts to hold on to Thessaloniki. Antonio Morosini seems at 
first sight to sum the whole thing up as a matter of finance: 
The community of Venice has spent in all, counting soldiers on land and men at sea, with many 
shiploads of grain and other foodstuffs, and the arming of galleys, in total 740,000 ducats. 
However, he does address the disaster in religious terms, presenting it as not just a defeat for the 
Venetians but a divine punishment for the whole of Christendom: 
All this is because of ours sins, and those of the whole of Christianity, because we have not 
shown gratitude to the Eternal God for the favours that He has so often bestowed upon us, and 
that we have not recognised, and it seems to many that in this life these things happen so that 
we may gain a better understanding.212 
Whatever the wounded feelings of Venetians and Greeks, Thessaloniki seems to have recovered from 
its fall quite quickly. When the Italian humanist Cyriac of Ancona (1391-1452) visited a few years 
                                                          
212 Il Codice Morosini, vol. 3, p. 1419; trans. Melville-Jones, Venice and Thessalonica, p. 220. 
68 
 
afterwards he could happily wander around the city where the monuments, including the church of St 
Demetrius were all intact. The biggest change was demographic but the shift was to a Jewish rather 
than a Muslim population.213 
Chapter 3: The Crusade of Varna: the Condulmer Family and Venetian Involvement  
3.1 Introduction:  
In any discussion of Venice’s decision to participate in a crusade in the later Middle Ages, the military 
and naval expeditions that have become collectively known as ‘the Crusade of Varna’ must be 
included. It is worth pointing out at the outset that there was a naval aspect to this campaign, since 
the most of the current secondary works largely ignore it.214 As a small city-state unable to field a 
large army, when it comes to the participation of Venice and Venetians, it is the naval campaign that 
must be the focus of attention, although the fate of the land army was intimately bound up with it. 
As will be seen, the focus will be two-fold, discussing first, the Venetian promoters and participants 
who were based outside Venice in the papal curia in Rome: Pope Eugenius IV (1431-1447) and other 
members of the Condulmer family. Second comes Venice itself, and how its government responded 
to the call for a crusade, and to the news of its progress. The chapter will argue that in the case of 
the Condulmer family the primary motivation for involvement was to vindicate the primacy of the 
pope in the face of the challenge mounted by the conciliar movement. Nevertheless, the actions of 
some members of the family during the crusade seem to display residual ties to their native Venice 
and to the policies of its government. In analysing the response of the Venetian government, it will 
be argued that the republic’s participation was influenced by an additional consideration, more than 
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simply the defence of Christendom, the recovery of Thessaloniki. This, however, is not necessarily to 
imply that the Venetian participation is somehow lacking in commitment nor dedication to the cause 
of the crusade. Furthermore, examination of the sources will attempt to bring to light the Venetian 
participation in a crusade for which they have received little or no credit from modern historians.  
3.2 The Condulmer Family in the Papal Court: 
 The Venetian Condulmer family played a significant role in the background and genesis of 
the Crusade of Varna and while Pope Eugenius IV preached the Crusade, another of their number, 
Francesco Condulmer (1390-1453) served as the appointed papal legate of the crusading fleet and 
actively worked in Venice to complete its preparations.  
 Pope Eugenius IV was born Gabriele Condulmer in Venice around 1383 to a seemingly 
unimportant noble family. The family only came to prominence in 1381 after the War of Chioggia, 
but did possess a prestigious home within Venice, the Tolentini Palace located at St. Simeon the 
Prophet in the direction of St. John the Evangelist.215 When Gabriele was 15 he entered into the 
canonry of the cathedral of Verona and in 1406 was invited to Rome by his maternal uncle, Pope 
Gregory XII (1406-1415).216 He was given the Bishopric of Siena in 1407 due to his ties with his uncle 
and remained in that position until he was recalled to Venice by his family where he, along with his 
cousin, Antonio Correr, founded an Augustinian monastery at S. Nicolo di Lido, which they later 
moved to S. Giorgio di Alga. He was briefly given the bishopric of Corone but resigned from the 
position when he was made Cardinal of S. Clemente 12 May 1408. He was appointed vicar of the 
Sees of both Corone and Constantinople in January 1409 and in 1417 upon the death of their uncle, 
both Gabriele and Antonio attended the Council of Constance supporting reform within the Church. 
Gabriele served under Pope Martin V (1369-1431) until the pope’s death at which time he was 
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elected pope himself 3 March 1431.217 Eugenius IV’s reign began in a troubled time for the papacy, 
with the start of the Council of Basel and the challenge that it presented to the authority of the 
Papacy. He would spend the next decade working and fighting against them. His contests with the 
Council defined his role as a Pope and he focused on ensuring the power of the Papacy held firm and 
that the position of the Pope maintained its worldly and spiritual importance. Furthermore, through 
the involvement of the Orthodox Greeks and the Byzantine Emperor himself, the struggle between 
the Pope and the Council directly led to the launching of the Crusade of Varna.  
Francesco Condulmer’s rise to power came directly from his uncle’s position. Eugenius’ 
appointment to the papacy in March 1431 made Francesco’s rise nearly unstoppable. Throughout 
his career he stuck close to his uncle and collaborated with him to safeguard the power of the 
papacy within the Church. Francesco Condulmer was born in Venice around 1390. Under Gabriele’s 
instruction Francesco joined the canons in the Convent of St. John of Padua where he studied law 
and history.218 After Gabriele’s election in 1431 Francesco quickly rose to greater heights being 
appointed Cardinal of S. Clemente on 19 September of that same year.219 Francesco became ever 
more tied to Eugenius and was increasingly called upon to handle issues throughout Italy and 
Christendom: in April 1435 he was called upon to study problems between Naples and the Roman 
Curia, and in 1438 he was ordered by a bull to take control of the activities of the third Franciscan 
order of Venice and to remove the habit of those in rebellion. He also gained numerous positions 
including director of Amiens in June 1436, Archbishop of Besanꞔon in 1437, the bishopric of Verona 
in October 1438, and the position of vice-chancellor in 1439.220 Despite the titles he was given, 
Francesco remained in Rome with his uncle much of the time. In 1442 he was appointed by Eugenius 
as legate of the fleet for the Crusade of Varna. His work both during the Council of Ferrara-Florence 
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and during the Crusade of Varna followed the policies of Eugenius IV. Like his uncle, Francesco 
focused his efforts on improving the position of the papacy and championing papal authority.   
Aside from the prominent figures of Gabriele and Francesco, two other Condulmer family 
members played an important role in the family’s fight against the Council of Basel and both are 
reported to have participated in the Crusade of Varna, though in less prominent roles. Marco 
Condulmer born c.1405-08, like Francesco, entered into an ecclesiastical career at the urgings of his 
uncle, Gabriele. By 1427 he was in Rome with Gabriele and was appointed to the offices of Dean of 
Patras, sub deacon of the Holy See and the Castel Sant’Angelo.221 In 1430 Pope Martin V appointed 
him bishop of Avignon. On February 8, 1433 Marco took possession of Bologna in place of Fantino 
Dandolo, however the city rose against him and he was captured along with Venetian ambassador 
Paolo Tron. He was appointed to the metropolitan See of Tarentaise (modern day Moutiers in Savoy) 
in 1434. However, in keeping with the traditions of the Condulmer family he remained in Rome 
instead of moving to his newly appointed position. He later took an active role in the action against 
the Council of Basel.222 In 1437 he was sent with the delegation to Constantinople to bring the Greek 
Emperor and his entourage to the Council of Ferrara-Florence. And in 1439 he was present for the 
drafting of the Decree from the Council of Ferrara-Florence.223 
Our final figure of importance, Antonio Condulmer, is almost completely unknown. Unlike the 
other members of his family whose backgrounds are traceable through their ecclesiastical career, 
Antonio was a layman making records of his life much harder to investigate. Aside from a few 
documents discussing his involvement in the fleet that went to Constantinople during the contest 
between the Council of Basel and the Council of Ferrara-Florence and a mention of his service in the 
crusader fleet during the Crusade of Varna little is known of him.224 Antonio provides an interesting 
contrast to the other members of the Condulmer family, who forwent their places in Venice to 
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follow ecclesiastical careers and tied themselves largely to the power of papal authority, while 
Antonio remained a layman and likely remained in Venice for much of his life. 
3.3 The Council of Basel and the Conciliar Movement: 
To understand the involvement of Eugenius IV and his kinsmen in the Crusade of Varna, it is 
essential to place it in the context of the ecclesiastical politics of the late fourteenth and early 
fifteenth centuries and the challenge that was being mounted to the traditional claim of the pope to 
authority over the whole Church. This challenge took the form of the conciliar movement which 
began in no small part due to the schism caused in the Western Church by the death of Pope 
Gregory XI (1370-1378). After numerous attempts to unite the Church it was decided that a general 
council was needed to solve the issue of the Schism. Thus in 1409 the Council of Pisa was held, the 
main purpose of which was to decide which of the sitting Popes, Gregory XII (1406-1415) or Benedict 
XIII (1394-1423), had the legitimate claim.225 The delegates rapidly and unanimously elected Pope 
Alexander V (1409-1410) as replacement to both Benedict and Gregory. The remainder of the 
Council of Pisa dealt largely with the forgiveness of Cardinals from both other parties after which the 
council dispersed. However, neither Benedict nor Gregory agreed with the Council’s ruling and 
refused to step down leaving three sitting Popes over the Western Church.226 Alexander died only 
months after the completion of the Council of Pisa and John XXIII (1410-1415) was elected to replace 
him. By 1414 the situation had grown out of control leading John to call together another council, 
the Council of Constance 1414-18. The main goals of Constance were much the same as Pisa: to 
unite the Church under a singular pope, to deal with certain concerns over heresy, and to discuss 
reform within the Church. Constance, unlike Pisa, attempted to ensure that it would succeed where 
the previous council had failed, by asserting the power of the Council over that of the Pope within 
the Church. To this end it produced two main decrees: Sacrosancta or Haec Sancta, which agreed 
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that the Pope and his Curia would continue to oversee the day to day running of the Church but that 
the Cardinals held the right to call for general councils.227 This had been at the core of the failings of 
the Council of Pisa as it lacked legitimate backing from the sitting Popes and had not been able to 
secure a decree stating its superiority over them. The second decree, Frequens, called for a series of 
Councils to be held at regular intervals that would deal with any future concerns and needs of the 
Church.228 Constance succeeded in electing Pope Martin V (1417-1431), Eugenius IV’s predecessor, 
and removing the other claimants from their seats, thus reuniting the Western Church under one 
Pope seated at Rome. However, the conciliar movement had proven that it could deal with the 
internal matters of the Church, held the power to call and hold general councils, and had even 
chosen a Pope to rule over the affairs of the Church. In 1423 in accordance with Frequens the 
Council of Pavia was called but Martin V in a position of relative power by this point was able to 
disperse the council before much was achieved.229 The Council of Basel, however, which began in 
1431 again in accordance with Frequens was called to session by Pope Martin V shortly before his 
death. Upon his election Pope Eugenius IV himself confirmed the Council. The council’s main 
concern was the Hussite heresy but quickly turned once more to the question of papal supremacy 
within the Church.  
Quite apart from the Council’s challenge to the centuries old power of the Pope, the Condulmers 
may also have felt themselves to be directly threatened. In 1430 the city of Avignon revolted against 
Marco Condulmer who had been appointed bishop of the city by Pope Martin V. The city turned 
against Marco due to his refusal to leave Rome and reside in Avignon itself. This rebellion was later 
backed by the Council of Basel which in 1431 attempted to appoint Cardinal Abionso Carillo as vicar 
of Avignon. Marco refused to meet with the Council to mediate the situation.230 Eventually the 
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conflict was resolved when Pope Eugenius IV removed Marco and appointed Pierre de Foix as legate 
of Avignon. This is the first of many issues that the Pope had to contend with in his struggles against 
the Council of Basel. The Council’s power grew by attracting many of the most important figures of 
the church including Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini (1398-1444). Cesarini arrived in Basel in September 
1431 and under his leadership the Council fought against the Pope until he changed sides and joined 
the Papacy. It seems that by the beginning of the Crusade of Varna the two had reconciled as 
Eugenius IV trusted Cesarini enough to appoint him legate to the crusader army in Hungary.231 In 
December 1431 Eugenius, possibly sensing the threat that the Council could pose, attempted to 
disperse it but the council refused to comply and renewed the decree Sacrosancta that was 
established during the Council of Constance (1414-18).232 After a long battle Eugenius admitted 
some level of defeat and in December 1433, two years after he called for the dissolution of the 
council, he rescinded the order. In 1434 the Council of Basel backed a revolt against the Pope and his 
family in Rome. Eugenius escaped down the Tiber River but Francesco Condulmer was captured by 
rioters and imprisoned in Florence until 1435.233 In 1437 Eugenius attempted to transfer the council 
to Ferrara, closer to the Papal States, in attempts to counteract the Council of Basel and he 
succeeded in luring away a number of its delegates. In response to his attempts to take power and 
respected figures of the Church away, the Council of Basel suspended Eugenius as Pope and in 1439 
elected Duke Amadeus VIII of Savoy, a layman, as his successor. He took the name Felix V. Eugenius, 
however, continued to hold power within Italy.234 
3.2.1 The Condulmers’ fight against the Council of Basel  
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Eugenius’ attempts to fight back against the Council of Basel led to the creation of his own 
council now known as the Council of Ferrara-Florence since it was moved from Ferrara to Florence in 
early 1439 after a plague outbreak. The Council of Ferrara-Florence was Eugenius’ main tool to 
counter the Council of Basel and from this council he fought back and eventually won out over the 
conciliar movement.  
The event that would bring success to the Condulmers and that would ultimately spell the end of 
the Council of Basel came in the form of a diplomatic contact with the Byzantine Emperor John VIII 
Palaiologos (1425-1448). John began his reign in a period of fierce aggression from the Ottomans. 
The Ottomans had laid siege to Thessaloniki in 1422 and a year later the Despot Andronikos 
Palaiologos (1408-23), John VIII’s brother, granted the city to the Venetians in an attempt to save the 
city from falling. The emperor was desperate for allies to aid in the protection of his remaining lands 
and sought them wherever possible. In 1421 he had married Sophia, daughter of Theodore II of 
Montferrat (1381-1418), in an attempt to gain alliances.235 In the 1430s with the division in the 
Western Church coming to a head, John saw the perfect opportunity to gain further support from 
the West. Hoping to lure support he approached Eugenius in 1431 with overtures of the promise of 
unification between Orthodox and Occidental Churches. The Pope however was initially resistant to 
John’s approaches, so with the rise of the Council of Basel, John VIII sent delegates to the Council in 
an attempt to gain support from them instead, or at least to play the rivalling parties against each 
other.236 With the start of Eugenius’ Council in Ferrara the two competing councils each sought to 
gain the attention of John VIII in an effort to achieve unification of the Church. For the important 
mission of enticing the Emperor to come to the Council of Ferrara-Florence and not to the Council of 
Basel Eugenius, unsurprisingly, chose two of his nephews, Marco and Antonio Condulmer. They were 
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given the task of travelling to Constantinople and bringing the Emperor to Italy.237 Marco served as 
the chosen legate and spiritual ambassador for the venture while Antonio, who was a layman, 
served as commander of the fleet that travelled to collect the Greek delegation. This event highlights 
the deep commitment of the Condulmer family in championing Papal supremacy over the Council. 
Upon their arrival in Constantinople, they discovered a fleet from the Council of Basel had arrived to 
carry out similar orders from their own council. Antonio Condulmer despite being a layman showed 
great loyalty to the position of his uncle, Pope Eugenius, when he began threatening and planning to 
attack the fleet from the Council of Basel. His plan was only waylaid by the intercession of Emperor 
John VIII, who warned that they would be wrong to start a war within his lands.238 The Emperor 
eventually agreed to travel to the Council of Ferrara-Florence largely due to the lack of decision 
making and arrogance of the remaining members of the Council of Basel. Eugenius was adaptable 
and more conciliatory when dealing with the Emperor and agreed to meet him at his leisure 
following the negotiations previously discussed between Pope Martin V and the Emperor for a trip 
that never happened. The Council of Basel however refused to negotiate with the Emperor about a 
meeting place, as the Emperor did not want to travel further than Italy, while the Council demanded 
he travel to Basel to meet them. Eugenius IV conversely agreed to meet in Italy and even reportedly 
allowed that they could meet in Constantinople if necessary. This allowance and his cordial attitude 
won out and the Emperor travelled with the Condulmers’ fleet to Venice and from there to the 
Council of Ferrara-Florence.239 This visit shows the influence Eugenius held in Venice. Not only did 
Venice allow Antonio Condulmer to take a fleet of ships under his command to Constantinople, 
Venice agreed to play host to the Emperor in the lead up to his meeting with the Council. They also 
agreed to host the Emperor and the delegates for up to twelve days and to provide an allowance not 
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exceeding 3000 ducats during the Emperor’s stay.240 This was in line with their promise in 1436 to 
not only host the Emperor should he travel to Italy but also to provide for the defence of 
Constantinople in his absence.241 This promise may also have influenced John VIII’s agreement to 
come with the papal ambassador to the Council of Ferrara-Florence and not to the Council of Basel 
as the Venetian protection may not have been offered had he done so. On top of the allowance 
provided, the Venetian Senate allowed the Greeks to bring any provisions they brought with them 
into the city without charge. The Doge of Venice, Francesco Foscari , welcomed the Emperor to 
Venice and held a pageant in the Emperor’s honour which included the use of the Doge’s barge 
equipped with the imperial eagle mounted between the winged lions of St. Mark.  After playing host 
to the Emperor the Venetian Senate kept watch on how the Council played out and advised the Pope 
on a number of matters.242 This included warning him against shifting the location of the council 
again to prevent rumours of incompetence should the council move again without achieving 
anything.243 Upon completion of the negotiations between Eugenius IV and John VIII the declaration 
of the union of the Churches was announced in 1439. The Greeks then approached the Venetians 
about transport homewards. The Byzantines requested the use of a trade fleet heading to Tana to 
provide extra protection for the Emperor’s ships; however, the Venetians denied this as it would 
have delayed the trade fleet and disrupted the route. Instead they offered the protection of a galley 
and two other ships that were bound for Crete as protection along the journey.244 The meeting 
between the Emperor and the Pope largely marked the end of the conflict with the Council of Basel. 
Eugenius was successful in not only gaining the prestige of recognition of the Byzantine Emperor by 
his agreement to come to his council and not the Council of Basel, but he had also obtained 
promises from the Emperor to promote a unification of the Church in exchange for an organized 
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expedition to the East in the defence of Byzantine lands. This promise, which would be upheld by 
Eugenius, though not so by John VIII, led to the preaching and subsequent launch of the Crusade of 
Varna. The emperor faced opposition in Constantinople led by Mark Eugenikos (d.1445) and later 
George Scholarios (c. 1400-1473), and others like Syropoulos. This anti-union faction was able to 
undo much of the work that had been do at the Council of Ferrara-Florence, in large part due to 
John’s half-hearted attempts to control the eastern Church.245 The anti-unionists saw the emperor’s 
allowance for the debates at Xylalas Palace as a sign that he did not want the unification but it had 
been forced upon him at Florence. Despite this fact, the Council of Basel had been completely 
outmanoeuvred by Eugenius and the Council of Ferrara-Florence. Basel remained in existence 
protected by the supporters of their chosen Pope Felix V until finally dissolving in 1449. 
3.3.2 Francesco and the Preparations for the Crusade of Varna 
The Crusade of Varna was launched by Eugenius as he had promised Emperor John VIII 
Palaiologos, in return for the Emperor bringing the news and process of unification to the East. On 
January 1 1443 Eugenius pronounced the crusade through the Papal bull Postquam ad Apicem.246 
The bull proclaims the need for both an army and a fleet to fight against the Turks and to gain victory 
in Hungary. Furthermore, it claims that the Cardinals have given consent to the raising of the tithe 
from their benefices. It not only boosted the Pope’s prestige and essentially ended the Pope’s 
conflict with the Council of Basel but it also allowed the Pope to launch a crusade against the 
Ottomans to protect and possibly extend the reach of Christendom. Eugenius appointed two legates 
to serve as the Papal representatives on the crusade. Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini, who had reconciled 
himself with Eugenius after heading the Council of Basel in the early period of its conflict with the 
Pope, was selected as the legate to the land army. While Cardinal Francesco Condulmer, Eugenius’ 
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nephew and the serving vice-chancellor of the Papal Court, was chosen as legate to the fleet.247 
Eugenius IV chose these cardinals to ensure that the Papal court was well represented and to ensure 
that the prestige of a successful campaign was attributed to the Papacy.  
It is difficult to judge Francesco Condulmer’s actions as no documentation written in his own 
hand has survived; however, the records of the Venetian Senate provide an account of many of his 
while he was in Venice preparing the fleet for the crusade. What is apparent from these documents 
is that from the beginning of the crusade Eugenius and Francesco wanted to maintain control over 
all aspects of the campaign. One clear concern was that Francesco Condulmer wanted to ensure that 
the Papacy would not foot the majority of the bill for the fleet that would serve the crusade. 
Francesco was Eugenius’ camerlengo, or vice-chancellor, and knew that the Papal treasury was 
relatively empty after hosting the Council of Ferrara-Florence, even though Cosimo de’ Medici had 
covered the cost once the delegates moved to Florence.248 Upon his arrival in Venice in 1443 
Francesco immediately began a long-running debate with the Venetian government over prices, who 
should pay for the ships, and how many ships the Papacy would actually provide for the campaign. 
During the high point of the debates, rumours abounded that Francesco was mishandling the funds 
that Venice had provided for the construction of ships.249 However, there seems to be no 
corroborating evidence to support this accusation and it may have been lodged against Francesco 
simply to discredit him in attempts to lessen his influence within the city and to counter his 
argument of needing more funds for the preparation of the fleet. The Papacy originally promised to 
provide 10 galleys for the crusade while Venice and Burgundy promised 8 and 4 galleys 
respectively.250 These ships were meant to convene in Venice where they would be armed and 
supplied, while others were constructed there. It was a costly endeavour to prepare these ships and 
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Condulmer was meant to ensure the ships were prepared and the funds were appropriated and 
used responsibly. On May 25 the Senate sent a letter to Eugenius stating that they had learned that 
the Pope had changed the number of ships that the Papacy was to supply.251 The Papacy was now 
dropping its contribution from 10 galleys to 6; the letter from the Senate points out that they had 
previously advised from their own experience that this would leave the fleet with too few ships to 
hold the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits effectively.252 Despite their warnings however, the papacy 
would have to reduce its contribution because of a lack of funding. The Venetian letter went on to 
say that the tax on the clergy would not be gathered fast enough to prepare the ships in time to 
reach the Straits. The Senate proclaimed that they would provide 20,000 ducats for its part and 
provide a further 2000 ducats to prepare each of the galley crews it would provide to the Duke of 
Burgundy’s vessels. The Pope would need to provide the money to cover the rest of the cost and the 
Senate suggests the imposition of a tithe. Eugenius, however, was finding this difficult in other areas 
of Europe, namely England. For this job the pope selected the Bishop elect of Concordia, Baptista of 
Padua as his agent in England, Scotland, Ireland, Holland, and Germany.253 However, King Henry VI 
(1422-1461) of England was not willing to create a mandate for the Pope to impose taxation on the 
clergy of England, so instead he met with the primates of England and it was decided that instead of 
having the tithe raised on the clergy instead England would freely donate to the cause. Henry sent 
word that England would do this if peace was made with France. However, the money never came. 
The instance is one of the best-known times of a Pope attempting to raise a tithe in England but it is 
unclear where it went wrong even to modern historians. Lunt attributes it to a confusion in 
communication that England would provide the money only after France and England had secured a 
peace, which did not happen.254 However, Baptista records that the English had promised to pay. 
Whatever occurred it was clear that Eugenius could not raise the tithe in England through 
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mandatory or voluntary payment and was therefore in need of funding from other locations 
throughout Europe.  
The change in the number of papal ships was only the beginning of the tension between the 
Papacy and the Venetian government. The contest continued in August when Eugenius levied the 
tithe in Venetian territory without formally informing the Doge and the Senate.255 Francesco arrived 
in August 1443 having been sent to oversee the construction of the fleet that he would lead east. In 
September of 1443 the Senate seems to have become increasingly annoyed and angered by the 
actions of the Papacy and its Legate. A letter from the Senate to the Pope tells of Francesco’s 
demands that Venice pay for the safe conduct of the galleys that Alfonso V of Aragon (1416-1458) 
had promised to provide for the crusade.256 The Senate further mentions that there are still 10 
galleys awaiting the necessary funds for armament and that Alfonso did not need to fear any attack 
from Venice.257 It is unclear why Francesco would have made the demand that the Venetians should 
pay for the safe-conduct of the Aragonese, but it seems to have been the will of the Papacy. The 
Aragonese King had promised ships to the crusade, though they would never arrive or participate. 
Eugenius and Francesco were likely attempting to ensure the Aragonese fleet would participate in 
the crusade by any means necessary. The Pope needed every participant he could get in order to 
ensure the success of the campaign. In February 1444 the Senate replied to Francesco stating that 
they would not provide the 500 ducats he demanded from the tithe that had been collected from 
Venetian lands for the sending of reports and expenses of the fleet, stating that he should use the 
tithes collected in Florence, Lombardy, and other northern Italian provinces first. The Venetian tithe, 
they assured the Cardinal, would always be available to him but that if he used the Venetian money 
first, the Senate feared that the other states would refuse to pay leaving Venice with the full weight 
of the cost of this crusade.258  
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It could be seen as detrimental to the preparation of the crusade to have the Cardinal Legate 
arguing with the main contributor to the fleet. However, the wrangling should be seen in the context 
of the goal of the Papacy which was not only to ensure the successful completion of this crusade but 
to ensure that the Papacy came out as the primary benefactor of its success. Francesco, as 
camerlengo under his uncle, knew that the Papacy could not afford to pay for the fleet from its 
owncoffers so it needed to ensure that the costs of the fleet were provided. This led to conflict with 
the Venetian government who desired simply to be treated fairly and their contributions to the 
crusade recognized. The second half of this chapter will focus on the Venetian side of this debate to 
fully understand how their role in this debate and the crusade came about. 
3.3.3 Francesco Condulmer on Crusade 
Francesco left Venice with the fleet on 22 June 1444 arriving in the environs of Constantinople in 
September.259 Francesco Condulmer, as legate, maintained full control of the movement and actions 
of the fleet. This was seemingly accepted by the other primary commanders of the fleet. Alvise 
Loredan was instructed by the Venetian Senate to follow the orders of Francesco Condulmer, even 
to the extent that if questioned to say that the entire fleet was under the command and control of 
the Papacy.260 This was obviously a defence mechanism so that Venice could protect itself against 
Ottoman reprisals should the crusade fail or the fleet be destroyed and people captured, but it also 
meant that Loredan was subservient to the Legate while on campaign. Waleran de Wavrin, the 
commander of the Burgundian fleet, seemed to accept this fact as well, as he regularly consulted the 
legate with any plans and ideas in order to obtain his blessing before carrying them out. However, 
Francesco was not the sole Condulmer to participate within the fleet. Antonio Condulmer is 
recorded to have commanded ships within the Venetian portion of the fleet; however, aside from 
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this sole mention, the extent of his involvement is largely unknown.261 Due to the previous close ties 
observed between the Condulmer family and their relative on the Papal throne it is not a difficult 
assumption to make that Antonio participated more in line with the Papacy’s goals and not the 
Venetian.  
Francesco was alone in his role as head of the fleet once the ships departed from Venice. The 
distances involved made timely communication with Eugenius, or indeed anyone in the West, 
impossible. This meant that Francesco alone was charged with carrying out the plans he and 
Eugenius had laid out for themselves. So while on crusade Francesco needed to maintain tactical and 
political control over the fleet. Upon arrival in the Bosporus, Francesco, with several of the other 
leaders within the fleet, went to Constantinople to meet with the Emperor while the rest of the fleet 
split into two divisions, the first group consisted of the Burgundian ships which were sent to cover 
the Bosporus north of Constantinople, while the Papal and Venetian ships guarded the Dardanelles 
to the south. This was done in an attempt to ensure that the Ottoman army of Asia Minor was not 
able to cross and reinforce the Ottoman army of Europe. Despite Francesco’s rocky relationship with 
the Venetian government during the preparations of the fleet it seems that the legate and the 
Venetians on the crusade had a cordial and co-operational attitude towards each other.262 This may 
be due to the orders to Alvise Loredan to follow his command as mentioned before, but it did mean 
that Francesco had at least one contingent within the fleet that he could rely upon to carry out his 
orders. This was not always the case with the various other factions within the fleet or its supposed 
allies.  
Francesco arrived in Constantinople expecting help and compliance from the Greeks and from 
Emperor John VIII Palaiologos. Upon his arrival in the city, however, it seems that the Emperor was 
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neither overly welcoming nor did he provide the pomp and regalia that Francesco had expected to 
receive. Instead the Emperor made the legate wait and upon their eventual meeting, according to 
Syropoulos (a major opponent of the unification of the Church) relations were less than cordial and 
the attitudes of both men were quite cold.263 It was clear that the Emperor had not fulfilled his part 
of the promises to the Council of Ferrara-Florence to begin the process of unification. This would 
likely have been very clear to Francesco early on in his visits within the city causing conflict between 
emperor and legate. The Condulmers, particularly Eugenius, had preached and launched the crusade 
almost specifically to help reduce the pressure the Ottomans had placed upon the Byzantines but 
the Emperor had failed to obtain widespread support for the Union of Florence among the people of 
Constantinople. Without the writings or personal thoughts of Francesco it is impossible to know 
what the legate himself thought of this, but it is clear that the legate and the Byzantine Emperor did 
not begin the crusade on good terms which would later be a possible detriment to the survival of the 
crusade. 
Meanwhile in the Bosporus, the Ottoman armies on both sides of the strait were gathering their 
artillery and bombarding the Burgundian fleet. De Wavrin wrote to Francesco who was still in 
Constantinople to ask the Emperor to lead his army out and attack the Ottoman army on the 
European coast. However, the Emperor refused, claiming that to do so would risk leaving the city 
undefended and vulnerable to attack.264 This may have been the case. However, it is also possible 
that the Emperor was simply unwilling to help the legate and deemed the threat too negligible for 
him to deal with directly. This of course was a mistake as the bombardment by the armies, along 
with possible help from the Genoese, allowed the Ottoman army to cross the straits and once united 
with its European counterpart to march to Varna where it attacked and defeated the land army of 
the crusade leading to the deaths of both the King of Poland and Hungary, Vladislav III (1424-1444), 
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and the Papal Legate Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini, at the battle of Varna in November 1444. Francesco 
would return to Constantinople at the end of the crusade to take part in the debates held at Xylalas 
Palace over the viability of a unification of the Churches. At this point, it would seem Francesco’s 
own goals and plans to ensure the Papacy retained control and to unite the churches of East and 
West Europe had been disrupted. The lack of help from the Emperor had weakened the chances for 
overall success for the crusade and the fleet’s ability to involve itself. After the defeat of the land 
army the fleet decided to winter in the straits to further protect Constantinople while the crusading 
army recovered from its defeat and word reached Constantinople that the Hungarian general and 
later regent John Hunyadi would be marching against the Ottomans once more in the spring.265  
Francesco Condulmer needed to maintain control over the tactical decisions of the fleet as well. 
Previous crusades throughout the Middle Ages had proven that strong leadership from a single 
source, or at least a small council of leaders, was needed to maintain control over the crusading 
armies and fleets. This was a lesson learned through the failures of the earliest crusades; including 
the First Crusade which despite its success had numerous delays and internal fighting due to a large 
and disunited leader base. Crusading efforts brought together groups of soldiers and followers from 
various places throughout Medieval Europe. These groups shared a common religion and enemy but 
often very little else. Tension between the various cultural groups was not uncommon. One of the 
inbuilt purposes of the Papal Legate was to provide a single unifying leader to act as the Pope’s 
representative and religious leader. The legate therefore was meant to encourage co-operation 
between the various cultural factions within a crusade movement. This also meant that the legate 
needed to maintain control over the army and use his layman commanders as advisors. Francesco 
seems to have been rather successful at this.266 His ability to maintain tactical control of the fleet 
helped him maintain his goal of full papal control and authority over this campaign.  
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An example of this control can be seen in the events around the capture of Castle Turquantan. 
The fleet, after wintering in Constantinople, decided to press up the Danube River and assist John 
Hunyadi’s campaign against the Ottomans in 1445.267 After reaching Silistria and fighting a few 
skirmish actions around the city, Francesco met with several of the commanders and it was decided 
that the city was too well defended and would take too much time and manpower to take which 
would delay the fleet from its proposed meeting with the Hungarian army. With the decision to 
press on made, de Wavrin and the ships under his command left and sailed past Silistria and further 
upriver while the rest of the fleet under Condulmer’s command prepared to set out later that same 
day. That afternoon, de Wavrin’s ships arrived in sight of Castle Turquantan where they stopped to 
await the arrival of Francesco and the rest of the fleet. In the meantime, a faction of Wallachian 
soldiers that had joined de Wavrin’s fleet convinced Waleran to attack the castle. Initially, Waleran 
declined to attack it for he had not been given permission from the legate to do so, but by evening 
when the rest of the fleet still had not arrived the Burgundians and Wallachians attacked the weakly 
defended castle and were successful in their attempts to capture it.268 Francesco Condulmer and the 
rest of the fleet arrived the next day. Condulmer was furious with de Wavrin for proceeding with the 
assault on the castle without waiting for him. Condulmer’s ship had run aground outside Silistria 
forcing them to unload the ship to launch it before reloading it all while defending themselves from 
harassing attacks from the city. This caused the delay in the legate’s arrival at Turquantan. 
Condulmer and de Wavrin argued over the capture of the castle which caused a rift between the two 
leaders. According to de Wavrin’s recounting of the crusade the two men remained at odds with 
neither seeking nor offering counsel for a time afterwards. Eventually the two reconciled after de 
Wavrin fell ill and was unable to participate in combat.  
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This event highlights Condulmer’s desire to maintain total control over the fleet. In fact, his delay 
likely made it possible for Turquantan to fall as the Ottomans were too nervous of the fleet that 
remained outside the walls of Silistria to send troops to reinforce the castle itself. Waleran argued 
this but Condulmer dismissed his defence and insisted that de Wavrin should have waited for the 
legate’s arrival and permission to attack the fortress. Its capture without the knowledge and 
permission of the legate undermined his authority over the rest of the fleet and diminished the 
prestige of the legate’s position. Francesco Condulmer did not want to lose control over the fleet 
and have the crusade spiral out of control of the papacy. So he punished and berated de Wavrin for 
his actions and while temporarily causing a rift between the two commanders of the fleet 
maintained control over it. Unfortunately, the fleet’s campaign came to a lacklustre end. Upon 
reaching Nicopolis the fleet joined up with Hunyadi’s army and together attempted to lay siege to 
city. However, after a time it was decided that the fleet needed to sail back down the Danube River 
before the weather shifted and the river began to freeze.  
After their excursion up the Danube River, Francesco and the fleet returned to Constantinople 
where he remained until 1446. However, Francesco had further duties to perform as a papal legate, 
to serve ambassador to the east. Despite the promises made by Emperor John VIII Palaiologos during 
his visit to the Council of Ferrara-Florence to bring about the Unification of the Church the Emperor 
had returned to the East and done very little to gain acceptance of the Union of Florence. Therefore, 
it fell to Francesco to help mollify the opposition to the Union that was now being led by the monk 
Gennadios, formerly George Scholarios. Scholarios had joined John VIII’s entourage when the 
emperor had travelled to the Council of Ferrara-Florence and had initially been resistant, though not 
outright opposed, to the unification of the Churches and had left the council early.269 In a last 
attempt to bring the Greeks under the papal fold a series of debates was held at Xylalas Palace. 
While there is some contention over when the debates were held in Constantinople it seems likely 
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that they were not held until after and the return of the fleet from its unsuccessful attempts to help 
John Hunyadi’s campaign. If it was held earlier it likely would have been at least mentioned in de 
Wavrin’s text, which while focused on Waleran de Wavrin’s movements does quite often comment 
on the whereabouts and actions of the legate and other leading figures of the fleet. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect a mention of the legate appearing for the debates in his text if they took place 
in 1444 during the crusade. Instead it is likely that Condulmer was busy with running the fleet. The 
debates are more likely to have been held in the late summer or autumn of 1445 after the return of 
the fleet from its campaign up the Danube as Condulmer did not return to Venice until 1446.270 
There must have been something keeping him in Constantinople and it is probable that the debates 
were the cause. Regrettably, we only have Syropoulos as a record of these debates. Syropoulos was 
stringent supporter of the anti-unionists within Byzantium and did not have a high opinion of 
Condulmer himself who he saw as pretentious and presumptive.271 We know very little about 
Condulmer’s actions during the events of the debates. Syropoulos only provides a truncated 
summary of the events of the debates and celebrates that due to the poor showing of the crusade 
and the help provided by the West, the actions and presumptions of Condulmer, and the lack of 
support for the cause of the unionists in the East a unification was avoided. It is unclear if Condulmer 
acted as a judge or moderator or did he actually speak and present arguments to the debates 
himself. In the end all that is certain is that Condulmer attended the debates and upheld his and his 
uncle’s attempts at ensuring that the Papacy was represented and its authority and prestige 
enforced. Though a unification was not achieved Eugenius was still able to trigger debates in the East 
over whether to follow through with the unification or not. The papacy under Eugenius IV had 
successfully survived the crisis presented by the Council of Ferrara-Florence and nearly nullified 
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them entirely, it had launched a crusade in defence of Christendom, and begun the process of 
potential unification of the Churches.  
We have seen how the Condulmer family worked to strengthen the position of the Papacy 
throughout the 1430s and 1440s. Despite their origins in Venice they are seen as a family be focused 
almost entirely on preserving and emboldening the figure of the Pope. However, there is one curious 
incident during the Crusade of Varna that has as yet been untouched by modern historians. 
Francesco Condulmer spent much of the Crusade of Varna enforcing his superiority over the fleet in 
the name of the Pope. However, in the spring of 1445 after the crossing of the Ottoman army, the 
subsequent defeat of the crusading army at Varna in November, and the wintering of the fleet at 
Constantinople Condulmer chose to enact a plan that almost solely benefitted the Venetian 
contingent of the crusade and could have led to disaster for the remnants of the Crusade. In the 
spring of 1445 de Wavrin planned to sail around the Black Sea to learn the truth about the defeat of 
the army at Varna including the fate of the Hungarian king who was said to have been killed by some 
but was said to have survived the battle and be in hiding in a friendly fortress around the Black Sea 
by others. Condulmer, according to de Wavrin’s account, praised his actions and gave him his 
blessing and permission to carry out this mission. In the meantime, however, Condulmer allegedly 
departed from Constantinople with the Venetian fleet and travelled to the Aegean Sea in order to 
see what could be captured there. 272 This diversion and removal of the fleet from Constantinople 
was not only not in keeping with the crusade or the Condulmer family plan to enhance the papacy’s 
position it was potentially very dangerous. The crusade had no scope for protecting or recovering 
lands in the Aegean, Condulmer’s absence from Constantinople meant that progress could not be 
made on the unification of the church and indeed the debates at Xylalas Palace could have been held 
during this period instead of after the crusades defeat, and it also left Constantinople open to attack. 
Furthermore, had the fleet engaged in any battles while in the Aegean, it would have risked the life 
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of the papal legate. Unfortunately, there is little known about this diversion; however, it is a singular 
ripple in Francesco’s attitudes and drives and could be the key to understanding why the Venetians 
participated in the Crusade of Varna at all and therefore merits further study in the second part of 
this chapter.   
3.4 Venetian Involvement in the Crusade of Varna  
 Venice’s involvement in the Crusade of Varna has never been specifically addressed by 
modern scholarship, even though much of the crusade fleet was composed of Venetian vessels. The 
work that has been done on Varna focuses on the crusading land army with some small attention 
paid to the actions of Francesco Condulmer and the fleet. However, few discuss the fleet’s 
movements after the defeat of Varna and do not seem to count the 1445 campaign, led by the 
regent of Hungary John Hunyadi, which the fleet supported from the Danube. Even more important, 
previous works have almost all neglected to mention the fleet’s brief foray into the Aegean in the 
spring of 1445 before the Danube campaign. One of the few who has is Stefan Stantchev but he 
plays down the episode and does not perceive its importance. In this section, it will be argued that 
Venice initially joined the crusade as a willing if semi-reluctant participant and was enticed into 
being more cooperative through the reports of early victory. It will be argued, moreover, that 
willingness was enhanced by the possibility of conquering or regaining territory. Among the 
territories in question was the city of Thessaloniki which Venice had ruled between 1423 and 1430 
when it had been conquered by the Ottoman Turks. This ambition has not been adequately 
appreciated and indeed it has even been specifically denied by one recent scholar. It is, however, 
central to any understanding of Venetian involvement in the Crusade of Varna.   
3.4.1 Venice and Thessaloniki  
To understand one of the key reasons for Venetian involvement in the Crusade of Varna, the 
recovery of lost territory, one must first understand what Venice had lost and what might entice 
them to join an armed campaign against the Ottomans. Venice, as has been discussed above, 
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obtained the Byzantine city of Thessaloniki from the despot of the city, Andronikos Palaiologos 
(1408-23), in 1423.273 It had already been besieged by the Ottomans for many years at this point and 
the weakening Byzantine Empire believed it could no longer hold the city against the Turks. 
Therefore, they approached the Venetian bailo Daniele Loredan who brought the question of 
acquisition to the Venetian government. A council was formed to judge the viability of their ability to 
hold on to the city themselves.274 The council held the vote for the acquisition of the city on July 7, 
1423.275 It was decided that Venice would take possession of the city and they refused several 
proposals that would allow for the Greeks purchase the city back from the Venetians. Venice still 
spent a vast fortune on manpower and supplies for this distant city. Despite the city’s loss in 1430, it 
is clear, as will be shown in this chapter, that the Venetians never truly gave up on the city and that 
it viewed expeditions, like the Crusade of Varna, as possible avenues for reclaiming their lost city.  
The city had already been the target of numerous attacks and sieges by the Ottoman 
European army and these did not let up after the Venetians took charge of the city. This was not, 
however, the first time Venice had acquired cities due to the threat of the Ottomans.276 Over the 
course of this struggle the city sent constant supplies of manpower, equipment, and food from 
across their maritime empire. Much of the food came from the island of Crete that had increasingly 
become the breadbasket of the Venetian Empire, while the men provided for the defence of the city 
were often hired mercenaries.277 Stantchev believes that these figures however are nothing when 
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considered next to the amount of resources spent on Venetian expansion into the Italian mainland 
which according to him dominated Venetian interest from 1402 onwards.278 Using figures from the 
wars Venice fought with Milan in 1425-6 and 1427-8 Stantchev states that the Venetians sent only a 
few hundred men to protect the city of Thessaloniki while agreeing to arm ‘8,000 cavalry and 3,000 
infantry in 1426, and… led an estimated 20,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry into battle against the 
Visconti armies in 1426.279 He then compares the total expenses for the War of Thessaloniki at 
200,000-740,000 ducats and around roughly 60,000 ducats a month while the War with Milan in 
1431 was supposed to cost 70,000 ducats a month from the Republic. There are however key 
differences between the city of Thessaloniki and the attempted conquests in northern Italy. First and 
foremost, in Italy Venice had allies it was relying on to help them in the fighting. In the 1425-6 war 
Venice had an agreement with Florence to arm soldiers providing Venice with an ally that could not 
only help for the payment of soldiers but also to pick up any slack that Venice could not cover itself. 
Furthermore, as can be seen in the shifting number of ships provided for the Crusade of Varna, 
numbers promised and numbers arrived were rarely the same. Conversely, in Thessaloniki, Venice 
had few close allies to help protect the city, they were, for all intents and purposes, alone. They had 
acquired the city from the Byzantines because the Greeks felt they could not hold it against Ottoman 
aggression and the other main player in the region, the Genoese, were no ally of Venice to provide 
support. This left them alone to send as much as they felt they could provide. Second, the Wars with 
Milan were less defensive in nature. Where Venice was trying to hold the city of Thessaloniki and its 
immediate surrounding areas from Ottoman assault, the War with Milan was meant to increase 
Venetian control in the Italian mainland. This type of campaign would require more troops for 
fighting and holding locations versus a solely defensive action that could rely, at least ostensibly, on 
the defences of the city and the inhabitants of that city. Lastly, the campaign in Italy was significantly 
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closer to home and therefore would have been significantly easier for Venice, despite its sizable 
fleet’s presence, to send men, money, and supplies into northern Italy than to take the long journey 
to Thessaloniki. Therefore, the comparison of the War with Milan and the War for Thessaloniki is far 
from equivalent. Furthermore, the sources that the Senate’s own records provide shows that while 
they were sending less to Thessaloniki than to northern Italy they were still actively sending support, 
food, and other resources to the city with some regularity throughout the seven years of occupation 
and war.   
Eventually however, Sultan Murad II decided to take the city once and for all.280 The fall itself 
happened after only a few days of fighting and the Venetians within the city fled to their ships in the 
harbour. The defeat hurt Venetian-Byzantine relations both due to the reported treatment of the 
Byzantines under Venetian rule as well as the reported cowardice of the Venetian flight from the 
city. This however, is not the focus of the study here, instead simply to show that the city fell 29 
March 1430. Venetian records immediately following the loss of the city are rather limited.281 
However, they show that the Venetians remained at war with the Ottomans for a time after the fall 
of Thessaloniki with the Senate issuing orders to their Captain General of the Sea to harass and raid 
Ottoman holdings throughout the Aegean Sea and Gallipoli using the Romanian fleet in hopes of 
obtaining a treaty that would return Thessaloniki to them.282 They were unsuccessful in their 
endeavours and the Venetians concluded a treaty with the Ottomans in September 1430.283 This 
treaty was based around a previous treaty concluded between the Ottomans and Venetians in 
1419.284 The treaty stipulated that Venice would not harass unarmed Ottoman vessels in the Aegean 
Sea that Ottoman armies would not attack thirty-eight named territories under Venetian control, 
                                                          
280 Chalkokondyles Vol1, pp. 389-91:Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, trans. Harry 
J. Magoulias (Detroit MI: Wayne State University Press, 1975), pp. 171-2: John Anagnostes, Diegesis, 
translation in John Melville-Jones, Venice and Thessalonica 1423-1430: The Greek Accounts, (Padua: Unipress, 
2006) pp. 146-79. Provide the best summaries of the fall of Thessaloniki, though all from Greek standpoints.  
281 Melville-Jones, Venetian Documents, pp. 225-35 
282 Melville-Jones, Venetian Documents, p. 229. This order went out July 28 1430.  
283 George Martin Thomas, Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum, vol. 2 (New York: Burt Franklin, 1966) pp. 343-5  
284 Stantchev, ‘Venice and the Ottoman Threat’, pp. 165-6 
94 
 
and that Venice would pay tribute for Lepanto and three Albanian fortresses (the 1430 treaty 
reduced this tribute as some of the Albanian territories had been recovered by the Ottomans). 
Through this treaty Venice was able to maintain their Aegean and Black Sea trade links but were 
unable to reclaim the city. Later in February 1431 the Venetians were allowed to open a consulate 
within the city of Thessaloniki.285 The loss of this major safe harbour on the Aegean was a hindrance 
to the expansion of the Venetian trade empire especially if Venice wanted to turn the city into a 
second Venice.286 Thessaloniki was still in the hands of the Ottomans in 1444 when the preaching of 
the Crusade of Varna began.  
3.4.2 Preparations for the Crusade 
 Venice had joined the crusade by May 1443 and preparations of a fleet began to form in the 
city.287 This fleet was originally meant to consist of ten Papal ships, six Venetian ships, and four 
Burgundian ships which would form the core of the fleet with the prospect of other ships joining the 
fleet after it had departed.288 Francesco Condulmer arrived in Venice in August 1443 and the 
difficulties between himself and the Venetians began almost immediately as discussed previously. 
These difficulties arose around the payment of the necessary preparations of the crusade and of the 
selection of Alvise Loredan as lay commander of the fleet. However, there was a definitive shift in 
the Venetian attitude which was tied to reports of the early success that the army was having 
against the Ottomans. It may be argued that the Venetians did not see themselves as obstructing the 
crusade and instead simply that they were attempting to protect themselves from being exploited as 
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well as ensuring that the crusade could proceed without significant delay and with the utmost 
possible chance for success.  
 As discussed in the previous section, the Venetians’ greatest challenge was to provide for 
the construction and/or provisioning and outfitting of the Papal, Venetian, and Burgundian ships 
that would comprise the core of the crusading fleet. This was a costly undertaking to accomplish and 
would require Venice to focus all of its efforts to ensure that the ships were prepared in a timely 
fashion so as not to delay the fleet’s departure. Furthermore, it would require the Venetians to 
suspend their trade and focus all efforts on constructing the fleet necessary to carry out the crusade. 
This cost had to be covered by someone, of course, but as mentioned previously the Papal coffers 
had been severely depleted during the long confrontation between Eugenius’ Council of Ferrara-
Florence and the Council of Basel. It was the Pope’s and Legate’s prerogative to ensure that other 
parties paid for the crusade and the necessary support and preparations. It seemed, at least to 
Venetian eyes, that the majority of that financial burden fell upon them. Much of the surviving 
correspondence surrounding this period between Venice and the Legate or the Pope deals with the 
necessity of payment and the fact that Venice did not think it fair that they should cover the vast 
majority of the expenses. However, this was not simply the Venetians trying to skimp out on paying 
for their share of the crusade, instead they wished to be given fair treatment and to have others 
bear some of the immense financial burden. In at least one missive to Eugenius IV the Senate wrote 
that they were committed to the crusade and were willing to pay for their fair share. They pointed 
out, however, that the money in Venice would always be accessible to the crusade while other areas 
around northern Italy including Florence and Lombardy, were also obliged to provide the tithe but 
had not collected this.289 The Venetian Senate were not trying to dodge the bill but were giving 
useful alternatives for the collection of money while Venice would remain the constructor of and 
willing participant in the fleet. Throughout their missives the Venetians claimed to be committed to 
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the crusade and the need to expedite the construction of the fleet so that it could be in position to 
prevent the Ottoman army of Asia Minor from crossing and reinforcing the Ottoman army of Europe. 
 Some may see these as platitudes while Venice tried to negotiate its way out of paying for 
the fleet thereby protecting their fortunes. However, this does seem unlikely as they were still 
helping cover some of the costs and willingly accepted the raising of the tithe in their territories. 
They agreed for the tithe to be collected with the stipulation that Venetian officials were present 
during collection to prevent misuse of the funds.290 Furthermore, when Eugenius IV announced that 
the Papacy would send eight ships not the originally agreed upon ten the Senate protested against 
him.291 The government wrote that from their own experience against the Ottomans this would 
provide too few ships to effectively hold the straights around Constantinople, despite the fact that 
this would mean a cheaper and quicker turn around, but meant the fleet would be less successful. 
Later they even provided a sum of money to help speed the process along before they finally 
relented, providing the remaining funds necessary for the completion of the fleet.292  
 Trouble further brewed around the Papal selection of the lay commander to the crusader 
fleet. Pope Eugenius IV and Francesco Condulmer both selected the well-regarded naval commander 
Alvise Loredan for the position of Captain of the Fleet. He would serve as the lay commander and 
would for all intents and purposes be subservient solely to Francesco Condulmer himself while on 
campaign.293 The Loredan family were well renowned sailors and had numerous accolades attributed 
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to them through their numerous successes at sea. Alvise Loredan himself had had a successful naval 
career prior to this. This is almost certainly why the Condulmers chose Alvise Loredan to be the lay 
fleet commander. There was a significant issue with their choice however. The Loredan family had a 
long-standing feud with the current Doge of Venice, Francesco Foscari. This rivalry between the two 
families prompted Foscari to bring before the Senate a proposal that no Venetian should serve a 
foreign power for money or glory.294 The Senate voted against this measure and allowed for the 
selection of not only Alvise Loredan but other Venetian commanders to positions throughout the 
fleet. It is impossible to know if the Condulmers knew about this rivalry between Loredan and 
Foscari or if they knew that the selection of Loredan would cause Foscari to attempt to block their 
appointment of him. It is possible since certain members of the Condulmer family were still 
patricians in Venice despite the family’s growing power within the Papal Court.295 However, this 
delay and conflict did not arise from a Venetian sense of hindering the campaign but instead was 
caused by internal political intrigue within the government and society of Venice. 
 Word spread of the early success of the land army of the Crusade of Varna. The Crusade set 
out in earnest in October 1443 under the command of King Vladislav, John Hunyadi and Cardinal 
Cesarini. The crusaders crossed the Danube into Serbia at a time in which they may have expected 
the Ottoman armies to have returned to their lands for harvest.296 They met with initial success 
defeating an Ottoman force in Serbia and then pushed as far as the town of Sofia. However, the 
Ottoman army had been able to muster enough forces to confront the invading crusaders and 
delivered a crushing defeat at the Zlatitsa Pass around Christmas 1443.297 During their retreat from 
this defeat Hunyadi was successful in defeating their pursuers and allowed the rest of the army to 
retreat. Reports which trickled west exaggerated the successes and victories of the land army and 
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omitted much of the troubles and the defeat. It is difficult to tell when exactly Venice received their 
reports and from whom they were sent. They may have heard of some of the early successes of the 
army as early as December 1443 before the battle of Zlatitsa Pass from the Bailo of Corfu but the 
Senate does not seem to have chosen to act upon this information without confirmation.298 By 
January 1444 Venice had become more favourable toward participating in the crusade. On 17 June 
1444 the senate sent its instructions to Alvise Loredan and the captains of the papal ships laying out 
their advice and what should be done to help the crusade proceed.299 It seemed that Venice wished 
to get the crusader fleet moving and to get into position so that it could support the army when 
needed.  
Venice had numerous reasons for avoiding active participation in the crusade. First and 
foremost they technically had a treaty with the Ottomans from 1430 after the Ottomans had 
attacked the Venetian held city of Thessaloniki.300 Because of this treaty the Venetians were less 
inclined to declare a direct war upon the Ottomans as the treaty provided them some semblance of 
protection from direct confrontation with the Sultan and his armies. Furthermore, participation and 
the inevitable backlash should the crusade fail would fall first and foremost upon the Venetians, or 
so they seemed to believe. Venice formed what Norman Housley dubbed an ‘antemurale state’, a 
frontline buffer against the Ottoman threat to Western Christendom.301 Directly involving 
themselves with a crusade could make them the target of any retribution. Venice still relied heavily 
on its trade with the east and particularly its lands in the Aegean, primarily Syria and Egypt.302 War 
with the Ottomans would make this trade impossible.303 It is reasonable to understand the Venetian 
                                                          
298 Imber, Crusade of Varna, p. 18 
299 ASV Sen. Sec. Reg. 16, ff. 100 a 101v: TR, III, doc. 2651, p. 113. These instructions included that all captains 
were subservient to Condulmer, that they should avoid Rhodes at all costs, and a list of galleys that they could 
expect to rely on including ones from Negroponte, Nauplion and Tinos, as well as the Archipelago.  
300 Thomas, Diplomatarium, vol. 2, pp. 343-5 
301 Norman Housley, Crusading and the Ottoman Threat 1453-1505 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 
302 Stantchev, ‘Venice and the Ottoman Threat’, p. 163 
303 ASV Sen. Sec. Reg. 16, ff. 119v-20: TR, III, doc. 2668, p. 118-9 In the orders the Venetian Senate give to 
Alvise Loredan he is instructed to claim that if questioned by the Ottomans to state that the fleet is not a 
Venetian one but a Papal fleet so as to give some space for negotiation and innocence to the Venetian 
participation.  
99 
 
hesitation to dive unhindered into conflict against the Ottomans without the chance or belief of 
some level of success. Therefore it is unsurprising and understandable that the Venetians were less 
inclined to participate in the Crusade of Varna until they learned of the successes of the land army, 
however exaggerated they might be. Much of what we learn can be seen in the orders given to the 
bailos of Venice’s holdings and to those given to Loredan upon his departure from Venice. These 
orders give insight into Venice’s actions and involvement during the fleet’s campaign which is 
fortunate as there is little literary evidence that exists today that describes Venice’s actions during 
the campaign.  
3.4.3 Venice on Crusade 
 The fleet set out from Venice May-June 1444. Cyriac of Ancona, who was in regular 
communication with Cardinal Cesarini throughout the period of the Crusade, wrote once more to 
the cardinal to inform him of the arrival of the fleet and of Cardinal Condulmer around 12 
September 1444.304 Cyriac continues to inform Cesarini that the fleet has divided into two parts to 
watch the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. However, beyond this point knowledge of the contribution 
of the Venetians is limited. De Wavrin, the major contemporary source for the fleet’s campaign, 
focuses, unsurprisingly, on the Burgundian contingent and their commander, Waleran de Wavrin. 
Instead historians must rely on what little de Wavrin says about the Venetian-Papal fleet and the 
actions and orders of the Venetian government.  
It is known that several Venetian nobles were chosen as commanders in the fleet and were 
under the command of Francesco Condulmer and Alvise Loredan and would have followed what 
orders these men gave. 305 Loredan himself was ordered by the Senate to serve below the Legate 
himself, so it is not a stretch to believe that these other commanders would have been given similar 
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instructions.306 Two sets of instructions sent to Loredan have survived. The first, dated 17 June 1444 
dealt with the running of the fleet and what the fleet should accomplish upon arrival in the east 
while the second dated 9 November 1444 informed Loredan on diplomatic matters.307 The first set 
of orders is extremely important to the study of Venice in the Crusade of Varna as it serves as one of 
very few sources for the actions of the Venetian fleet. The Senate instructed Loredan to defend the 
Dardanelles with the fleet and to expect to be joined by galleys from Euboea, Nauplion, Tinos, and 
the Archipelago. De Wavrin confirms that the Venetians with the Papal ships held the Dardanelles 
while the Burgundian fleet moved to protect the Bosporus Strait. The Senate further instructed 
Loredan to avoid Rhodes, to not engage with the fleet of Rhodes, as well as preventing the 
Burgundians from going to Rhodes. This was done to avoid conflict with the Knights of Rhodes who 
were allied to the Genoese and often in conflict with the Venetians. This first set of orders also 
confirmed that Francesco Condulmer was the overall commander of the Papal-Venetian fleet as well 
as the Burgundian one and that Loredan should serve under him. It specifically laid out that all 
councils of war should be completed in the presence of Condulmer as well. Although it does not 
provide the exact actions of the fleet these orders are no less important for laying out what the fleet 
likely did as well as providing useful information into the command structure. The second set of 
instructions is perhaps more telling of Venice’s attitude towards the crusade and the political state 
of the Republic and the eastern Mediterranean at the time. Here Loredan was instructed that if the 
Hungarians made peace with the Ottomans, he should as well, for Venice was unable to continue to 
fight on alone. He was instructed to explain to the Sultan that the fleet belonged to the Pope and not 
to the Republic. He was to explain that this was the case despite the fact that the fleet was manned 
mainly by Venetians. It confirmed that Loredan had been given power to accept the best peace 
possible for Venice and to return with the entire fleet. This second set of orders shows how Venice 
viewed the conflict with the Ottomans; a war they could not fight alone. Without the other 
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participants both in the army and in the fleet, they did not believe they would be able to fight 
against the Ottomans. We also see the Senate’s prepared explanation to the Ottomans whom they 
had an existing treaty with about why Venetians were among the fleet by claiming it was Papal and 
not Venetian. This is obviously a defence mechanism that may or may not provide any protection 
against Ottoman reprisal for the crusade. One final thing of importance from these orders is the 
comment that the fleet was manned primarily by Venetians. It is unclear if this is a comment about 
the fact that many of the commanders were Venetian or if the sailors themselves came from the 
republic. However, the latter is highly possible and even likely due to Venice naturally having a large 
number of skilled sailors that could man the ships of this fleet which was constructed and 
provisioned in Venice. Overall, it seems that Venice while participating in the crusade was 
attempting to maintain a low profile by keeping their commanders subservient to the Papal legate, 
instructing Loredan to make peace quickly and safely should peace be made, and by calling the fleet 
Papal and not Venetian. 
In the summer de Wavrin writes that Condulmer arrived with some ships at the mouth of 
the Danube. This was after the fleet had travelled into the Aegean and returned, seemingly having 
completed nothing of any significance. The Venetians are not mentioned in relation to the crusade 
throughout the rest of de Wavrin’s account, not even the Venetian commander Alvise Loredan. 
Instead the account focuses on the Burgundians’ and Condulmer’s actions. However, if we are to 
believe the letters sent to Loredan by the Senate, since most of the Papal ships were manned by 
Venetian sailors they would have still played a key role, if an unspoken one, in the rest of the 
crusade.  
Despite the lack of information about the Venetian contribution there is at least one 
Venetian source that sheds some, though somewhat dubious, light on how Venice viewed their 
participation in the Crusade of Varna. Giovanni Maria Angiolello writes a very short summarization 
of the Crusade of Varna in his work Historia Turcessa where he mentions the successes of ‘our’ 
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fleet.308 It does not provide much, but this brief mention could show that the Venetians were proud 
of their participation in the Crusade of Varna. They may have seen it as an inclusive action in which 
the Venetians, along with the other crusaders, had some success. They viewed themselves as 
participants to the crusade and not separate from the rest. Furthermore, it ties the events of 1445, 
the actions of the fleet, and John Hunyadi’s campaign down the Danube with the rest of the Crusade 
of Varna, a fact that modern historians of the crusade ignore.  
3.4.4 The Aegean Diversion 
 
Though our knowledge of the exact actions of the Venetians during the Crusade of Varna is 
limited, there is one curious event in which they were involved in that has been largely overlooked 
by modern historians; a diversion of the fleet into the Aegean. While it does not appear that this 
diversion accomplished much of anything it does provide hints of the motives behind Venice joining 
this campaign as well as deeper connections than what some might previously have thought 
between the Condulmer family and their home city. This expedition is being classified as a diversion 
for several reasons; first of which is the timing of the trip, which as we will see is at a time when the 
rest of the crusading fleet is accomplishing other important tasks. Secondly, the goals of this 
expedition are solely for the benefit of the Venetians and not to the benefit of the crusade as a 
whole. Finally, the diversion put the life of the Legate, Francesco Condulmer, at risk and endangered 
the leadership of the entire crusade. Therefore, although the fleet would have passed through the 
Aegean on its travels to Constantinople, this specific trip can be seen as a purposeful diversion from 
the Crusade of Varna.   
The diversion occurred late winter to early spring 1445 as best as can be discerned from De 
Wavrin who mentions the diversion of the Venetian and Papal ships during this time.309 The timing of 
Francesco and the Venetian fleet’s departure seems poorly chosen. After the defeat of the crusader 
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army at Varna in November 1444 there is confusion and uncertainty among the surviving 
participants. John Hunyadi had retreated back up the Danube into Hungary and was planning his 
next move. However, the fleet received conflicting reports of the battle and the fate of King 
Vladislas. The Ottomans claimed the king was dead and even produced a head before several of the 
Burgundians as proof; however, word from the Hungarians and others reported that the king had 
survived the battle and was laying low in a fortress on the Black Sea. After wintering near 
Constantinople, the fleet commanders met and de Wavrin announced that he planned to seek out 
the Hungarian king. Condulmer praised him for his foresight and approved his plan and a date was 
set to meet at the mouth of the Danube to sail up the river to support Hunyadi’s coming campaign. 
In the meantime, the Venetians with Francesco would, according to de Wavrin, travel into the 
Aegean Sea. This meant that while the Burgundians sought out the Hungarian king and the fleet was 
meant to be protecting the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, the Papal-Venetian fleet set out into 
the Aegean on an unknown, at least to de Wavrin, mission. It seems a poor choice by the 
commanders of the fleet; however, it may have been the first chance the Venetians had to possibly 
gain something out of this crusade.   
Venice, despite the interpretations of Stantchev, had not taken the loss of Thessaloniki in 
1430 lying down. Immediately after its capture the Senate released orders for the Captain of the Sea 
to attack Ottoman held areas along the coast, in particular Gallipoli.310 This was done in hopes that 
they may be able to make a favourable peace treaty with the Ottomans and possibly regain the city 
either through siege or through the treaty. It is unknown what, if anything, the Captain was able to 
achieve but we know from the treaty of 1430 between Venice and the sultan they did not regain 
Thessaloniki.311 However, that was not the end for Venetian ambition over control of the city. During 
the preparations in Venice before the crusade fleet launched, the Senate sent out a call to their 
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bailos throughout the Aegean to look for targets that might be good to hit with the fleet.312 
Thessaloniki, along with Gallipoli and a few other locations, was specifically named in this order. The 
Senate stated that they did not wish to take these locations for themselves but would instead guard 
them in the name of Christianity. It is impossible to know if Condulmer had a hand in this plan. He 
had already arrived in Venice when these orders were sent out and may have been privy to the 
decision to put such a plan into action. However, it is clear that he approved of the action later since 
he himself participated in it. The potential for this plan to regain territory for Venice is undoubtedly 
one reason the commune joined in the campaign. It furthermore highlights that Venice still had a 
keen interest in regaining their line of defences against the Ottoman threat in general as well as 
specifically regaining Thessaloniki, further indicating that they viewed the Ottomans as a threat in 
the early fifteenth century and not as a ‘minor trade partner and a secondary geopolitical 
concern’.313 
The diversion was a huge risk for the legate as well but may hint at a deeper connection 
between the Papal focused Condulmer family and their birth home of Venice than previous studies 
realized. As previously stated the diversion came at a time when the crusade had lost much of its 
momentum and important members of its leadership. Both Cesarini, the papal legate for the army, 
and King Vladislas, the secular leader of the army, had fallen in the battle at Varna. While the fate of 
these men may not have been fully known to the fleet commanders, shown by de Wavrin’s 
expedition to find the king along the Black Sea, the events of the defeat were known to them, 
making this expedition into the Aegean Sea an odd decision on which the remaining legate would 
risk himself on. There was a serious possibility that Condulmer would be placed in unnecessary 
danger. Unfortunately, without any records from Condulmer himself it will likely never be known 
why he agreed to go through with this plan. The legate may have been fulfilling promises he made to 
the Venetians during their negotiations leading up to the departure of the fleet from Venice. By 
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agreeing to investigate possible targets in the Aegean, Condulmer may have been able to gain 
further support from the Senate and ease the tensions that had arisen between the legate and the 
Republic. This diversion therefore could have been his way of fulfilling that promise. Or having seen 
the crusade failing the legate may have wanted to see the crusade achieve something of note. The 
diversion could have provided the legate with a simple solution for two problems, fulfilling the 
Venetian desire to secure lands in the Aegean and striking the Ottomans where they were less 
focused. Whether he was attempting to secure even a minor victory for the Christians or not, 
Condulmer was assuredly helping promote the agenda of his native Venice during this diversion and, 
uncharacteristically of the Condulmer family, not acting in support of the papal agenda. While he 
was gone on this expedition Condulmer could have instead attended the debates at Xylalas Palace 
discussed earlier. If the debates had been held during the crusade, even though it was after the 
defeat at Varna, the pro-Unionists would still have been able to leverage possible future success of 
the campaign as a reason for proceeding with the Union of Florence. However, Condulmer was away 
from Constantinople during the spring of 1445 and in the early summer met with de Wavrin and 
proceeded up the Danube River to support Hunyadi’s campaign. Thereby leaving limited time for the 
debates to actually take place during this time and making it much more likely that they happened 
after the fleet had returned from its failed trip up the river.  
3.5 Conclusion:  
 The Condulmer family, led by Pope Eugenius IV, was ultimately successful in their battles 
against the Council of Basel and through keen diplomacy and guile were able to outlast the Council 
and turn many of the most powerful lay leaders of Europe against them. Thus, they achieved their 
ultimate goal of protecting the power and position of the Pope. Through their actions they sparked 
the beginnings of the Crusade of Varna with the promises of defending the Greeks in the east in 
exchange for possible unification between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches. The success of this 
venture would further increase the prestige of the Papacy and bring about a closing of the schism 
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that had begun centuries before. The Crusade of Varna began with promises of greatness but 
ultimately achieved little and its failure largely contributed to the broken promise of unification. 
Venetian participation within the Crusade of Varna is a factor that has been largely ignored by 
modern historians. The commune provided guidance and leadership to the fleet as well as serving as 
the bankroll and construction site for many of the ships that comprised it. Though initially hesitant to 
join the crusade due to the threat of the Ottomans should the crusade fail and their existing treaty 
with the Sultan Murad II the Venetians joined in earnest in early 1444. Though they had looked 
towards the potential of regaining lands they had previously lost to the Ottomans in the 1430s, 
particularly the city of Thessaloniki, I do not believe they joined solely for this reason. It was not until 
June or July 1444 that the orders to target the city were sent out and by that time the Senate had 
already begun to more willingly pay for the fleet. The Venetians it seems were not joining simply to 
use the crusade to their own benefit but instead were joining to help counteract the ever-expanding 
Ottoman threat. A threat that would continue to grow and leave Venice increasingly isolated on the 
front line.  
Chapter 4: Venetian Response and Participation in aid of the City of Constantinople, 1453 
4.1 Introduction:  
The fall of the city of Constantinople to the Ottoman army under the leadership of Sultan Mehmed II 
(1444-1446 and 1451-1481) in 1453 has received vast amounts of scholarly attention.314 However, 
despite the vast amount of study that the period leading up to the siege, the siege of Constantinople 
itself, and the aftermath of the city’s fall by historians there are still many unexplored aspects of this 
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event that require further investigation. Chief among them is the involvement of the Venetians 
during the siege. Most secondary work acknowledges that Venetians, under the command of Alvise 
Diedo and their bailo Girolamo Minotto, participated in the defence of the city. These studies use 
the work of the Venetian surgeon and diarist of the events of the siege, Nicolò Barbaro, to relate the 
events of the fall of Constantinople to the modern audience. However, some historians, like Franz 
Babinger, continue to view the Venetians as uncaring of the outcome of the siege and unwilling to 
risk their lives, profits, and treaties by disrupting the peace they had with the Ottomans.315 The 
Venetian Senate is blamed for acting overly cautiously and reacting too slowly to the events 
transpiring in the East or worse that they were unwilling to even come to the aid of the Greeks. To 
date there has been very little work investigating the real response of the Venetian Senate to the 
plight of the Byzantines and the surprisingly rapid fall of a city or the difference between the official 
state response posed by the Senate and the feelings and opinions of the Venetians who were 
present in Constantinople and who participated in the defence of the city. This disconnect between 
the available sources and the modern scholarship comes primarily from how the siege is addressed. 
Most works focus on exploring a particular aspect of history and use the siege of Constantinople as 
their example. The siege itself is laid out almost identically across all histories of the siege. There has 
been very limited analysis of what the sources can tell us about the individuals whose records are 
used to examine the events and instead are used to lay out the events of the siege. Unlike the 
previous events discussed in this thesis, from the Crusade of Nicopolis to the Crusade of Varna or 
even the fall of the major city of Thessaloniki, the fall of Constantinople has an unprecedented 
amount of written material that has survived from Venetian witnesses to these events. These 
sources provide unmitigated insight into how the Venetian participants themselves viewed the 
siege, what they thought of the decision to stand and fight, and how they viewed the defence of one 
of Christianity’s greatest cities. Yet secondary sources, such as the work of Donald Nicol, believe that 
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because the state response was slow or half-hearted that indicates an uncaring attitude toward the 
plight of the city, which in fact does not bear itself true with a deeper investigation into the actual 
actions of the Senate in response to a threat that had been discussed many times in the preceding 
century nor the information passed down to us from the Venetian written accounts of the defence 
of the city.316 This chapter will focus firstly on laying out the main source material that will be used; 
primarily the diary of Barbaro and the Dolfin-Languschi text, which has only recently come to light. 
The chapter will then look at the Venetian involvement and response to the siege first by the Senate, 
taking a deeper investigation into their actions and the timeline of events, and then at how the 
Venetian accounts, primarily the diary of the siege from Nicolò Barbaro, portrays the opinions and 
positions of the Venetians on the ground in the city during the siege. Using these conclusions the 
chapter will show that the Venetians were not only willing participants in defence of Constantinople, 
they saw it as their duty not only for the further success of the Venetian state in the east but also to 
protect their fellow Christians brothers from an attack from a heathen army that threatened all of 
Christianity; a direct contradiction to the typical model of Venetians as heartless businessmen and 
merchants willing to sell out others to advance their own profits and position.   
4.2 The Sources  
Unlike the campaigns discussed previously the defence of Constantinople has survived in the 
accounts, letters, and reports of various survivors a number of whom were Venetians. These 
Venetian sources provide tremendous insight into not only the events surrounding the siege of the 
city, the battle for the city, and the aftermath but also to Venetian opinions and attitudes towards 
the city, the fight to defend it, and the participants of the siege. Of these surviving Venetian 
documents the most important by far is Nicolò Barbaro’s Diary of the Siege of Constantinople, which 
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is heavily relied on by all historians of the fall of the city.317 There are however other sources that are 
equally important if only due to the fact that they are sources from a Venetian viewpoint, a very rare 
occurrence in the study of the Venetians and their involvement in the religious conflicts of the later 
middle ages. Before discussing Venice’s involvement in the defence of Constantinople these sources, 
their limitations and their uses, will be examined and briefly discussed to form the proper 
framework and narrative that this study will draw from for the examination of the siege of 
Constantinople.  
 Nicolò Barbaro’s diary is the longest and most in depth account of the fall of Constantinople 
and has been used by nearly all historians of the fall of the city. Through his diary, Barbaro relates 
the siege day by day recording the events both within the city and in the Ottoman camp outside. His 
source provides the chronology that most historians use for the siege and where possible to 
corroborate between his work and others Barbaro’s diary is usually reliable.318 Barbaro’s position of 
surgeon aboard the Venetian galleys would have given him access to the major decision makers and 
allowed him to attend many of the meetings and councils that he describes allowing for accurate 
record of the decisions made throughout the course of the siege. There are of course some issues 
with Barbaro’s text most of these revolving around issues of bias, particularly against the Genoese 
and the Greeks. This can be easily seen in a number of places throughout his text. When the 
Venetians develop a plan to launch a night attack against the Turkish fleet in hopes of sinking them 
Barbaro accuses the Genoese of Pera of warning the Ottomans and names them ‘enemies of the 
Christian Faith’.319 The great Genoese captain, Giovanni Guistiniani, whom Barbaro calls Zuan 
Zustignan the Venetian dialect spelling, who arrived with a contingent of men and was placed in 
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charge of the entire defence of the city by the Emperor himself features only briefly throughout. 
When the Ottomans broke through the walls of the city and begin to pour into the city Barbaro 
blames Guistiniani and claims that he abandoned his post and fled.320 However, the other accounts 
from numerous sources including Leonard of Chios and the Greek historians Doukas and Laonikos 
Chalkokondyles all claim that Guistiniani was wounded and secretly sought aid to prevent panic 
amongst the men when he left the walls.321 Equally suspect are the conversations that he records of 
the Sultan Mehmed II within his diary which are almost certainly fabrications. Of course, it would 
have been impossible for Barbaro to have access or knowledge to the events within the Ottoman 
camp. These made up scenes were likely placed within the text to allow Barbaro to give his 
impression of the Sultan, particularly that of a ‘man possessed of evil thoughts’ and the Ottomans.322 
His opinion of the Greeks is not much better, particularly when compared to the Venetians.323 
Despite these minor issues Barbaro’s solid chronology and attention to detail prove extremely 
useful.  
Of great interest to this study Barbaro’s heritage as a Venetian. Venetian accounts of anti-
Ottoman campaigns are very rare and have not been properly studied for what they can inform 
modern historians about the motivations and actions of Venetians present during conflicts like the 
defence of Constantinople or the crusades of Nicopolis and Varna. Barbaro’s diary itself has not 
received much investigation to this end yet provides a great resource of why the Venetians within 
the city and aboard the ships stayed to fight and can be used to counter the view of the Venetians as 
uncaring merchantmen who sought profit over all else.  
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 There is one other Venetian source for the fall of Constantinople that can provide insight 
into not just the siege and its defence but also the Venetian position, opinion, and actions 
concerning the siege and the defence of the city. The account of Languschi is of immediate concern 
as it has not received much attention yet. The text was found buried within Zorzi Dolfin’s text. 
Melville-Jones who has translated and collected many of these sources recognized that the 
Languschi text lies within Dolfin’s account but does not provide translation or analysis of the text 
itself.324 To Melville-Jones, the Dolfin account is ‘the least original’ with much of the narrative being 
a reproduction, with some inaccuracies, of Leonard of Chios.325 It is difficult to decipher where 
Languschi ends after he is introduced by Dolfin and it is unclear as to how much of the source is 
Dolfin and how much is Languschi. Furthermore, the text ascribed to Languschi may or may not itself 
be a collection of first-hand accounts and not the experiences and words of Languschi.326 Languschi 
certainly uses Leonard of Chios’ letter as well as the writing of Cardinal Isidore of Kiev and Filippo da 
Rimini. However, there are certain points across his account that do not coincide with any of these 
sources. Philippides posits that some of this information comes from the lost reports of Alvise Diedo 
to the Venetian Senate upon his return to Venice following the fall of Constantinople.327 
Aside from the Venetian sources there are a few other first-hand accounts that recall the 
events and mention the Venetian involvement. The first is the Florentine Giacomo Tedaldi’s text 
which is short and overall not seen as an overly useful source. The text is useful for corroborating the 
accounts of other sources where they overlap. Melville-Jones records that there are several versions 
that have survived but comparison between them and internal evidence shows that none of them 
reproduces Tedaldi’s own words.328 Little to nothing is known of Tedaldi himself apart from the fact 
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he was among the survivors that was able to escape the fall of Constantinople and arrived in 
Negropont where he gave his own account.  
Another non-Venetian source that discusses at length the involvement of the Venetians is 
the Genoese born Leonard of Chios, the Latin archbishop of Mytilene, who wrote a letter to Pope 
Nicholas V (1447-1455). The account was finished by 16 August, 1453 with the events of the siege 
fresh in the archbishop’s mind.329 Leonard was in the city to aid Cardinal Isidore of Kiev, Cardinal of 
Russia, in bringing about the unification of the Greek and Roman churches and much of his concerns 
were in that direction. It is unknown if he knew and had befriended Cardinal Isidore before this 
period or if he met the Cardinal as the latter travelled to Constantinople and stopped at Chios where 
Leonard was.330 He is recorded by Barbaro as being present for at least some of the meetings 
between the Venetians and the nobility of the city concerning the actions of the fleet and whether 
or not the Venetian ships would leave the city or stay and defend. His text is an important source for 
the military disposition of both sides of the conflict but he is also inclined to underplay the 
importance of the Greeks, many of whom still opposed the union of the Greek and Roman churches. 
Furthermore, it is largely recognized by modern historians that Leonard’s letter forms the anchor of 
more contemporary accounts than any other source. Pseudo-Sphrantzes, Languschi-Dolfin, and the 
unknown author of the Ignatus are all well-known copyists of Leonard’s work.331 The popularity of 
his text likely comes from its early translation into Italian and its merit as a source of information and 
news at the time. His letter to the pope was preceded by letters from Crete and others that were 
disregarded. Leonard’s letter provided a concise and detailed and trustworthy account of the 
events.332  
There is also a major Greek work that discusses the Venetian involvement in the defence of 
Constantinople, Doukas. His writing has survived in both Italian and Greek; however, there is some 
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debate over how useful and worthy of study his text is. Miller believes that Doukas is an important 
source for the siege of Constantinople due to Doukas’ truthfulness and clarity of speech and his 
status as an eyewitness.333 Melville-Jones on the other hand does not see the merits of the work as it 
was written many years after the events after others had recorded the events; however, he does 
give credit to Doukas’ ability to portray characters in the narrative and setting dramatic scenes even 
if he doubts the works importance to historical study.334 Doukas is a very religiously charged writer 
who despises the Turks. He openly praises the death of Murad II and calls Mehmed II the pupil of 
Satan.335 He viewed the Turks as a divine punishment on the Christians by god and each Turkish 
victory is treated as a divine mandate.  
Furthermore, there are two other sources for the fall of Constantinople; Chalkokondyles and 
Kritovoulos. Both authors were Greeks and record in their accounts the fall of Constantinople; 
however, neither provides accounts of the Venetians in the defence of the city. When discussing 
outside assistance they talk about ‘Italian’ aid but not specifically Venetian. Chalkokondyles 
mentions the Venetians twice in his account of the siege. He mentions that many of the Greeks fled 
to the harbour to board the Venetian and Greek ships there to escape the city after the Turks had 
breached the city walls. Later the Venetians reappear in his account as prisoners of the Turks and 
states that the ‘governor of the Venetians was brought before the sultan and executed.’336 
Kritovoulos on the other hand mentions that there were six Venetian ships but that they had not 
come for war.337 The Venetians receive no other attention from these sources, despite the fact they 
do feature later in both works.  
4.3 The Venetian State Response 
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Historians that study the fall of Constantinople often examine the reason the city was unable to hold 
out against the Ottoman forces. A common conclusion is that the city did not receive the help it 
needed to survive from the West.338 This arises largely from the sources of the period that essentially 
say the same thing; that without outside help from the West Constantinople will fall.339 Few are 
blamed more for their lack of response to the Byzantine calls for aid than the Venetians; whom it 
seems modern historians expect to have come rushing to the aid of the beleaguered city and 
provided further defence. It is a seemingly common belief that the Venetian government did not 
care at all for the fate of the city and were half-hearted in providing any aid. However, as will be 
shown here, the Senate continued to act in the best manner it could determine in order to provide 
aid for the city which they expected to hold out for longer than it did. When Venice received 
Constantine’s ambassador in February 1452 it was likely unthinkable that the city of Constantinople 
would fall in just over a year later. During that year the Senate would send aid via supplies in order 
to aid the city as well as treat with various parties of Western Europe to encourage others to march 
in defence of the city. Before the year was out, Venice would send two groups of ships to 
Constantinople, which would arrive in the vicinity of Negroponte just as the survivors of the siege 
arrived from the fallen city.   
4.3.1 Diplomatic Measures taken by the Venetian Senate  
 On 14 February 1452, an ambassador arrived in Venice from the court of the Byzantine 
Emperor, Constantine XI Palaiologos (1449-1453), who spoke before the Senate informing them that 
the Ottomans had truly invested in the city and there remained little doubt that they planned on 
sieging it and taking it for good. The Senate responded that they sympathized with the plight of the 
Byzantines and offered to assist the city if the ambassador would travel onwards to the Florentines 
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and to the Papal Court. They expressed a desire to help but would be able to provide more 
assistance if other powers were able to lend aid as well.340 Further they agreed to sell the 
gunpowder and armour for the price they discussed.341 This last clause may seem disingenuous to 
promise aid but then demand payment for supplies provided but as has always been true the 
Venetians were businessmen and merchants. The cost of producing and transporting the supplies 
the Venetians had that could aid Constantinople was not insignificant and they required 
compensation for their efforts. The Venetians had at that time a commercial treaty with Mehmed 
that had been renewed as recently as 1451.342 This did not protect them fully from attacks by the 
Ottomans, however, and any supplies delivered to the city could be seen as a threat and could lead 
to the loss of men, ships, and the supplies. Furthermore, the request of the Senate for further aid to 
be found was not a new nor uncommon request. As has been discussed in previous chapters the 
Venetian state was not large or populous. Their small size limited their total prospects in terms of 
manpower and the provision of supplies, instead they relied heavily on mercenaries for fighting and 
provision through trade and mercantile dealings. Any aid they could provide would amount to a not 
insignificant portion of their available resources and if other states could provide aid as well that 
would mean a smaller drain on the Venetian state. Therefore, this request for the ambassador to 
work and plead with others was not a sign of half-heartedness on behalf of the Senate but a 
recognition of the limitations of the Venetian state and the necessity that if the Ottomans had fully 
invested in the city more aid was required that simply what the Venetians could provide. The Senate 
however was not idle in seeking aid for the city of Constantinople either; although they had sent the 
Byzantine ambassador onwards to other Western states to plead for aid the Senate began to discuss 
and send out their own messengers and ambassadors to seek aid for the city, a task that was neither 
asked nor required of them. On 30 August 1452 the Senate gave Barbo Morosini, the ambassador to 
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Naples, a mission to meet with the king of Aragon and Naples, Alfonso V .343 Barbo was ordered to 
communicate the most up to date news from Constantinople, particularly the letters from July 16.344 
Morosini was then meant to impress upon the king that there was no longer any doubt what 
Mehmet’s plans were and that if nothing was done he would seize the city. He should then tell of the 
preparations to lend aid that were taking place in Venice and solicit the support of the king and his 
sizable naval forces. As preparations progressed in 1453 and Venice prepared its fleet to set sail 
towards Constantinople further diplomats were sent out to Pope Nicholas V, Holy Roman Emperor 
Frederick III, King Alfonso V of Aragon and Naples, and the King of Hungary Ladislas V, who had taken 
the throne on February 14 of that year, ending the regency of John Hunyadi who had held the 
position since the death of the previous king in 1444.345 These various leaders were informed of the 
preparations that Venice continued to make346 and they were informed that despite Venice’s 
preparations if the west did not act as well, then Constantinople would surely fall. Lastly, the day 
after the commission of Giacomo Loredan as Captain General of the Sea,347 on 7 May 1453, the 
Senate chose Bartolomeo Marcello as ambassador to Mehmed II.348 His commission ordered him to 
board Loredan’s ships and travel to a Greek port, or Constantinople if Loredan was able to reach the 
city. While Loredan began preparations for the defence of Constantinople, Marcell was ordered to 
travel to Mehmed and inform him of the peaceful intention of the Venetians and attempt to bring 
about peace between the Ottomans and the Byzantines. If questioned the fleet was there solely for 
the protection of Venetian trade and their interests within the city. Once he had treated with 
Mehmed, Marcello should then return to the city and attempt to bring about the peace with 
Constantine if the terms offered by the Sultan were deemed acceptable.  
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 These plans by the Senate show that the Venetians did not sit idly by while the city of 
Constantinople was assaulted as the common narrative suggests. The Senate did debate how best to 
proceed but also recognized the limitations of their own state. Therefore, as was common of 
Venetian diplomacy, they sought outside aid before they promised any of their own assistance. This 
was their modus operandi when it came to diplomatic issues surrounding combatting enemies of 
Christendom and not just enemies of their own state. When approached requesting their 
participation in the crusades of Nicopolis and Varna, the Venetians had responded very similarly 
claiming they would provide assistance if other states were involved, while making their own 
preparations in the meantime. This was not a sign of half-heartedness or uncertainty but a 
recognition that Venice alone could not provide the required assistance. Furthermore, they actively 
sought out and attempted to push for aid from other western powers, from Pope Nicholas V to the 
Holy Roman Emperor. This was not a necessary step for the Senate to take. Ambassadors were 
chosen to spread the word of the beleaguered Byzantine state and the threat that further Ottoman 
expansion posed and requested aid, while at the same time as we shall see began to prepare their 
own ships and men to travel to aid in the defence of the city of Constantinople. No one expected the 
city to fall quite so quickly. 
4.3.2 Physical Response of the Venetian Senate  
 Beyond the diplomatic attempts of the Senate in searching for others that could help aid the 
city, the Venetians did, if slowly, send their own aid towards the city. This began at first as ships 
meant to protect their own investments and the trade vessels. In August 1452 the Senate passed a 
measure that would send two light ships to travel to Negropont as reports arrived in Venice that 
travel in the area was increasingly dangerous. These ships would be under the command of Gabriele 
Trevisan, the vice-captain of the Gulf, and would work with the bailo of Negroponte to decide how 
best to proceed based on the situation and the positioning and disposition of the Ottoman fleet.349 
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This decision passed 74 to 7 after the provision that claimed the ships would travel to 
Constantinople and defend the city was removed. Understandably the removal of this clause is 
understood to be a hesitation to protect the city and disrupt the status quo. However, this was not 
the first time the city was under threat from the Ottomans or other outside attackers and had 
previously held out against sieges; therefore the immediacy of the threat was likely not of great 
concern in the fall of 1452. Furthermore, the Senate may have considered that two small ships 
armed to provide protection of trade convoys would not have provided much in the way of aid for 
the defence of the city. If the ships were able to ensure the safety of their trade fleet and return 
while Venice prepared a larger force, which they did begin to do, then Venice would be able to gain 
further information about the events transpiring in the East and send their relief when it was ready.  
Over the course of the winter of 1452 and with the collection of reports and hopes of further aid 
from other western powers the Senate began to ensure that preparations were made to aid 
Constantinople. In February 1453 the Senate, having received reports from some of their Romanian 
trade ships which made clear the peril that Constantinople was in, decided to arm two large 
transport ships each mounted with 400 troops. These ships should have a capacity of 500 botte and 
travel with 15 galleys. The captain that would be elected to command this fleet would have a salary 
set at a fixed level of 80 ducats per month.350 This was followed by a program to ensure that the 
preparations were made and paid for in a timely manner. It was decided with a vote 143 to 10 with 1 
abstention that merchants who had a stake in the Romanian and Black Sea trade routes would split 
the outstanding cost of arming the vessels amongst themselves.351 This was calculated at 16,000 
ducats. Furthermore, grain should be sent to Corfu and Negropont for the preparation of 2000 
biscuits and the anticipation of 2000 more for the men of these galleys. Finally, the decision was 
made for Crete to provide a further two galleys to be sent to Negropont under the command of 
Zaccaria Grioni, who had been to Constantinople and knew the situation there best. Between March 
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and April 1453, it was recognized that Venice’s preparations needed to be completed faster in order 
to reach the city in time to aid in its defence and fines were put in place for those who had not yet 
paid for the fleet’s preparations.352 Additionally, in preparation for the arrival of the main fleet the 
Senate decided on 13 April 1453 that Alvise Longo, patron of the armed vessels for the defence of 
Constantinople, should lead two ships to Negropont and Tenedos to gather information about the 
events transpiring at Constantinople and await the main fleet. Once the fleet arrived he was to join 
the fleet under the control of its commander and provide information and suggest how the fleet 
should proceed in the defence of the city.353 Longo was further ordered to work with the bailos of 
Negropont and Tenedos and to protect the city of Constantinople but is ordered to directly avoid 
fighting within the straits itself. Finally, on 7 May 1453 the Senate commissioned Giacomo Loredan 
as Captain General of the Sea and commander of the fleet that would be sent to defend 
Constantinople.354 His commission laid out the orders from the Senate as to how Loredan should 
proceed with the defence of the city. He was first to collect the remaining galleys from Corfu and 
Crete as well as the biscuit that had been prepared for the fleet at Negropont before sailing on to 
Tenedos. Once he had reached Tenedos, Loredan was instructed to sail straight to Constantinople 
and avoid conflict with the Ottoman fleet within the straits. If Emperor Constantine had made peace 
with Mehmed the fleet should return to Corfu leaving a galley at Modon to cross to the Cape of 
Malea, otherwise the fleet should place itself at the whim of the emperor and fight to defend the 
city. Loredan was told to inform the emperor that Venice had not hesitated to slow its efforts in 
Lombardy in order to aid his city. These orders are similar to those that we have which were given to 
previous commanders during the Crusades of Nicopolis and Varna and contain similar limitations on 
attacking parties outside the main conflict the fleet was prepared for, in this case warning Loredan 
not to attack Catalan pirates. The clause informing the emperor of Venice’s lack of hesitation in 
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coming to his aid was also typical of Venetian aid. They saw their reputation and image as an 
important tool and would use their image in trade and diplomacy, therefore it needed to be pointed 
out publicly when Venice answered the call to aid to show its support and therefore mark a reliable 
count of due that Venice could then use for later diplomacy.  
 Loredan’s fleet unfortunately did not arrive in time to assist in the defence of 
Constantinople. The city fell to Mehmed II and his army on 29 May 1453. In the aftermath of the fall 
many Venetians, Greeks, Genoese and others fled the city by any means possible and began making 
their way to safer ports. Many of the Venetian survivors travelled to Negropont as it was the 
nearest, largest Venetian enclave that was deemed safe. From the Venetian sources we learn that 
Loredan’s fleet arrived the day after many of the refugees did.355 In the margins of Nicolò Barbaro’s 
work, Marco Barbaro comments that the Senate ‘would not believe that the Turks could bring a fleet 
against Constantinople. They decided, however, to arm fifteen galleys and two ships… but did not 
begin to send them until they knew that the Turks had begun the siege’.356 This remark carries some 
amount of scathing but does indicate that the Senate did consider the defence of Constantinople to 
be important. They, within a year of receiving word from the Emperor that the Turks had invested in 
the city and that the Sultan’s intentions were clear, worked to raise awareness of the plight in the 
west and armed and prepared a fleet, comparable in size to the fleets that Venice had armed and 
sent to participate in crusades, to come to the aid of Constantinople. Was their reaction too slow? 
That is a question that can never be truly answered. However, what is clear is that the Venetian 
Senate did deem the city important and did act in order to save the city even if they were too late. 
The Senate was decisive, made clear judgements on how to proceed, and even raised heavy 
penalties against those of their own state who hindered the preparations of the fleet. These are far 
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from the acts of an indifferent state. The Venetian people, as we shall now discuss, viewed the city 
as an important location not just for their own purposes but an important ally and brother under 
God and it was their Christian duty to aid their brothers in faith in their desperate fight against the 
Turks.   
4.4: Barbaro’s Account and the Reaction of Individual Venetians 
The diary of Nicolò Barbaro is the most complete and detailed eye witness account of the siege of 
Constantinople in 1453. Many historians rely on his day by day telling of the events that happened 
both within the city and in the Ottoman camps surrounding it. However, while its use as a record of 
the siege is undeniable there has been very little study into what Barbaro tells us about the attitudes 
and motivations of the Venetians that remained within the city. Many historians point to the slow 
and half-hearted attempts of the Venetian Signoria as evidence of an unwillingness to fight for the 
defence of Constantinople or defend Christendom from the aggression of the Ottoman Turks. 
However, Barbaro, whose bias for his fellow countrymen can be problematic when investigating the 
activities of the Greeks and the Genoese, focuses heavily on the actions and opinions of the 
Venetians who were on the ground fighting to defend the city of Constantinople. He recorded their 
thoughts and ideas when discussing whether or not they should defend the city, their planned 
responses to the threat of the Ottomans and what they would do should the Signoria send orders to 
them, and he also recorded at least his own view if not the typical Venetian view of the Ottoman 
Turks. These records are unique in the study of Venetian conflict with the Ottomans providing a 
solely Venetian perspective that is lacking for the Nicopolis and Varna crusades and shows a deeper 
insight into how the typical Venetian not making decisions in the Senate viewed the situation.  
4.4.1 Venetian thoughts on defending the city:  
 According to Barbaro, the Venetians began arriving from around the Black Sea area from 
February 1452. The first to arrive were the ships from Tana led under the guard of Gabriele 
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Trevisan’s two light galleys that had been sent from the Senate to protect the trade galleys.357 On 10 
November Girolamo Morosini was able to slip through the Turkish toll blockade after taking fire from 
the Turkish garrison at Rumeli Hisar.358 Two weeks later, another galley commanded by Antonio 
Rizzo was not so lucky and was sent to the bottom by a direct hit. Although the captain and crew 
managed to make it ashore, they we all executed.359 Later between 2 and 4 December galleys from 
Trebizond arrive under the command of Jacomo Coco the elder.360 The crews of these ships would 
join with the Venetians already living within Constantinople under the bailo of the city Girolamo 
(Jeruolemo) Minotto. On 13 December Barbaro tells of a celebration of Union between the Catholic 
and the Orthodox Churches that was held at Church of Saint Sophia under the guidance of Cardinal 
Isidore of Russia. It is during this celebration that the Greek nobility first begin the discussion that 
the Venetian ships should remain within the city to help them against the Turkish forces.361 The 
following evening a meeting was held on the Venetian ships in the harbour between the Cardinal 
Leonard, Bishop of Mytilene, the Venetian captains and merchants, and several members of the 
Greek nobility with the purpose of discussing whether or not the fleet should stay and fight or leave. 
According to Barbaro, Cardinal Isidore began the meeting by pleading for the ships to remain in the 
city and help hold the city.362 The Minotto then spoke agreeing with the Cardinal and pleading ‘for 
the love of God, the honour of the Christian faith, and the honour of the Signoria of Venice’ the ships 
should remain and help Constantinople. However, Trevisan responded that he had been specifically 
instructed by the Senate that he is to retrieve the Black Sea trade galleys and escort them homeward 
and was ordered not to remain in the area for more than ten days.363 It is clear that there was some 
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division between the members of the ships and those Venetians living within the city. Those within 
the city likely agreed with the bailo Minotto. Their livelihood relied on the city of Constantinople, 
they had friends and family within the city and all of their businesses and fortunes lay within the 
walls of the Greek capital. Furthermore, as Minotto pressed, it was for the honour not just of Venice 
but of Christianity and the love of God that the Venetians remain within the city. Those Venetians on 
the ships did not have the same connections as those in the city; however, there was still the call to 
defend Constantinople for their faith and to protect their fellow Christian brethren as well as fellow 
Venetians. Trevisan’s only response to the pleas to stay are that he had been ordered to leave but 
not that he does not want to stay and assist. Though as many of Barbaro’s speakers point out it is 
believed that the Senate would agree that the ships should stay and help defend. This division would 
lead to a number of Venetians escaping the city aboard ships later. Following this initial meeting 
Minotto and many of the merchants and other Venetians then held a Council in the Church of San 
Marco to decide what should be done. It is agreed in a vote 21 for to 1 against that the ships should 
remain in Constantinople and the men should aid in its defence.364 The Venetian merchants within 
the city feared that the fine alone would not be enough to keep some of the captains from just 
accepting the fine and fleeing the city anyway and came together to write a letter condemning such 
cowardly acts.365 Once the decision had been made to stay, the Council of Twelve, who became the 
leaders of the Venetians within the city for the duration of the siege, elected Zuan Diusiagi to travel 
to Venice with letters from the bailo, the merchants, and from Diedo. These letters informed the 
Senate that unless they sent a reply instructing the defenders otherwise, the Venetians and their 
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ships would remain within Constantinople.366 Once it was decided that the Venetians would stay 
they began to make themselves useful in the defence of the city, lending aid in constructing 
defences, protecting parts of the walls, providing aid with their ships and council in plans of attack 
and defence. By January 1453 the Venetians were becoming tired of the mistrust placed on them by 
some of the Greeks and the bailo spoke to the Emperor about this. He requested that the emperor 
must stop treating Venetians like captives and allow for the loading and unloading of their ships as 
they pleased. This sparked debate between the Emperor and the Venetians with the Emperor 
claiming that the only thing preventing the Venetians from fleeing the city and abandoning him to 
the Turks was that their goods were not aboard their ships. Barbaro records much of the debate but 
the Emperor eventually relents and allows for the loading and unloading of the ships after the 
Venetians swear oaths not to abandon the city to the Turks.367 It seems that the Venetians, as 
represented by Barbaro, were willing to fight and to help defend the city. They had committed 
themselves to fight and would risk everything to protect their fellow Christians. This of course does 
not apply to all those that were there as there were a number of them that did flee the city. In in 
particular, Piero Davanzo, fled the city aboard his ships and was followed by six ships from Candia 
taking around 700 people with them. This betrayal must have really bothered Barbaro who is 
notorious for his dislike of the Genoese as Davanzo’s cowardice is countered earlier that same day 
by the arrival of Giovanni Guistiniani, the renowned Genoese captain to whom the Emperor gave 
control over the entire land defences.368  
 There are however several sources that would contradict Barbaro’s overly generous version 
of the Venetian participation in the defence of Constantinople. Whereas Barbaro claims that they 
stayed to defend the city for the good of all Christianity and because it was the right thing to do both 
Doukas and Leonard of Chios give contrasting accounts of the purpose the Venetians played. Doukas 
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claims that the Venetians stayed not for the good of all but because the Venetians within the city 
and the Emperor would not allow them to continue.369 This is not entirely a contradiction to what 
Barbaro claims. The meeting between the merchants and Venetians that is held within the Church of 
San Marco do discuss whether or not to allow the ships to continue. The merchants themselves even 
write a letter in an attempt to ensure the ships would not leave. All of this is recorded within the 
diary of Barbaro. However, Leonard of Chios claims that the Venetians were not forced to stay or 
chose to stay, instead he claims they were paid a large sum of money by the Emperor to stay and 
defend the city.370 This is a very damning claim as to why the Venetians remained in the city. It 
completely counters Barbaro’s point of view that the Venetians stayed for the good of all. However, 
Leonard’s claims could be a misunderstanding of the deal made between the Venetians and the 
Emperor that is also recorded by Barbaro in which the Emperor would provide a salary and food for 
the crews of the ships. It is unclear; however if the Venetians did stay for money it is a complete 
contradiction to why Barbaro claims they remained.  
4.4.2 Venetian Actions in Defence of the City:  
 Nicolò Barbaro’s diary of the siege tells of numerous instances throughout his account of the 
Venetians within the city and their actions to defend it. Although Barbaro was biased in his overly 
high opinion of his fellow countrymen, especially when compared to the Greeks and Genoese,371 his 
records do show that the Venetians were dedicated to protecting the city, they were willing to do 
their part, and contrary to what some would believe were unafraid to display themselves as allies to 
the Greeks. Early on in the siege Emperor Constantine approached the Venetians requesting their 
aid in bolstering the defences of the city and guarding areas of the wall.372 He first approached the 
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captain of the galley from Tana who agreed ‘for the honour of God and the Christian faith’ to aid the 
emperor. The Venetians then began preparing defensive ditches and ensuring the walls of the city 
were well defended and strong enough to repel the attacks of the Turks. Each captain and his men 
took up positions in the Chinigo (Blachernae) area and according to Barbaro did it for the love of 
God. Once they had taken control over the area they were charged with defending, the nobles of 
Venice approached the emperor and requested that he ensure the safety of the four gates and their 
keys to them.373 The emperor agreed and the Venetians held a section of the walls themselves. 
While these were not the most important places nor the locations most attacked by the Turks, those 
were instead given to the command of Giovanni Guistiniani, they still required protection and the 
Venetians willingly provided it. Once the siege had begun in earnest the Venetians participated and, 
according to Barbaro, the emperor requested that they parade before the walls to show the Turks 
that strong and united people defended the city against them.374 While Barbaro does not give a 
detailed image of this event, simply stating that the Venetians left their ships and were well armed 
and orderly, it is likely that the Venetians, being a proud people, would have brought out their 
standards and the decorations of their heritage which would have been on display for all to see.375 
Unlike some of the other conflicts discussed in this thesis, in which the Venetians attempted to keep 
a veneer of neutrality this parade would have been a clear sign that the Venetians were not hiding 
behind their treaty. Instead, this was a clear declaration that the Venetians were fighting to defend 
the city against the Turkish attackers.  
The Venetians did not solely provide manpower to ensure the safety of the walls of 
Constantinople, they were also largely in charge of defending the city from the sea. Although the 
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chain had been raised across the harbour from the city to Pera, the Turkish fleet was still a threat to 
the city. This was particularly true after the Ottomans had portaged their ships overland and into the 
waters behind the chain. The Council of Twelve met 23 April 1453 to determine how best to deal 
with the Turkish ships and since the Venetian ships outnumbered those of the Greeks and Genoese 
it was left to them to counter the Turks. A plan to attack during the day was originally proposed but 
was voted down in favour of Jacomo Coco’s, master of the galley from Trebizond, plan to burn the 
ships in the night.376 On the 24th Coco took two ships of around 500 botte and prepared them with 
extra protection of wool and cotton to protect them from cannon fire. That night the captains met to 
discuss the best time to launch the attack but, according to Barbaro, were persuaded by the 
Genoese from Pera to wait at least a day so that they could join in the attack. The Venetians agreed, 
but, according to Barbaro, were betrayed the next morning by the Genoese who sent a messenger 
from Pera to the Turks warning them of the plan.377 On the night of 28 April the Venetians finally 
enacted their plan. However, as they approached the enemy, Coco broke the line and attacked 
‘seeking greater glory’ and his ship was sunk.378 The other ships pressed the attack but without 
Coco’s ship to aid them were forced to turn back without inflicting much damage to the Turkish 
fleet.379 Shortly after Diedo chose Dolfin as Coco’s replacement and assigned him as the captain of 
Coco’s ship.380 Though to his credit Dolfin continued to man his place on the walls after receiving this 
great honour. Later, on 10 May in an attempt to ensure that any future plans that required the fleet 
were carried out with greater unity and success Diedo was elected by the Council of Twelve as 
captain general of the fleet giving him full control over all the ships at their disposal.  
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The Venetians had decided to protect the city of Constantinople and stuck by their decision. 
They helped bolster the defences of the city, they repaired walls in the brief pauses of the constant 
day and night bombardments by the Turkish cannon, they fought and died on the walls and on their 
ships and only after the city had been breached and defeat certain did many of them flee aboard 
their ships, often taking as many people with them as they could safely aid.381 Barbaro records lists 
of those Venetians of note that were killed, captured, and ransomed by the Turks in the ensuing 
months after the defeat. The bailo of the city Girolamo Minotto and his sons were brought before 
the Sultan and were executed for their role in defending the city against the Ottoman assault. The 
city served as a home to many Venetians who lived and worked within the quarter that had been 
created there, defending the city meant defending Venice and of all Christendom.  
4.4.3 The Language of Barbaro and the Venetian Opinion of the Ottomans:  
 The defence of Constantinople was not a proclaimed crusade and as such did not receive the 
same indulgences nor the support of the papal bureaucracy to raise funds and awareness of the 
need for Christians to mobilize in defence of the city. However, the language of Barbaro indicates 
that the Venetians, whom while some argue were unwilling participants of crusading actions, were 
actually dedicated to the protection of Christendom. Venice and Venetian men participated in many 
crusading campaigns dating back to the 1090s and the very first crusade. Though plagued by their 
reputation of desiring little aside from greater wealth and power and a general distrust in their 
motives and actions accounts like that of Barbaro show that the average Venetian could still be 
relied upon to do what he thought was his duty not just to Venice but to all of who shared his faith 
and beliefs. This is especially interesting as it shows that the Venetians who were at Constantinople 
in the 1450s and who fought against the Ottomans were not simply fighting for some reward or for 
                                                          
381 Tedaldi in Melville-Jones, Siege of Constantinople, p. 8: Claims that the Venetians waited until midday after 
the city walls had been breached before fleeing the city aiding all those that were trying to flee the Turkish 
attackers who were looting and pillaging.  
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some benefit or gain for the Venetian State, the Venetians were fighting because it was the right 
thing to do and in defence of Christendom and their brothers in faith against a heathen enemy. 
Throughout this chapter I have highlighted when Barbaro states when the Venetians took 
action for the love or honour of God and Jesus Christ. This continues throughout much of the text 
and he also attributes the successes of the Venetians and other Christians to the provenance of 
faith. God is praised highly when on 18 April the Turks attacked en masse and the defenders were 
unharmed despite killing over 200 Turks. Furthermore, Barbaro alludes to the impending loss of the 
city when he praises the ‘Eternal Lord’ for protecting the city and ‘not allowing a great scandal at this 
time’.382 And a few days later on the 20th when four Genoese ships sailed up the Dardanelles and 
were set upon by the Turkish fleet Barbaro again praises the ‘Eternal Lord’ who heard the prayers of 
those in the city and led the Christians to victory. Once more God intervened on behalf of the 
defenders and protected them from the heathens. It is clear that to Barbaro this fight was a religious 
struggle defending a bastion of Christianity in the east against Muslim aggression into Europe.   
Barbaro’s stance on this conflict as a war between Christianity and the heathens becomes 
even clearer when he discusses the Ottoman Turks. When the Janissaries attacked the walls in waves 
and were slaughtered by the defenders, Barbaro refers to their charges and attacks as if they were 
‘not afraid of death but they came on like wild beasts’.383 When the Turks came to collect their dead 
around the walls Barbaro then compares them to swine.384 These references to beasts and 
comparing them to swine some of the derogatory claims that are typical of many accounts like 
Barbaro’s. It is unknown how much Barbaro understood of the Islamic faith and teachings but his 
comparison to pigs may have been a further slander based on the Quran’s ban on the consumption 
of pork. In his description of the April 18 victory the defenders won a great victory against the 
‘heathen’ to their ‘great shame’.385 And during the sea battle fighting for the fate of the four 
                                                          
382 Barbaro, Diary, p. 32 
383 Barbaro, Diary, p. 32 
384 Barbaro, Diary, p. 32 ‘carrying them on their shoulders as one would a pig’  
385 Barbaro, Diary, p. 32 
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Genoese ships the ‘enemy of the Christian faith’ are attacking the ships.386 Furthermore, Barbaro’s 
description of the Sultan Mehmed are also full of derogatory phrases. He is described as ‘man 
possessed and full of evil thoughts’ after his admiral fails to stop the ships on 20 April.387 When the 
Ottomans plan to portage their ships to reach the waters behind the chain that blocked the harbour 
Barbaro calls the Sultan ‘an evil pagan’ and a ‘dog’ who devised ‘the evil plan’.388 Barbaro reduces 
the Ottoman Turks to an enemy that is less than themselves and marks them as evil and pagan or 
heathen. It is not a stretch to believe that this was a commonly held opinion by the Venetians and 
that he was not the only Venetian who viewed this conflict as a religious struggle and a matter of 
faith. Unfortunately, the lack of Venetian accounts of other campaigns makes comparison difficult to 
see how Barbaro’s writing measures up to Venetian accounts of crusades and other religious 
conflicts that the Venetians faced. However, this account does lend aid to the idea that the 
Venetians, while commonly seen as businessmen, merchants, and bankers who cared little for 
anything except how to expand their fortunes and investments were in fact willing to lay down their 
lives and fight to defend their faith against its enemies when fighting on the front lines. Many 
studies only take into account the archival material of the bureaucratic state of Venice but the work 
of Barbaro hints of a deeper and more complex truth to the Venetian state and their opinion of 
religious conflict against the Turks in the fifteenth century.  
4.5 Conclusion:  
Venetian participation in the defence of Constantinople is undeniable. The ships that were caught up 
in the conflict decided to stay and help their fellow countrymen and their fellow Christian brethren 
defend the city against the Muslim aggression despite the fact that they had orders from the 
Venetian Senate to return home and despite the treaty, and symbolic peace it represented, between 
the Venetian state and the Ottomans. Venetians fought and died and were captured and executed 
                                                          
386 Barbaro, Diary, p. 35  
387 Barbaro, Diary, p. 35 
388 Barbaro, Diary, p. 37: 22 April 1453 
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for their role in defending the city. The Venetian sources are clear, they did not fight to gain lost 
territory or better trade agreements or an increase to profit. Instead they fought because they 
believed it was the proper thing to do. For its part the Venetian Senate worked to provide aid to the 
beleaguered city. They sought to spread word of the plight of the Greeks and the need for a reaction 
by the West and they prepared a fleet to come to the rescue. The Venetians themselves passed 
recorded their own actions, ideas, and opinions in their own accounts for the fall of Constantinople. 
These documents are a treasure trove of information for how the Venetians saw their actions and 
the events unfolding around them. Barbaro’s diary and the accounts presented by other Venetians 
provide a unique insight into the Venetian viewpoint of the conflict with the Ottomans. The defence 
of Constantinople was not a crusade, it was not given the attention and the indulgences from the 
Pope and Venice was provided no promise of immediate or even potential gain for coming to the 
rescue of the city. Unlike the Crusade of Varna which offered the potential of retaking the lost city of 
Thessaloniki, the defence of Constantinople promised no such rewards. Instead Venice and its 
citizenry acted out of the interest of Christianity and for the defence of a city important not just to 
them but to the survival of the Byzantine Empire and Christian Europe. It is not a stretch to think 
that had records from Venetians survived from earlier conflicts examined here in this thesis they 
might show a similar dedication and importance placed not just on the gains of the state but also on 
the importance of the wider Christian community and more altruistic reasons for joining with these 
campaigns. The Venetian state was never shy to demand compensation for its involvement and did 
often seek to gain whatever it could through tough diplomacy and hard bargaining; however, as a 
small state limited by its meagre and separated lands and reliance on trade and shipping for much of 
its income and survival these acts of diplomacy were necessary for the survival of the state. Without 
the discovery of new source material from Venetian hands it will forever remain debated whether or 
not the Venetians were as willing and dedicated to the earlier campaigns as they were to the 
defence of Constantinople, but it can be shown through the works of Barbaro and others that the 
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Venetians fought and died to protect the city of Constantinople and were not simply fighting for 
personal gain.    
Chapter 5: Conclusions  
The participation of Venice in the later middle ages has been a topic that many historians have 
skirted around and failed to interact with directly. Venetian historians fail to focus on their role in 
the crusades due to a focus on the growth and development of the city of Venice itself and the 
social, political, artistic, and cultural expansion of the city. Their focus on trade and the expansion of 
the overseas empire that Venice developed, such as the case of F. C. Lane in his large work on the 
city of Venice, is the focus of a few chapters or small sections. The crusades, if featured at all, are 
given simplistic summaries with little in the way of analysis as to why Venice participated in these 
actions or what Venice contributed to the campaign. Conversely historians that focus on the 
crusades of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries do not take the Venetian contributions seriously 
and fail to provide in-depth analysis or research into them. Venice’s contributions are seen as 
‘typical’ of the minor state or ‘minimal’ to the point of being negligible. Much of this negligence is 
born from a bias that has persisted throughout the historiography of the study of Venetians as 
crusaders. They are seen as half-hearted crusaders that desired simply to expand their territory and 
gain further wealth and power, not to fight for the defence of Christendom. Furthermore, Venice’s 
inability to field large numbers of troops or knights is another detractor for many traditional crusade 
historians who focus mostly on the military campaigning and battles between standing armies of 
men. This is a disingenuous treatment of the Venetian contribution to the crusades. As this thesis 
has worked to show, the Venetians were able to provide and participate in these crusades and the 
other anti-Ottoman actions of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Venice provided naval 
support, food, weapons and armour to the armies and cities that were the goals of these crusades. 
Their involvement was heavily sought out by the other contemporary crusaders. In the case of 
Nicopolis the campaign was delayed by a year while negotiations with the Venetians continued 
about what the commune would provide for the crusade. While during the Crusade of Varna the 
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Venetian fleet was pushed for by the papal legate Francesco Condulmer, who pushed for the fleet to 
depart as soon as possible to support the land army. Their role was not minor nor unappreciated by 
the other participants of the crusades. While often critical or even hostile towards the Venetians, 
even the Greek sources acknowledge the contributions of Venice to the defence of their lands and 
their participation in the crusades. This paper, then, set out to show that the Venetian contribution 
was not insignificant and to understand further why the Venetians participated and how their 
approach shifted between the Crusade of Nicopolis in the 1390s and the fall of Constantinople in 
1453.  
 In the case of the Crusade of Nicopolis the Venetian Senate was at its most hesitant to 
participate in the campaign proposed. The city had only a decade before brought a close the War of 
Chioggia, which they had fought, and won, against the Genoese. However, the treaty that had 
brought this war to a close also diminished Venetian control and power both overseas with the loss 
of the island of Tenedos and their Dalmatian territories, as well as at home. The city was left 
demoralized and bankrupt from the fighting both on land and at sea. When the crusade planning 
began Venice was still recovering thanks in no small part to its overseas territories. Their hesitance 
to join this crusade therefore was two-fold: first they could not risk another war so soon, and the 
threat of war with the Ottomans should the crusade fail to strike a strong enough blow may have 
been a powerful deterrent. Secondly, and tied closely to the first point was the need to defend and 
protect their overseas territories against Ottoman, and potential Genoese, reprisals. However, the 
Venetians did eventually agree to send a contingent of ships. Unfortunately there is little material 
surviving that gives an accurate account of what the Venetians accomplished with their ships during 
the actual campaign. Aside from saving King Sigismund of Hungary after the defeat of the army 
outside Nicopolis, there is no known evidence of the accomplishments of their participation. While 
Venice was hesitant to join the crusade in 1396 by the time of the Crusade of Varna in 1444 this 
hesitation had greatly reduced. They joined the Crusade of Varna at the insistence of Pope Eugenius 
IV and his nephew Cardinal Francesco Condulmer, both native Venetians. For this crusade they 
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provided not only the ships for the papal fleet, to be led by the Cardinal who was serving as papal 
legate, but they also built and outfitted a fleet of their own ships which was sent to support the land 
army marching from Hungary. While the fleet was not prepared in time to support the campaign for 
1444, they were in position in time to assist the continuation of the crusade in 1445, led on land by 
John Hunyadi, the regent of Hungary after the death of the King in 1444. This part of the campaign 
has often been ignored by historians of the Crusade of Varna who end their discussions with the 
death of the King at the Battle of Varna. This then ignores the bulk of Venetian contributions to the 
latter half of the crusade. Their participation in the crusade and their willingness to join can be 
measured by the strength that Venice had been able to rebuild since the late fourteenth century. 
They had been able to expand their overseas empire and acquire new islands and ports in the 
Aegean and southern Ionian Seas. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the Senate desired to reclaim 
the city of Thessaloniki which had been lost in 1430. They had attempted to reclaim it immediately 
after its fall but had failed. In the preparations to the Crusade of Varna they began to seek the 
potential of reclaiming the city and while on campaign the legate and the Venetian ships sailed in 
the Aegean to harass the Ottomans over the winter of 1444-5. From these examples it could seem 
that Venice only joined in the reactive and defensive anti-Ottoman actions for the sole purpose of 
their own personal gain. However, the other two studies of this thesis help to argue against that. 
Those being the occupation and defence of the city of Thessaloniki 1423-1430 and the defence of 
Constantinople in 1453. 
 While these were not crusade actions they were struggles against the Muslim Ottoman 
Turks and took on a religious connotation and a struggle of Christian versus the heathen. Venice had 
accepted the city of Thessaloniki in 1423 after significant debate. They worried over their ability to 
hold the city and the cost that might be incurred to protect it. Although it seems likely that they had 
hoped to convince the Ottomans to allow them to hold the city and pay tribute for it. It was finally 
decided that the city was better off in Venetian hands and in the hands of a Christian power than 
falling to the Muslims. Additionally, the natural defensive position of the city and its lucrative 
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harbour enticed the Venetians to acquire Thessaloniki. The Ottoman siege was already underway 
when the Venetians arrived and lasted the next seven years. The works that describe the fighting of 
the city and the continuing struggle record the religious nature of the fighting. While these texts are 
Greek and not Venetian and do not portray the Venetians in the best light, they do provide the 
feelings of the inhabitants of the city and the religious nature of the conflict. This is particularly true 
of the record of Symeon of Thessaloniki who was Archbishop during the early years of the siege 
before his death. The Venetians found themselves in a similar position twenty years after the loss of 
Thessaloniki when they participated in the defence of Constantinople in 1453. However, unlike all 
the two crusades and the defence of Thessaloniki, there still exists Venetian records of the defence, 
penned by Venetian eyewitnesses to the events that unfolded. Barbaro’s diary of the events during 
the siege of Constantinople are suitably focused and over inflated of the importance that the 
Venetians within the city held. It is clear in his writings that the Venetians were convinced of the 
need to defend their Christian brethren from the Muslim attackers. The Senate had demanded that 
the trade fleet that took refuge in the city should flee and return to Venice while they provided a 
defence fleet. This relief would be sent too late and arrive the day after the city fell. However, the 
captain decided to remain in the city. Some claim they were forced to stay and others that they were 
paid to stay but there is little evidence of this. The Venetians needed Constantinople to maintain 
their trade lanes and protect their citizens that lived within the city. So the captains decided to stay 
and fight and to protect Christendom, and thereby their interests, from the Muslims.  
 This work set out to explain the Venetian participation in the crusade of the later middle 
ages, particularly those of Nicopolis and Varna, as well as the defence of Constantinople against the 
Ottoman Turks in 1453. This subject, which has been only loosely discussed by previous historians, is 
a rich topic that still requires further investigation and exploration. This work will hopefully provide 
the basis of further investigation and study, extending the timeline both past the 1453 and the 
Venetian Ottoman wars of the later fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as well as to the earlier 
crusades prior to the 1390s. The opinion of the Venetian contribution as self-serving and linear is 
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easily disproven with some further investigation into their motives, the shifting political position of 
the lagoon based commune, and the strength and weaknesses of both Venice and their enemies.  
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